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Introduction
American leaders saw it [to be] in their self-interest to obtain British 
advice before taking major decisions. It was an extraordinary 
relationship because it rested on no legal claim; it was formalized 
by no document; it was carried forward by succeeding British 
governments as if no alternatives were conceivable. Britain’s 
influence was great precisely because it never insisted on it; the 
‘special relationship’ demonstrated the value of intangibles.
Henry Kissinger’s assessment of the US–UK ‘special relationship’1
Introduction
The above quote from Henry Kissinger, who served as US national security 
adviser (1969–75) and US secretary of  state (1973–77) under presidents 
Richard M. Nixon (1969–74) and Gerald R. Ford (1974–77), gives the impres-
sion that the US−UK special relationship functioned in a cooperative manner 
during his years in office. Moreover it suggests that British policy-makers 
could also exercise a decisive influence upon the course of  US foreign policy. 
Readers will find that a quite different picture emerges in the following chap-
ters. During the period under examination, the US−UK special relationship 
would come under severe strain. Demonstrative of  this was the fact that on 
a number of  separate occasions the most ‘special’ areas of  US−UK coopera-
tion, which related to the intelligence and nuclear aspects of  the relationship, 
were suspended at the behest of  Washington because of  wider US−UK political 
disagreements. Indeed, by the end of  1973, it appeared as if  the special rela-
tionship was at an end with both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger declaring 
it to be ‘over’.2 
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Yet, in spite of  such rhetoric, the US−UK relationship remained extremely 
resolute. The decision by Edward Heath in late 1973 to upgrade Britain’s stra-
tegic nuclear deterrent ensured US−UK nuclear cooperation would continue 
for at least another generation. Intimate cooperation between the two coun-
tries with regard to international diplomacy was also evident throughout 
the period. Similarly, the intelligence relationship between the two countries 
continued throughout the era and beyond. Thus, cooperation, as well compe-
tition, was a continual feature of  the US−UK relationship during the years 
under examination here. 
Whilst cooperation and competition are the two main features of  the 
relationship, there is, however, another key element that is largely over-
looked by scholars analysing the relationship, that being coercive diplomacy. 
Traditionally, scholars believe that the coercive elements of  US foreign policy 
were a tactic applied by the United States towards its foes, such as the Soviet 
Union (USSR), the People’s Republic of  China (PRC) and North Vietnam. It is 
shown, in contrast to existing accounts, that this aspect of  US diplomacy was 
also applied to its relationship with the United Kingdom. By utilising new docu-
mentary evidence unearthed in both US and British archives, it is demonstrated 
that the United States sought to convince British policy-makers to pursue 
alternative policy choices on a number of  different occasions by utilising its 
security relationship with the United Kingdom as a means of  political leverage. 
For instance, during what Henry Kissinger would term the ‘Year of  Europe’, 
the United States would suspend its intelligence and nuclear cooperation 
with the United Kingdom to persuade British policy-makers to pursue a more 
amenable foreign policy line. As shown later in the book, this was a rather 
successful policy and unsurprisingly we see the United States pursuing a 
similar course when US−UK disagreement emerged in subsequent years.
Existing accounts of  the Nixon–Heath years (1970−74) have tended to 
emphasise the points of  difference and antagonism between the two countries. 
The relationship is depicted as being fraught with difficulty either because of  
Heath’s European ambitions, which necessitated a loosening of  the ties with 
Washington, or because of  Washington’s pursuit of  détente on a bilateral basis 
which resulted in the US−UK relationship being largely ignored. Regardless 
of  how you attribute the cause of  the difficulties in the relationship, all 
accounts agree that the Nixon−Heath years were largely antagonistic for 
US−UK relations.3 
In opposition to this, it is suggested below that the Nixon–Heath years 
are better understood as having consisted of  two distinct phases. The years 
between 1970 and 1972 saw a failure to address fundamental points of  differ-
ence between London and Washington. Consequently, US–UK differences 
about the course of  détente, EEC entry, NATO restructuring, potential strategic 
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arms limitations between the US and USSR and progress towards an Arab−
Israeli settlement came to a head in 1973–74, when the United States sought 
to bring some definitive conclusions to these subjects. The period 1970–72 
should also be seen as a transitional one for US–UK relations. Détente meant 
that a less antagonistic Cold War was evolving and the imperative for close US–
UK cooperation therefore diminished. Added to this, the Heath government’s 
confirmation of  the British withdrawal East of  Suez meant that the opportu-
nity for potential US–UK interaction declined. Along with this, a number of  
policy decisions concerning the breakdown of  the Bretton Woods system; the 
war between India and Pakistan in 1971; the evolution of  triangular diplo-
macy between the US, USSR and PRC, and Britain’s bid for membership of  the 
EEC caused difficulties for US−UK relations. In spite of  this, there was also a 
remarkable amount of  cooperation between the two sides which is often over-
looked or downplayed in existing accounts of  the Nixon−Heath years. Thus, 
we see nuclear diplomacy being actively re-energised as Heath’s govern-
ment sought to find an upgrade to its strategic nuclear deterrent. Likewise, 
British intelligence worked closely with its American counterparts. Finally, 
British diplomats and officials had considerable contact with the leading figures 
within the Nixon White House. The early years of  the Nixon−Heath epoch 
were hardly ones of  unmitigated antagonism that they are so often presented 
as being.
The years 1973–74 were undoubtedly a more troubling time for US–UK 
relations, when differences surrounding the ‘Year of  Europe’, the fourth Arab–
Israeli War and the subsequent oil crisis led to serious discord. Nevertheless, 
scholars should not overlook that intelligence, nuclear and diplomatic 
cooperation did continue throughout this period. Indeed, in 1974 Edward 
Heath confirmed that US−UK nuclear cooperation would continue for at 
least another generation when he approved the updating of  Britain’s strate-
gic nuclear deterrent. Thus, the Heath years should not be viewed as ones of  
constant disagreement. Rather, the archival record which is now open to schol-
ars provides us with a more nuanced assessment of  the relationship where 
considerable cooperation and profound disagreement as well as coercive diplo-
macy were the hallmarks of  the relationship. 
US–UK relations between 1974 and 1977 witnessed rather less bellicosity 
than seen in the Nixon–Heath years. However, a number of  important points 
have been omitted in existing historical accounts. US threats relating to the 
continuation of  US–UK nuclear and intelligence collaboration were made 
periodically as a means of  influencing British defence policy. This coercive diplo-
macy is an element of  the relationship that is much underappreciated within 
the literature of  the US−UK special relationship. Further to this, it is demon-
strated that this coercive diplomacy was only partially successful. By 1976 
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Harold Wilson had concluded that US threats to reappraise its security cooper-
ation with London if  the Wilson government enacted further defence cutbacks 
were mere bluster and he subsequently largely ignored them. Wilson was right 
to conclude that the United States had little intention of  permanently severing 
the defence relationship it had with London. However, he miscalculated just 
how seriously the defence cutbacks affected how US policy-makers viewed the 
United Kingdom as an ally. As his successor, James Callaghan, would find out, 
this would have serious consequences for British interests during the 1976−77 
IMF crisis.
Book organisation
The book is divided into four core chapters which are, broadly speaking, chron-
ologically organised and focus upon the political–diplomatic dynamics of  the 
US−UK relationship during 1969−77. They all begin with a brief  overview of  
the existing literature, and this is followed by an analytical narrative of  key US–
UK interaction within the designated timeframe. Chapters 2 and 3 focus upon 
the Nixon years (i.e. 1969–74), whilst Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with 
the administration of  President Ford (1974–77). The book addresses several 
interconnected topics and questions. It analyses how the US reacted to British 
membership of  the European Economic Community (EEC), as well as providing 
an examination of  how US–UK relations were conducted within the context of  
international superpower détente. Broader themes of  economic decline; intel-
ligence and nuclear collaboration; and US and UK conceptions of  multilateral 
diplomacy are also studied.
Chapter 2 illustrates that the Nixon administration re-assessed whether the 
US should continue to support British membership of  the EEC. Throughout 
the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the US had encour-
aged its British counterparts to join the EEC for largely economic and wider 
political reasons. However, in the 1960s a number of  US policy-makers 
had begun to make arguments about the detrimental impact that EEC expan-
sion would have upon US economic interests.4 Nixon’s economic advisers 
repeated this advice, with John Connally – the US Treasury Secretary – being 
especially vocal in making such arguments. Economics, though important for 
Nixon, were never the determining factor behind US policy towards British 
membership of  the EEC. For the president, longer-term strategic and political 
considerations would determine policy, and these were the areas that were seri-
ously analysed by Nixon and his chief  foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger. 
While both raised doubts as to whether British membership of  the EEC bene-
fitted long-term US interests, they reluctantly concluded that US support for 
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this should be given. As Nixon was aware, the United States was largely power-
less in determining whether Britain would become a member of  the EEC. More 
important yet was the concern that without EEC membership the US would be 
‘saddled with the UK and the pound in a permanent client status’.5 Along with 
this, Nixon also believed that British membership of  the EEC could encourage 
Europe to accept the burden-sharing concept he was keen to foster. In the next 
two years, such aspirations failed to materialise and, as Kissinger noted, Nixon 
would come to regret supporting British membership of  the EEC.6 
Chapter 2 also explores several areas of  US–UK interaction vis-à-vis détente. 
Particular attention is given to the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations. Nixon’s triangular 
diplomacy with the USSR and the PRC, and the subsequent impact this would 
have upon US foreign policy actions – notably during the India–Pakistan war – 
are also examined. All of  these areas witnessed US–UK disagreement. Heath’s 
government feared that superpower cooperation in SALT could prevent future 
US–UK nuclear cooperation. It was the view of  the Heath administration that 
MBFR could seriously impinge on British security interests, and that the onset 
of  triangular diplomacy was needlessly distorting US policy. 
However, as Chapter 2 argues, one should not forget that, despite the many 
difficulties for US–UK relations, there existed many points of  agreement and 
examples of  cooperation. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that Nixon and 
Heath actually re-established closer US–UK interaction in the nuclear realm 
with US–UK working groups convening to discuss the upgrading of  Britain’s 
Polaris nuclear deterrent. Equally, the intelligence relationship between the 
two countries continued throughout this period. Nor should it be forgot-
ten that Heath publicly supported Nixon’s Vietnam policies even in the face 
of  severe criticism from his European allies. Coupled with this, British offi-
cials managed to establish remarkably close contact with Henry Kissinger 
which enabled them to learn of  US policy intentions (if  not actually influence 
them a great deal). SALT, MBFR and the CSCE were also matters which were 
to be resolved via diplomatic consultation between the two countries, and the 
existence of  disagreement should not be taken as a demonstration of  an antag-
onistic US–UK relationship. This chapter therefore provides a rather more 
mixed assessment of  US–UK relations than is currently available.
Chapter 3 marks the rapid decline of  the Nixon–Heath relationship into one 
of  open disagreement between the two countries. Such was the deterioration in 
relations that both Nixon and Kissinger would declare that the special relation-
ship was over, and both intelligence and nuclear collaboration between the two 
sides were suspended on a number of  occasions at Washington’s urging. This 
chapter highlights that US–UK relations had assumed a virtually antagonistic 
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agenda because of  differences surrounding what Henry Kissinger termed the 
‘Year of  Europe’. Kissinger envisaged that a ‘Declaration of  Principles’ would 
be made by the US, the newly enlarged EEC and NATO. This declaration would 
encapsulate all areas of  US–European interaction, and in practical terms this 
meant that monetary and trade discussions would no longer be conducted in 
isolation from military–security negotiations.7 In essence then, the Nixon–
Kissinger worldview of  ‘linkage’ was to be formally applied to US–European 
relations.8 
It was the interpretation of  how this policy agenda would be implemented that 
separated US and British policy-makers. Of  course, Kissinger’s insistence that the 
Europeans be assigned a year was seen in British circles as deeply patronising. 
However, matters of  substance were what really divided US and British opinion. 
Central to British concerns was the fact that Kissinger’s motive for the project was 
believed to be less than altruistic. At best, the implementation of  ‘linkage’ to US–
European relations would allow the US to extract preferential economic terms 
in trade and monetary discussions by utilising their security commitments to 
Europe. This, in the British assessment, would be unfavourable to their interests 
and therefore they sought to avoid the level of  ‘linkage’ to US–European relations 
that Kissinger wanted. Darker assessments of  US intentions also loomed large 
in British thinking. In particular, it was thought that Kissinger was seeking to 
‘divide and rule’ the newly enlarged EEC for his own purposes, and was using this 
‘Year of  Europe’ scheme to create tension and discord amongst the EEC member 
states. It was for these reasons, then, that the British rejected Kissinger’s proposal 
to work bilaterally in creating a Declaration of  Principles and were generally 
uncooperative towards the idea.
As for the US, it came to the conclusion that British intransigence signalled 
that the valuable bilateral relationship with Britain was being substituted for 
a US–EEC relationship built on a rather more competitive agenda. The seri-
ousness of  such political disputes resulted in the more practical aspects of  
US–UK cooperation being affected, and on two occasions US–UK intelligence 
and nuclear cooperation were temporarily suspended by the US. This occurred 
as a form of  political punishment, but the US – especially Henry Kissinger – 
also saw this as a policy tool. Kissinger believed that, by utilising aspects of  
the US–UK relationship, he could achieve policy results in other areas. This 
feature of  Kissinger’s foreign policy is another demonstration of  his worldview 
that international relations were an interconnected web which the statesman 
had to manipulate and master in order to achieve policy goals. On this occa-
sion, Kissinger’s policy was successful and by placing pressure on other areas 
of  US–UK interaction, particularly that of  nuclear and intelligence coopera-
tion, Kissinger was able to gain political movement in regard to the Declaration 
of  Principles. 
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The chapter then moves on to highlight the severe US–UK discord that 
resulted from the fourth Arab–Israeli war of  October 1973 and the subsequent 
oil crisis. During the war, Heath decided to pursue what he dubbed a neutral-
ist policy. Accordingly, when American requests for British airbases to launch 
flyovers of  the warzone were made, they were rebuffed. Equally, Heath refused 
to support US diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as it 
was perceived to have been openly pro-Israeli. The most serious moment for 
US–UK relations followed the decision by the US to move their nuclear forces 
to Defense Condition III (DEFCON III).9 The open British hostility to this move 
led, once again, to US–UK intelligence collaboration being temporarily halted 
at the behest of  the US.
While this chapter highlights the problems within the US–UK relationship, 
it also points out that the alliance was extremely resilient and that coopera-
tion in many sensitive areas of  national security continued. For instance, 
Kissinger tasked Thomas Brimelow – the deputy permanent under-secretary 
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) – with drafting the US–
USSR’s Prevention of  Nuclear War Agreement. By November 1973, Heath 
had decided to upgrade Britain’s Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent, which 
required additional US assistance. Nixon duly approved this request in January 
1974.10 Finally, throughout the Washington Energy Conference of  February 
1974, the Heath government worked closely with the Nixon administration 
in finding a collaborative response to the oil embargo. This chapter therefore 
highlights that much of  the existing literature on the Nixon–Heath years has 
been too focused on the moments of  discord and disagreement. By assessing 
other facets of  the relationship, a more nuanced picture of  the relationship 
emerges. 
Chapter 4 charts the conduct of  US–UK relations following the return to 
office of  Harold Wilson in March 1974. Wilson sought to re-establish closer 
US–UK relations and hoped it would provide him with a greater level of  influ-
ence upon US policy that would allow the British a more decisive and influential 
world role. Wilson, however, was ultimately unsuccessful because his continual 
defence cutbacks to the UK military weakened the utility of  Britain as an ally 
in the perception of  policy-makers in Washington. Also, as the Cyprus crisis 
of  1974 demonstrated, British policy-makers had limited influence over US 
policy even when direct British interests were at stake. Such arguments must 
be carefully qualified and, although a number of  scholars have seen the US–UK 
relationship as almost irrelevant for this period, it has to be remembered that 
US–UK cooperation continued in numerous areas of  extreme importance. US–
UK interaction on the updating of  Polaris and intelligence sharing serve as the 
most obvious examples but considerable interaction over the CSCE and MBFR 
also occurred.11
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It is also within this chapter that Britain’s continued economic problems 
really come into focus. Indeed, no study of  the US–UK relationship would 
be complete, or even convincing, without taking into account the profound 
impact that economics had upon US–UK relations. In particular, British 
economic troubles created the impression throughout the Nixon–Ford admin-
istrations that Britain was a declining ally. At its worst, it presented an image 
that Britain was on the verge of  economic and political collapse. Consequently, 
senior policy-makers in Washington – including President Ford and Kissinger – 
believed Wilson’s government was unable to restore order to Britain’s economy. 
This belief  was to be influential in dictating the course of  US policy through-
out the IMF crisis when a largely uncooperative attitude (at least as perceived 
by British policy-makers) was adopted by Washington.
The resulting IMF crisis is therefore the predominant focus of  Chapter 5. It 
is demonstrated throughout this chapter that US financial assistance, in the 
guise that the new Prime Minister James Callaghan wanted, never materi-
alised. Callaghan believed that Britain’s position within the Western alliance 
would ensure that the US would use its influence to ensure that the IMF would 
provide preferential loan conditions. The Ford administration, however, 
did not believe Britain warranted such treatment. It is tempting to see the 
Callaghan–Ford epoch as one where the US–UK relationship was largely irrel-
evant for serving their respective interests. However, as noted elsewhere, 
many of  the institutionalised aspects of  US–UK cooperation, notably in the 
security/defence realms, continued. In other areas, US–UK cooperation was 
also in evidence; for instance, the US and UK worked together efficiently in 
Lebanon and Rhodesia.12 Nevertheless, the fact that Callaghan over-estimated 
the degree of  importance which the US attached to the UK cannot be ignored. 
The IMF negotiations were viewed as critically important by Callaghan; the 
prime minister believed he would be able to obtain preferential financial treat-
ment because of  Britain’s ability to promote US interests in Europe. Evidently, 
the Ford White House did not ascribe the same level of  importance to its 
relationship with Britain as those in London did to their relationship with 
Washington. 
The US–UK relationship during 1974–77 should not, however, be seen as a 
period of  unmitigated crisis. Rather, as Britain declined in significance on the 
world stage, so did the number of  occasions in which US and UK policies inter-
acted. Essentially, US–UK diplomacy had to adjust to the reality that Britain 
was no longer a world power.13 Further, the more institutionalised aspects of  
US–UK relations, such as nuclear and intelligence cooperation, continued. 
Wilson’s more hostile attitude towards the EEC was appreciated in Washington 
and he also lent his support to wider aspects of  the US’s Cold War policy. This 
was particularly evident during the final approaches to the CSCE’s Final Act 
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in Helsinki. As such, all of  this would suggest that the US–UK relationship, in 
the period under consideration, is one that is rather more multifaceted and 
complex than existing accounts would suggest.14 
Sources
The UK’s ‘Thirty Year Rule’ has resulted in the recent declassification of  
large amounts of  government documentation (1970–1979). The US has 
also steadily released archival material from this era. This work has drawn 
heavily upon such material in constructing its argument and analysis. Indeed, 
the archival historian is particularly blessed when studying the Nixon–Ford 
administrations. The taping system which Richard Nixon installed within the 
White House, which have come to be termed the ‘White House Tapes’, give an 
insight into the creation of  US foreign policy, and contain hours of  conversa-
tion between the president and his senior advisers. In a similar fashion to his 
boss, Henry Kissinger also had a penchant for recording his conversations, and 
scholars have access to thousands of  Kissinger’s verbatim records of  telephone 
conversations and meetings with US and foreign officials, such as Richard 
Nixon, Gerald Ford, Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, Alexander Haig, Alec 
Douglas-Home, Sir Burke Trend, Lord Cromer and James Callaghan. 
Historians, however, must use these materials with the utmost caution. 
Nixon’s recording device within the White House was automatically acti-
vated on hearing a voice, and, therefore, captured all of  the conversations held 
within the various rooms bugged by the president. On listening to the tapes, the 
historian finds that the discussions are often disjointed, range over a number of  
issues, and on a number of  occasions can be considered as examples of  when 
the president is seeking to ‘let off  steam’.15 As Edward Keefer, the general editor 
of  the Foreign Relations of  the United States documentary series, wisely points 
out:
The Nixon tapes are often raw, incoherent, rambling, and repetitive ... They 
must be used with caution, because Nixon had a tendency to exaggerate, 
vent, and posture. For example, he would announce that he wanted officials 
fired on the spot and rant about his intentions or his toughness as a leader. 
What Nixon says on one day in the heat of  the moment is not in itself  
absolute proof  of  his intentions, just evidence of  his state of  mind at that 
particular time. Obviously, upon reflection a president can change his mind 
or moderate his attitudes. Multiple examples from the tapes, backed up by 
other documents, are the best way to discern Nixon’s real motivations and 
reasoning.16
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Even though the tapes do need to be used with caution, they offer a valu-
able and unique insight into how foreign policy was conceived and debated 
in the Nixon White House and are used throughout this work. Along with this, 
the policy-making papers from the White House, the State Department, the 
Pentagon and the National Security Council have been utilised in the construc-
tion of  this work. This material has been sourced from the various presidential 
libraries, the United States National Archive II, and the various volumes of  
the collected documentary editions of  the Foreign Relations of  the United States 
(FRUS) series. By utilising this material, a more nuanced and fuller understand-
ing of  US foreign policy-making can be advanced. The telephone transcripts of  
Henry Kissinger serve as one such example. From these it is possible to learn 
Kissinger’s private intentions about a particular subject, learn his often candid 
assessments of  his colleagues and international counterparts, or discern 
the tactical nuances that went into his approach to diplomacy. By using this 
material the historian has a unique insight into the creation and formulation 
of  US foreign policy during this period. 
On the British side, the predominant material has been drawn from govern-
ment documentation available at the National Archives (formerly the Public 
Records Office) in Kew, Surrey. This includes material from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of  Defence (MOD), Treasury and the 
Cabinet. The private papers of  former policy-makers and officials, including the 
likes of  Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, have also been utilised. All of  this 
archival material has been triangulated with secondary works, oral history 
interviews with former officials, and the voluminous memoirs that have been 
written by many of  the protagonists featured in this work.
It would, however, be remiss not to point out that there are several impor-
tant omissions in the source material. In particular, the private papers of  
Henry Kissinger and Edward Heath were not available to consult during the 
writing of  this work. Kissinger’s private papers, which supposedly consist of  
over 33 tonnes of  material, are stored in the Library of  Congress, and cannot 
be consulted publicly until five years after his death.17 The papers of  Edward 
Heath, who died in 2005, are also unavailable as they are waiting to be cata-
logued.18 While such source material always has the potential to aid our 
understanding of  the period, the contemporary historian has to accept that 
only partial access to the documentary record can be obtained. Moreover, 
the amount of  material that is available for consultation is extremely detailed 
and, indeed, far outweighs that available to scholars who study many earlier 
eras. 
By utilising this source material, this work provides a more thorough 
understanding of  the US–UK relationship. Importantly, it allows many of  the 
arguments made within the memoirs of  the former policy-making protagonists 
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to be cross-referenced with the government records and accordingly challenged 
and corrected. This new material also allows scholars to have a better insight 
into how policy is created and executed. As such, the arguments advanced 
throughout this work are substantially supported by the documentary record 
and need not be curtailed due to a lack of  documentary evidence. Indeed, as 
John Lewis Gaddis correctly asserts, the writing of  any history is conducted 
and produced within its own moment in history. In view of  that, a history of  
the Cold War written in 2013 should, and probably will, be very different from 
one that is produced one hundred years later.19 
Special relationship?
Since the end of  the Second World War, for policy-makers and academics alike, 
both the practice and study of  US–UK relations has been dominated by the 
idea that a special relationship exists between the two countries. While close 
US−UK political and military cooperation had been apparent during earlier 
periods, the special relationship is largely believed to have been born during 
the unique conditions which the realities of  total war fostered.20 Winston 
Churchill – British prime minister, 1940–45 and 1951–55 – is usually credited 
with bringing the phrase special relationship into the popular imagination.21 
Churchill, who himself  was half-American, had spoken of  the special rela-
tionship throughout the Second World War, but it was not until after the war, 
during his 1946 ‘Iron Curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri, that the phrase 
special relationship would enter the ‘lexicon of  international politics’.22 During 
this speech Churchill explained that a special relationship between English-
speaking peoples was required to avert another global war. As Churchill 
eloquently espoused:
Neither the sure prevention of  war, nor the continuous rise of  world 
organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal 
association of  the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship 
between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.23 
Defining what this special relationship is has been a matter of  some debate 
amongst scholars. Alex Danchev has divided the various arguments surround-
ing the special relationship into three broad schools of  thought: what he terms 
the ‘Evangelical’, ‘Functionalist’ and the ‘Terminalist’.24 The Evangelical 
school has largely bought into the idea championed by Churchill that the 
US–UK special relationship is based upon a shared cultural and political philos-
ophy on how international politics should operate. In a typically evangelical 
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fashion, H. C. Allen explained the special relationship thus: ‘Happily, the inti-
macy of  Anglo-American relations is by no means solely dependent upon the 
powerful but sometimes fickle bond of  emotion; it has manifold links embedded 
deep in the lives of  both peoples.’25
Others have treated such interpretations with scepticism. As David Reynolds 
has noted about the origins of  the special relationship, it ‘grew out of  a sense of  
shared threat and mutual need’.26 Such assessments provide a ‘Functionalist’ 
interpretation of  the US–UK relationship. Drawing upon a ‘realist’ under-
standing of  international affairs, the US–UK special relationship is driven by 
national interests, rather than shared cultural or social values. Intelligence, 
nuclear and wider defence cooperation are at the core of  the special relation-
ship, and are undertaken and sustained because they suit the interests of  
each power. This is perhaps best highlighted by the words of  James Callaghan 
when he explained to those who could not understand how a Republican pres-
ident could work with a Labour prime minister, ‘We both accepted that the 
interests of  our two countries and of  the Alliance transcended political differ-
ences’.27 More bluntly, Peter Carrington – British secretary of  state for defence, 
1970–74, and foreign and commonwealth secretary, 1979–82 – noted that: 
‘It’s always been national interests. People like to bang on about the special 
relationship but it’s always interests.’28
Terminalist arguments draw on similar ideas for explaining the special rela-
tionship. For these commentators, the special relationship was sustained by 
mutual security concerns, but gradually eroded in its significance as the Cold 
War progressed because of  Britain’s dwindling military and economic signifi-
cance. As Sir Michael Howard noted in 1986, if  the special relationship existed 
for the US, then it was only because of  the memory of  Winston Churchill, which 
persisted throughout the American psyche.29 Similarly, the likes of  John Dickie 
predicted the demise of  the special relationship once the rationale of  Cold War 
security had been removed.30 Dickie was perhaps too hasty in announcing the 
end of  the special relationship. The resurrection of  the special relationship 
was clearly evidenced throughout the Bush–Blair years (2001–2007). As two 
scholars of  US–UK relations have noted, the special relationship remains the 
‘Lazarus’ within international affairs.31 
This work prefers to avoid adjudicating as to whether or not it can be said 
that a special relationship existed during the era under consideration. At first 
glance this approach may appear curious, but the reason for pursuing such a 
course is based upon several key factors. The first of  these is that utilising the 
actual term special relationship brings an array of  problems. The biggest of  
these is actually defining what is meant by the term ‘special’ and what exactly 
the phrase is referring to. Does it, for instance, refer to intelligence sharing, 
nuclear cooperation, or the overall political relationship? Can there be an 
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economically competitive relationship but concurrently a special relationship 
in the security realm? Should scholars look for some sort of  special cultural 
ties between the two countries? As there is little clarity on this matter, it is left 
to individual scholars to decide for themselves as to what the special relation-
ship refers to. This then results in a rather haphazard approach for analysing 
the US–UK relationship. 
Further to this, the term also inevitably leads to comparative analysis with 
other eras, and with other relationships enjoyed by both states with third 
actors.32 This is clearly highlighted in many existing accounts of  US–UK 
relations. ‘No personal rapport developed between the rough spoken Texan 
President [Lyndon Johnson] and the wily British Prime Minister [Harold 
Wilson], nothing like the relationship that had been built up by Macmillan with 
Eisenhower and Kennedy,’ claim two authors.33 Wilson’s period of  government 
in the 1960s was ‘less special’ than that enjoyed under the governments of  
the half-American Harold Macmillan (1957–63).34 The Cold War special rela-
tionship was ‘not as comprehensive or special’ as that experienced during the 
Second World War, according to another scholar.35 This comparative approach 
is problematic for studying US–UK relations during 1969–77 because whether 
this era is less special in comparison to another is largely immaterial for under-
standing the relationship during this timeframe. Comparing the ‘specialness’ 
in one era with another provides only a superficial assessment of  the period 
under question. Moreover, the idea of  something being ‘special’ is not a fixed 
concept. Rather it is something that can only ever be relative to something else. 
Thus, by continually debating whether or not the US–UK relationship is special 
or, as current jargon would have it, ‘essential’, very little about the events in 
question can be understood. 
While this work prefers to avoid assessing whether the US–UK relationship 
was special or not throughout this period, it does situate itself  largely within 
the Functionalist school of  interpreting the relationship. The discussion of  
mutual interests and antagonisms is central to the analysis, as is the military 
and economic interaction and competition between the two countries. This 
approach is taken because these areas of  US–UK interaction were deemed by 
the actual policy-making elites to be the most important for promoting their 
respective interests. For the vast majority of  both US and UK policy-makers, 
material interests were central to their understanding of  US–UK interaction.36 
Richard Nixon, for instance, regarded power as the central conduit of  interna-
tional relations. Likewise, for Henry Kissinger, ‘international relations cannot 
be conducted without an awareness of  power relationships’.37 Edward Heath 
was equally frank in articulating that ‘realism’ had to be the bedrock of  any 
British foreign policy.38 The following chapters, therefore, provide an analysis 
of  the key political engagements between the two countries. 
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The context for US–UK relations 
The Nixon presidency has long fascinated historians, political scientists, jour-
nalists and psychologists, with the personality of  Nixon himself  attracting 
particular scrutiny.39 It is the president’s often contradictory personality that 
has come to dominate large swaths of  the literature on the Nixon presidency. 
This, to some degree, is understandable given the amount of  attention those 
who worked with the president have themselves given the subject. Indeed, 
nearly all those who worked closely with the president have remarked on his 
contradictory personality.40 As one former Nixon associate recollected: ‘One 
part of  Richard Nixon is exceptionally considerate, exceptionally caring, senti-
mental, generous of  spirit, kind. Another part is coldly calculating, devious, 
craftily manipulative. A third part is angry, vindictive, ill-tempered, mean-
spirited.’41 For George Schultz – who served as Nixon’s Treasury Secretary, 
1972–74 – the president demonstrated ‘brilliance’ in creating foreign policy 
strategy, but could also exhibit a peculiar amount of  insecurity for a man who 
was the president of  the United States.42 In the opinion of  Henry Kissinger a 
popular myth has developed that Richard Nixon ‘was a man given to histrion-
ics, to shouting his prejudices at cowed subordinates, and to dominating his 
environment by conveying his views with great, and even overpowering insis-
tence – frequently under the influence of  alcohol’. Rather, in Kissinger’s own 
assessment, ‘The Richard Nixon with whom I worked on a daily basis for five 
and a half  years was generally soft spoken, withdrawn, and quite shy’.43 
Likewise, the personality and psychology of  Henry Kissinger has attracted 
a lot of  attention. For some, Kissinger was akin to a modern-day Metternich, 
who shrewdly conducted US foreign policy at a time of  considerable chal-
lenge for the US.44 Others have viewed Kissinger’s record less kindly.45 Some 
have gone as far to suggest that Kissinger’s actions equate to those of  a ‘war 
criminal’ and that he should be arrested for his misdemeanours.46 Regardless 
of  where one stands on this, it is indisputable that Kissinger received remark-
able attention both in and out of  office. One historian has even estimated that 
Kissinger has been the subject of  the largest number of  inquiries of  any US 
secretary of  state.47 What is evident is that ‘Kissingerology’ continues to be a 
flourishing industry, with the now nonagenarian Kissinger still commanding 
the attention of  the world’s policy-making elite and media.48
Whilst there is much to be gained from analysing the personalities of  
Nixon and Kissinger, their actions, decisions and policies must be placed prop-
erly within the context of  the international and domestic system in which 
they operated. Many existing accounts fail to actually do this and, worse yet, 
several historians have subscribed to a ‘personality disorder’ theory of  the Nixon 
presidency. For these commentators, Nixon’s personality traits – especially the 
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‘darker’ elements – largely explain the course of  US foreign policy under his 
tutelage.49 Such is the power of  this train of  thought that work undertaken by 
one usually authoritative author opens with the sentence: ‘Richard Nixon was 
a peculiar person.’50 
This work prefers to avoid placing so much emphasis upon the supposedly 
peculiar personalities of  Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. This is not to 
downplay the role of  individuals in making and executing foreign policy. As 
one leading commentator on international relations theory notes, ‘the interna-
tional distribution of  power can drive countries’ behaviour only by influencing 
the decisions of  flesh and blood officials’.51 Given this, US foreign policy is better 
understood by contextualising the world situation, as understood by US policy-
makers at the time.52 Thus, structural factors, domestic interests, and identity 
politics all influenced the decisions undertaken by US policy-makers.53 It is by 
taking this approach that one can better appreciate and explain why certain 
policy choices were undertaken throughout the period.54 
On taking office in January 1969, Nixon was confronted with a myriad of  
domestic and foreign policy problems: a worsening economy, strategic nuclear 
parity with the USSR and, most pressing of  all, the ongoing Vietnam War.55 
The domestic discontent the Vietnam War created had undermined Lyndon 
Johnson’s presidency, and Nixon was aware that seeking a solution to Vietnam 
was as much a domestic as a foreign policy imperative. Vietnam, however, was 
only part of  a more general problem that, in Nixon’s assessment, the US faced 
at the onset of  his presidency. For Nixon, the US had overstretched its resources 
throughout the 1960s in trying to maintain all of  its global commitments, and 
had subsequently fallen into the Vietnam misadventure, seen its leadership of  
the Western alliance undermined, now faced the reality of  nuclear parity with 
the USSR and had witnessed the weakening of  American economic power.56 
When taken together, Nixon concluded that the US no longer held the position 
of  global supremacy that he perceived it to have had during the Eisenhower 
administration, in which he served as vice-president (1953−61). Indeed, 
the new president wondered whether the USSR was now the ‘number one’ 
world power. Nixon was not alone in reaching such a conclusion, given that 
the senior advisers surrounding him largely shared his opinion of  America’s 
declining international position.57
Following his defeat for the presidency in 1960, and his subsequent failure to 
capture the Californian Governorship in 1962, Nixon had watched America’s 
political situation unfold as somewhat of  an outsider. His years outside poli-
tics were not misspent and they allowed him to conceive new policies to 
implement, if  he was given the opportunity.58 Nixon devised a number of  strat-
egies for resolving both domestic and foreign policy problems, and these could 
often be quite radical in their nature. For instance, he seriously contemplated 
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establishing a new political party that would draw in the ‘left’ of  the Republican 
Party and dissatisfied southern Democrats.59 
It was in the realm of  foreign policy, however, where Nixon’s real interest lay, 
and here too he sought to impart fresh thinking into US policy. Nixon possessed 
a worldview that held international relations between states to be a single web 
of  interlinked and interconnected actors and institutions (Kissinger, too, was 
strongly attracted to this model). This, in turn, led to an American approach 
that is often termed ‘linkage’. As the term implies, the globe consisted of  a 
network of  states, statespeople and systems that were there to be mastered and 
manipulated to one’s own advantage. This new outlook in foreign policy was 
to be applied to America’s foes and allies alike. As Nixon remarked in private, it 
was now the time to ‘play our allies and hit our foes’.60
The other major innovation in US foreign policy expressed itself  as the 
so-called ‘Nixon Doctrine’. Ostensibly aimed at avoiding Vietnam-style embroil-
ments in the future, the Nixon Doctrine also articulated a future vision of  US 
foreign policy. For Nixon, there were five centres of  world power: the US, the 
USSR, the PRC, Western Europe and Japan, but within this the US and the USSR 
were the dominant actors. However, Nixon sought to limit direct US involve-
ment globally, because the economic and domestic burdens of  maintaining 
such commitments could no longer be endured. In particular, the damage 
Vietnam had caused for the US meant that future assistance to regional allies 
would have to be limited to American money and material. While not explicitly 
ruling out direct US military assistance, the Nixon Doctrine illustrated a deter-
mination to lessen America’s global commitments.61 
Reducing America’s global presence was seen to pose a number of  chal-
lenges for the US, especially in relation to the possible actions of  the USSR. 
As both Nixon and Kissinger realised, a lessening of  American commitments 
could be misinterpreted by Moscow as a sign that the US would not oppose 
Soviet aggrandisement. Thus, a dual strategy would be pursued. This would 
involve improving relations with Moscow through a policy of  détente (an 
easing of  strained relations) that would enable Moscow to see that it would 
benefit more from superpower cooperation, rather than confrontation.62 Along 
with this, American power and influence could be maintained by improv-
ing regional alliances and distributing the military burdens of  the alliances 
more equitably. NATO, therefore, would be one area receiving this new atten-
tion from Washington and its members were now being encouraged to provide 
a greater material commitment to the alliance. This policy took the label of  
‘burden-sharing’.63
Like the US, the beginning of  the 1970s was a point of  re-assessment for the 
UK. Since the end of  the Second World War, close US–UK relations had been 
seen as a means of  ensuring Britain’s global influence.64 Robert Cecil – first 
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secretary in the British Embassy in Washington in the first years of  the Cold 
War – explained how the special relationship was:
a means of  making sure that if  this little British gunboat was following 
in the wake of  the American battleship … on the bridge … the Americans 
would be receiving messages from the British who had this long experience 
of  international affairs and knew so much more about things than the 
Americans did, or so we liked to think.65
Harold Macmillan perhaps typified this type of  thinking when he referred to 
Britain playing the role of  Greece to the American Roman Empire. Macmillan 
had made this in reference to how Britain would run the Allied Headquarters 
in Africa during the Second World War. When prime minister he made similar 
remarks to his foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd.66 Tony Blair – British prime 
minister, 1997–2007 – less eloquently noted that close US–UK relations gave 
Britain ‘immediate purchase’ and a ‘huge position’ in influencing the course 
of  US foreign policy.67 From both of  these assessments it is implied that Britain 
would be able to utilise its network of  global bases and its well-practised diplo-
macy, coupled with its military and intelligence capabilities, to exercise a 
decisive influence over US foreign policy. Whether the British government 
ever had the level of  influence over US policy that it sought is questionable. 
Regardless, as Henry Kissinger perceptively noted: ‘Whatever the “reality” of  
the “special relationship,” Britain has tried hard to give the impression to the 
outside world that American policy is strongly influenced, if  not guided, by 
London.’68 
Maintaining such an illusion throughout the course of  the Cold War became 
increasingly difficult for British policy-makers as economic problems and the 
unwillingness of  subsequent governments to maintain Britain’s global mili-
tary commitments clearly challenged the idea of  Britain acting as a global 
lieutenant to the United States. Continued British economic weakness, typi-
fied by the devaluation of  its currency in 1967 and the transition of  the British 
Empire into a Commonwealth, along with the 1967 decision by the Wilson 
government to withdraw all British forces ‘East of  Suez’, cemented both the 
image and the reality that the UK was no longer a global power.69 Much of  the 
rationale then for close US–UK relations was undermined by this set of  events. 
Accordingly, from the 1960s onwards, membership of  the EEC was seen by 
British policy-makers as a means of  achieving the twin objectives of  improving 
Britain’s economic performance and its international influence. The French 
president, Charles de Gaulle, however, scuppered such aspirations when he 
twice vetoed British membership of  the EEC (1963 and 1967). Harold Wilson, 
however, refused to relent and began the third application. Therefore, when 
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Heath assumed power in June 1970, he inherited a situation where British 
foreign policy was on a more European-focused trajectory. This was a course 
the new prime minister was unlikely to alter because he was deeply committed 
to gaining British membership of  the EEC.70 
It is within this broader context then that US−UK relations are analysed 
throughout the subsequent chapters. As shown, the challenges that détente, 
economic decline, retreat from global obligations and membership of  the 
EEC created were to be ones that would nearly lead to a fundamental break 
in the US−UK relationship. Nonetheless, and in spite of  these challenges, the 
institutionalised aspects of  the relationship, notably intelligence and nuclear 
collaboration, remained. Indeed, close US−UK cooperation, however one might 
view it, remained a rather resilient feature of  US−UK interaction.
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There could be no special partnership between Britain and the 
United States, even if Britain wanted it.
Prime Minister Heath to President Pompidou, May 19711
The jilted lover
According to Henry Kissinger, Edward Heath rejected a close working part-
nership with Richard Nixon, which left him feeling akin to that of  a ‘jilted 
lover’.2 Kissinger’s analysis has had an incredible impact upon the subse-
quent scholarly assessments of  the US–UK relationship. As Heath’s official 
biographer Philip Ziegler has claimed, ‘Certainly it was no fault of  President 
Nixon’s if  the special relationship languished’.3 As the argument runs, Heath 
was determined to attain membership of  the EEC because this would bolster 
a stagnant British economy, and promote Britain’s international influ-
ence. France, having vetoed British membership on two previous occasions 
in 1963 and 1967, had to be convinced that Britain could be a ‘European 
country’. Accordingly, Heath disassociated from the US–UK special relation-
ship in order to prove his European credentials, and thus undermine the 
perennial French fear that Britain would act as an American Trojan Horse 
within the EEC.4 
This interpretation has been challenged by other scholars. Rather than 
it being London’s enthusiasm for a weakening of  the special relationship, 
the cause of  this lay with Washington. The Nixon administration’s secre-
tive foreign policy resulted in Britain being ignored and British policy-makers 
therefore sought to re-galvanise their influence internationally by entrenching 
a European foreign policy.5 Other commentators have attempted to synthesise 
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such arguments. The Nixon administration’s indifference towards the special 
relationship coupled with a British foreign policy pursuing a more European 
path resulted in the special relationship becoming near redundant. It was only 
once the consequences of  the global economic and energy crisis of  1973–74 
became apparent that the special relationship became prevalent again.6 
Central in many of  these accounts is the role played by certain individual 
policy-makers. Henry Kissinger, in particular, is seen to have had a malevo-
lent effect upon US–UK relations.7 As one leading scholar of  US–UK relations 
declares, US–UK difficulties ‘certainly owed something to Kissinger’s ego’.8 This 
line of  argument appears especially popular amongst former British officials.9 
Certainly, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, Kissinger’s penchant for 
presenting himself  as the archetypal proponent of  realpolitik should be chal-
lenged, given that his actions could be dictated by anger, jealously and suspicion 
of  his bureaucratic rivals.10 Personalities, and especially that of  Kissinger, did 
have an impact, often a detrimental one, upon the course of  US−UK relations.11 
Nonetheless, such arguments should not be taken too far. US–UK relations are 
far greater than simply the behaviour of  a few men. Indeed, if  one is to accept 
the arguments of  some scholars, one would be left with the impression that the 
entire US–UK relationship was virtually single-handedly controlled by Henry 
Kissinger. While personal relations in the conduct of  international affairs 
are important, they are not overriding in determining the course of  relations 
between states. Economic, security, political and domestic factors all play an 
important role in determining the development of  events. Accordingly, these 
areas feature prominently below.12
Existing accounts have also tended to focus too heavily upon moments of  
crisis and acrimony between the two states. US–UK differences concerning 
the ceasing of  the post-World War II Bretton Woods economic consensus, the 
India–Pakistan War, the ‘Year of  Europe’ and the fourth Arab–Israeli War have 
all been emphasised. This is not unreasonable given the sometimes serious 
ramifications which emanated from such disagreements. Yet, as other analysts 
have highlighted, focusing solely on such events presents a distorted image of  
this era, and continued military, nuclear and intelligence cooperation between 
the two countries was hardly symbolic of  a relationship that was supposedly 
‘All at sea’.13 
Accordingly, it is argued below that certain aspects of  the US–UK relation-
ship functioned smoothly throughout this period (1969–72). In contradiction to 
the typical portrayal of  Edward Heath actively shunning close US–UK coopera-
tion, it is shown that in some areas it was actively re-energised.14 This was most 
obvious related to the updating of  Britain’s strategic nuclear weapons system, 
Polaris. Where US–UK difficulties did arise, these stemmed from differences 
towards détente, EEC entry and the re-ordering of  the world’s financial system. 
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For US–UK relations, 1969–72 should be seen as a period of  transition, rather 
than one of  crisis. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that many areas of  diffi-
culty for US–UK relations were largely ignored by policy-makers during this time. 
As shown throughout subsequent chapters, these unresolved differences were to 
create a number of  problems for US–UK relations in the following years.
Dramatis personae 
Nixon, as with all presidents, brought his own style of  conducting foreign 
affairs to the White House.15 He was determined to centralise the creation of  
foreign policy in the White House because he was distrustful of  the traditional 
centres of  power in Washington. In Nixon’s assessment, his years as vice- 
president (1953–61) had demonstrated how the Washington bureaucracy was 
able to manipulate the president into pursuing choices which ‘they’ wanted. 
In Nixon’s estimation, the CIA was full of  ‘Ivy League Liberals’ who disdained 
him. Worse yet, Nixon distrusted the work of  the CIA and believed that many 
of  its analysts had a tendency to utilise intelligence as a means to support pre-
existing conclusions.16
As one former director of  the CIA (DCI) recalls, Nixon ‘despised’ the agency, 
not least because he was convinced that it had worked with John F. Kennedy in 
the 1960 presidential election to undermine his candidacy.17 As such, the role 
of  the DCI (Richard Helms) was severely curtailed, and all intelligence assess-
ments were instructed to run through the office of  Henry Kissinger.18 Kissinger 
also made sure that Helms would never meet with the president alone, and 
that all intelligence estimates that were to reach the president had to be in 
Kissinger’s possession ‘at least 48 hours’ beforehand.19 This meant that all of  
the intelligence assessments that were to reach the president could be vetted 
by Kissinger and duly influenced according to his design. As national secu-
rity adviser, therefore, Kissinger effectively functioned as Nixon’s ‘principal’ 
intelligence officer. It is with authority then that Richard H. Immerman notes, 
‘Richard Nixon had no use for sources of  intelligence other than his own – 
which meant Henry Kissinger’s’.20
The new president’s opinion of  the State Department was little better. As one 
prominent journalist recollected, Nixon ‘distrusted the state department which 
he considered both fuzzy minded and a nest of  holdover liberal Democrats’.21 
Nixon’s disdain for the State Department is captured well by his comment that 
it was staffed by ‘striped pant faggots’.22 Worse still, the president believed that 
the existing Washington bureaucracy was actively seeking to undermine his 
policies. In order to overcome this, Nixon wanted to replace all of  the existing 
bureaucrats with his own appointees.23 On matters related to foreign policy, 
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Nixon was determined to centralise its creation and execution from within the 
White House. Nixon believed that a sort of  inertia had enveloped US foreign 
policy, and it was only through the White House that foreign policy could be 
properly debated and re-conceptualised. In the subsequent years, the opin-
ions of  the CIA, Pentagon and State Department were to be largely ignored. As 
Arthur Schlesinger noted, Nixon’s conduct really did mark the zenith of  the 
‘Imperial Presidency’.24
Nixon was aided in this ambition by employing a very small circle of  advisers 
in which policy choices would be debated and decided. This circle included Chief  
of  Staff  H. R. Haldeman, Deputy Chief  of  Staff  John Ehrlichman, Treasury 
Secretary John Connally and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. 
Haldeman’s position within the administration was particularly important 
given that Nixon wanted all matters of  substance to be channelled through 
him. Such was Haldeman’s importance that he was referred to by Nixon as 
his ‘lord high executioner’. In fact, the president made clear in one Cabinet 
meeting: ‘When [Haldeman] talks, it’s me talking.’ According to a number of  
White House insiders, nobody, not even Kissinger, could ignore Haldeman.25 
Whilst not immune to Haldeman’s presence, at least in advising the presi-
dent on foreign policy matters, Kissinger reigned supreme.26 Kissinger managed 
to achieve this in a number of  ways. First, he had been quick to centralise as 
much power in his office as possible. Thus, Kissinger – under the direction 
of  Nixon – sought to change the Washington bureaucracy, in order to strip 
the traditional centres of  influence of  their power. The State Department was 
Kissinger’s first target and, in spite of  meeting resistance, he was successful in 
diminishing its influence by forcing through a number of  changes.27 Kissinger 
did this by first warning against following Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Tuesday Lunch’ 
decision-making approach. As Kissinger suggested, this approach meant that 
the ‘discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and often unfamiliar with 
the nuances of  the issues before them’.28 To avoid this in the new administra-
tion, Kissinger advised that the National Security Council should return as the 
principal forum for discussing and deciding US policy. Here, the national secu-
rity adviser (Kissinger), working under the ‘direction of  the President’, would 
determine the agenda and lead the discussion.29 This won Nixon’s approval 
and the first National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) issued under 
him stated that the National Security Council would be the ‘principal forum for 
issues requiring inter-agency decisions and setting basic national objectives’. 
NSDM Number 2 re-affirmed this.30 Nixon was even more explicit within private 
communications with Kissinger.31 The State Department also lost a number of  
its advisory roles within the administration. For instance, the collective group 
meetings between various bodies were taken away from the State Department 
and placed in the hands of  Kissinger.32
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Kissinger’s position within the administration as the number one foreign 
policy adviser was therefore endorsed at the onset of  the Nixon administration. 
Nixon’s decision to re-establish the National Security Council as the primary 
body for debating and deciding US foreign policy enabled Kissinger to enact 
a tremendous amount of  influence upon the course of  US policy. However, it 
should be remembered that Kissinger’s position within the bureaucracy was 
far from supreme. His biggest challenge was that he did not have an insti-
tutional base from which to operate in the same fashion that a secretary of  
state or defense would have. Instead, Kissinger relied solely upon the contin-
ued good will of  the president himself. Thus, although Nixon gave greater 
prominence to his national security adviser, it was the president who assumed 
the dominant role in the Nixon–Kissinger relationship and it was Nixon who 
established the general outlines of  foreign policy. It was Kissinger’s job to then 
turn these general ambitions of  the president into reality.33 One former Nixon 
White House insider eloquently summarises the relationship thus: ‘Many of  
America’s moves in this period originated with Kissinger, but Kissinger was 
operating within the Nixon framework.’34 
On the face of  it, it is perhaps curious that a book which deals with US foreign 
policy has yet to mention the role played by the US secretary of  state. William 
Rogers was appointed as secretary of  state in 1969, and had worked with Nixon 
as a partner within the same New York law firm, had advised him as a senator 
on the Alger Hiss case and had served as the Attorney General during the 
Eisenhower administration with him. Given this, one would naturally presume 
that Rogers would have had a major role to play in US foreign policy-making 
but in reality he had limited influence upon significant aspects of  US foreign 
policy. The institutional changes to the Washington bureaucracy ensured 
that the State Department’s influence was curtailed, and Nixon’s disdain for 
the department meant he had little time for it anyhow. As such, Rogers’ main 
area of  concern was with trying to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. Even this 
had only been given to Rogers largely because of  Nixon’s belief  that Kissinger’s 
Jewish background would leave him incapable of  pursuing a path which was 
not profoundly pro-Israeli.35 Thus, Rogers’ influence upon US–UK relations 
was limited and occurred only sporadically. 
Melvin Laird, as Nixon’s defense secretary, had a much more influential role 
in US foreign policy which can largely be attributed to his superb bureaucratic 
in-fighting skills.36 However, on the major issues, Kissinger usually managed 
to triumph. More importantly, Kissinger had a far more consistent record of  
supporting Nixon on the most crucial issues. On all of  the critical events during 
the early days of  Nixon’s first term, be it Cuba, the potential Syria–Jordan war 
and the escalation of  hostilities in Vietnam, Kissinger steadfastly supported the 
president which, in turn, gave Kissinger more influence with Nixon.37 Laird, 
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however, was still important for US–UK relations and obvious areas where his 
influence would be felt included the MBFR negotiations and debates about wider 
NATO restructuring. Laird’s position on the upgrading of  Britain’s Polaris fleet 
was also of  crucial significance for British interests. Nevertheless, UK policy-
makers would predominantly gain access to Nixon via Kissinger.38 Given this, it 
is the person of  Henry Kissinger that features heavily in subsequent chapters. 
In comparison to Nixon’s distrust of  the bureaucracy, Heath worked well 
with his civil service. Heath leaned heavily on Robert Armstrong – his princi-
pal private secretary – especially on matters related to European and domestic 
policy. Douglas Hurd, who would go on to become foreign and commonwealth 
secretary during the Thatcher and Major governments (1989–95), and 
Donald Maitland, who acted as Heath’s press secretary, also enjoyed a close 
professional relationship with the prime minister. Heath also actively sought 
the advice of  Lord Carrington, secretary of  state for defence (1970–74), on 
defence and security issues.39
Burke Trend, the Cabinet secretary, enjoyed a somewhat mixed relation-
ship with Heath. Apparently, his Socratic method in proffering advice irritated 
Heath and he was also judged to have been too close with the former prime 
minister, Harold Wilson. However, for US–UK relations, and in matters 
regarding defence and wider foreign policy, Heath realised that Trend was 
indispensable, because Trend was, as one author put it, ‘Heath’s link-man with 
Nixon’.40 Trend achieved this position largely as a result of  Nixon’s insistence 
that the usual channels for international communication, i.e. via the State 
Department, be bypassed. Instead, foreign governments deemed of  importance 
were encouraged to communicate all sensitive and important matters via Henry 
Kissinger. This backchannel method is usually associated with Kissinger and 
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Washington (1962−86). 
However, the British also engaged in backchannel diplomacy with Rowley 
Cromer (UK ambassador to Washington, 1971–74) first acting as the main 
liaison, and Trend gradually assuming the role from 1971/2 onwards.41 
Other key individuals for the management of  US–UK relations included 
Rowley Cromer, Denis Greenhill, Thomas Brimelow, Richard Sykes and Charles 
Powell.42 Cromer was the former governor of  the Bank of  England, and had 
acted as an unofficial adviser to the Conservative Party during the Labour 
governments of  Harold Wilson (1964–70). Cromer’s reward for this was to be 
appointed as the ambassador to Washington.43 Greenhill and Brimelow were 
the two officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office who had the most 
contact with the Nixon administration. Sykes and Powell were both important 
as they attended many of  the meetings between Cromer and key US officials. 
Once the Kissinger–Trend backchannel was established, they attended these 
meetings too.44
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Little has been said so far about foreign and commonwealth secretary Alec 
Douglas-Home. While he was certainly not marginalised in foreign policy-
making, Heath was keen to dominate the areas of  foreign policy that he felt 
were most important. Such aspects included Britain’s application to the EEC 
and the conduct of  US–UK relations. Furthermore, whilst Douglas-Home 
established a cordial relationship with his opposite number William Rogers, 
and was held in high regard by both Nixon and Kissinger, the reality was that 
points of  importance were communicated and discussed via backchannels. 
Consequently, communication about matters of  substance largely took place 
through Rowley Cromer and, later, Burke Trend.45 
Maintaining a presence East of Suez
On assuming office, Heath was faced with a number of  associated difficulties 
regarding the economy. Heath had inherited an economy with an unexpected 
budget deficit and his economic problems were compounded by the fact that 
his chancellor of  the exchequer, Iain Macleod, passed away soon after taking 
office. Macleod, who had spent his years in opposition crafting an alternative 
economic agenda for the country, was replaced by Anthony Barber who, by 
own admission, was ill-prepared for the job.46 In foreign affairs, two immedi-
ate points were prevalent: whether to endorse the 1967 decision to withdraw 
British military forces East of  Suez, and how to attain membership of  the EEC. 
Both of  these topics had obvious consequences for US–UK relations.47 
Throughout the 1960s, the US had made several efforts to convince the 
British to maintain their East of  Suez commitments.48 This presence included 
the two sovereign bases in Aden and Singapore, agreements to uphold security 
in a number of  states, and a number of  smaller bases located east of  the Suez 
Canal. In total the British committed close to 90,000 troops to upholding this 
role. Such efforts proved superfluous when Wilson announced in 1967 that 
Britain would begin a phased withdrawal of  its forces East of  Suez. By January 
1968, Wilson had decided that this process would be accelerated and British 
forces would be withdrawn by the end of  1971.49 Such announcements deeply 
irritated Washington with Lyndon Johnson giving the impression that a British 
withdrawal signalled that the US would have to stand alone in the defence of  
the entire Western bloc.50 
Once Nixon took office in January 1969, he too attempted to convince 
Wilson that he should reverse the East of  Suez decision. Nixon believed that 
Britain had a role to play globally and he lamented the decision not to support 
Britain during the Suez crisis (1956–57) because it resulted in Britain hasten-
ing its global retreat, which had only damaged the long-term interests of  the 
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US.51 Added to this, Nixon wanted a more self-reliant Europe. In practical terms 
this meant Europe would contribute more fully to its own defence needs. This 
took the moniker ‘burden-sharing’. A whole host of  domestic, strategic and 
economic factors were behind Nixon’s desire for burden-sharing. For one, the 
way in which Lyndon Johnson had financed the Vietnam War had created 
serious problems for the US economy. Thus, there was an economic imperative 
for the United States to lessen its spending commitments. The American misad-
venture in Vietnam had also encouraged calls that the United States could not 
offer open-ended commitments to foreign powers which would involve huge 
manpower and monetary resources. Therefore, on the domestic front Nixon 
was facing Congressional and public opinion pressures to reduce America’s 
global commitments. In such a context, it is not a surprise that Heath’s allu-
sion within the 1970 Conservative Party manifesto to reverse the decision to 
withdraw East of  Suez was met with approval in Washington.52
Running alongside this potential change in British defence policies were the 
efforts of  the Nixon administration to share the burden of  NATO’s conven-
tional forces more equally throughout the alliance. This was driven not only 
by the aforementioned factors but by the increasingly apparent reality of  
nuclear parity. NATO had adopted the doctrine of  ‘flexible response’ in 1967 
which superseded the previous policy of  ‘Massive Retaliation’, that being 
that any Soviet military aggression against US allies would be met with a full 
strategic nuclear response. Flexible response was designed to place a heavier 
reliance upon conventional forces in a world where rough nuclear parity 
meant Massive Retaliation was deemed no longer credible. This, so the theory 
ran, would offer decision-makers greater flexibility during a confrontation 
with the USSR and prevent a scenario where a president of  the United States 
would be forced to surrender or precipitate a nuclear Armageddon in response 
to any Soviet military aggression in Europe.53 However, NATO’s force levels fell 
well short of  being able to realistically pursue this flexible response strategy. 
As Nixon’s team had been informed prior to taking office, and soon concluded 
once in office, the Warsaw Pact held an advantage in conventional forces and 
had also reached parity with the United States in the nuclear realm.54 Given 
this, we can see why Nixon questioned whether NATO’s heavy reliance on 
nuclear weapons was credible under such circumstances. As Nixon bluntly 
stated, ‘[the] nuclear umbrella in NATO [was] a lot of  crap’.55 Less crudely, he 
informed Heath that the era of  ‘nuclear standoff ’ had dawned.56 As a result, 
Nixon concluded that a far greater emphasis had to be given to conventional 
forces. Only by improving these would a credible deterrence posture be posed 
towards the USSR.57 
Kissinger agreed largely with Nixon’s assessments on the dangers that 
nuclear parity posed for Western security. During his time at Harvard, Kissinger 
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had made similar arguments to those now being pushed by Nixon and in 1970 
he repeated such thinking to the president.58 As Kissinger noted:
We no longer can count on our nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggressiveness 
or threat of  using force. With near parity in strategic weapons the Soviets 
probably assume that we could not credibly threaten their use except when 
faced with a direct attack on the US itself.59
Kissinger was not alone in offering such gloomy advice. The president’s other 
advisers, including Laird and Rogers, were equally pessimistic about the evolv-
ing strategic situation.60 
The Nixon administration therefore assumed a dual strategy towards the 
British. They first sought to convince both the Wilson and Heath govern-
ments to contribute further resources to the NATO alliance. They tried also to 
persuade the British to reverse their decision to withdraw their forces East of  
Suez and therefore encouraged Heath to retain as large a commitment as possi-
ble.61 Such an approach proved, ultimately, to be a wasted effort. With respect 
to NATO, the British government refused to bow to American pressure. With 
regard to the East of  Suez decision, Wilson remained unperturbed and stuck 
with his original decision. Heath, while wanting to implement a full reversal of  
Wilson’s policy, found that it was not easily reversible. The new prime minister 
therefore largely endorsed Wilson’s East of  Suez plans.62
The only discernible difference was that Britain signed a Five Power Pact 
Treaty with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. It was not, 
however, a major defence treaty. As Lord Carrington put it, ‘There was no 
question of  completely putting the clock back; we accepted much of  the situ-
ation as we found it’.63 However, it should be remembered that the agreement 
did ensure that the British retained a symbolic global military role which 
Wilson’s plans would have eliminated. For Nixon, this did provide a small 
token victory. In relation to Britain’s NATO commitments, American efforts 
were equally pointless. The Heath government made it clear that Britain would 
not be contributing greater resources to NATO. All that the Heath administra-
tion offered was their auspices in trying to convince fellow NATO members to 
increase their own contributions.64
Doing as much as they can
The manner in which the Nixon administration should react to Heath’s 
defence review was vigorously debated in Washington. Melvin Laird, who was 
ever conscious of  Congressional opinion, wanted to send a message to London 
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that defence cuts were intolerable. In his assessment, Congressional demands 
for US troop withdrawals globally, and in particular throughout Europe, would 
become more vehement because of  British defence cuts. The US, therefore, 
should threaten to withdraw its troops from NATO unilaterally. This, Laird 
hoped, would force the British into retracting their own defence cuts. However, 
Laird’s advice did not attract much support within the administration. His 
deputy, David Packard, suggested that a public rebuke of  Heath’s decision 
should be issued; the approach was endorsed by William Rogers.65 
Aside from Laird, there appeared little appetite at this stage for a major 
confrontation with the UK over their defence spending. As other US offi-
cials advised, to pursue Laird’s course, or even the less bellicose options put 
forward by Packard and Rogers, would do little to serve US interests. As George 
Springsteen reasoned, the UK still contributed, as a proportion of  Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the most of  any European state to NATO.66 Therefore, 
to publicly admonish the Heath administration would be an unproductive 
course. More important yet, Laird’s approach was unlikely to actually change 
the British decision, meaning a confrontation would actually not serve any 
meaningful objective.67 This line of  argument gained the support of  Kissinger’s 
advisers. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger’s key aide for European affairs, argued 
that whilst Britain’s defence commitment had not increased, Heath had not 
agreed to the scale of  cutbacks envisaged under Wilson.68 This clearly reso-
nated with Kissinger. ‘The fact is that the British have probably done about 
as much as they can,’ Kissinger informed the president.69 Such advice won 
the president’s backing. Consequently, no public rebuke was issued; nor were 
any threats of  US troop withdrawals from Europe made. Instead, when US 
officials met with their British counterparts, a sympathetic tone, along the 
terms outlined by Kissinger, was employed.70
The White House took Heath’s decision rather philosophically given that 
it ran contrary to Nixon’s policy of  burden-sharing. For US–UK relations, 
Heath’s confirmation of  Wilson’s East of  Suez policy had reduced Britain’s 
utility as an ally to the US. This, however, was not an event deemed to be 
terminal in the eyes of  the Nixon White House. Kissinger had argued against 
the notion of  a public rebuke because of  the president’s desire to establish 
solid relations with the new Conservative government.71 Moreover, the five 
power defence agreement did provide the US with a symbolic partner on the 
world stage, in that the US could plausibly argue that it was not alone in 
trying to maintain global stability. Thus, as one author has recently noted, 
the East of  Suez decision did not mean the end of  Britain’s ability to actu-
ally project global power.72 Yet, Heath’s decision did signify the increasingly 
Euro-centric nature of  British defence and foreign policy. As Lord Carrington 
wrote, ‘Defence had come full circle. It was not only to start but almost to end 
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at home.’73 Furthermore, the British had been perceived by the Nixon admin-
istration to have undermined US interests. As shown in subsequent chapters, 
when US–UK opinion collided, the Nixon administration would not always 
react in such a subdued manner. 
EEC expansion: A future competitor? 
As Denis Greenhill argued, for Edward Heath, ‘Europe came first’.74 Heath 
had demonstrated this desire during a series of  lectures at Harvard University 
in 1967 where he noted that Britain should reconfigure its foreign policy 
priorities away from the ‘Atlantic Community’ and the Commonwealth. 
Instead, Britain would shape a new Europe, which would act as a genuine 
third power centre in a world dominated by the superpowers. Thus, as one 
early biographer of  Heath noted, the EEC was a vehicle in which Britain could 
ensure a world role ‘commensurate with the role that she enjoyed in the 
past’.75 
Traditionally, historical accounts have tended to present Heath’s EEC policy 
as a zero sum affair. For these authors, Heath rejected a close relationship with 
the US in order to gain EEC membership.76 When Heath read a biography of  
himself  in which it was claimed he wanted to abandon the special relation-
ship, he scribbled in the margin ‘No’.77 Heath was correct to reject this line 
of  argument. Certainly, Heath brought his own particular brand of  realism 
to the US–UK relationship; he refused to accept that US–UK cooperation was 
always beneficial to British interests. For instance, soon after assuming office, 
Heath ordered an assessment of  US usage of  British bases globally and wanted 
to know whether it was in the British interest to grant US access to these bases. 
Both Douglas-Home and Carrington responded that it was in Britain’s inter-
est, arguing that it allowed Britain to continue exploiting US expertise in the 
nuclear and intelligence realms.78 
Nevertheless, Heath querying US rights to British bases does not automati-
cally imply that he wished to terminate such cooperation. Rather, Heath wanted 
to ensure that the US–UK relationship, as it had traditionally been conceived by 
British policy-making elites, actually continued to promote British interests. 
Relevant aspects of  the relationship, such as nuclear and intelligence sharing 
would be allowed to continue whereas other elements, such as international 
summitry, would be allowed to slip.79 Europe then was seen by Heath as a way 
of  maintaining Britain’s international position and would, much in Ernest 
Bevin’s vein of  ‘pillars’, act as one pillar for British interests. The other pillar, 
the US−UK relationship, would be retained and utilised as and when needed.80 
None of  this was seen as particularly controversial (at this stage anyhow) 
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from Washington’s perspective. The Nixon administration wished to pursue 
its détente agenda in a largely bilateral fashion. British international decline 
in recent years also undermined notions that it could act as America’s global 
lieutenant. However, as Kissinger explained, the US was not blessed with many 
close allies and the US ‘should not discourage those who feel they have a special 
friendship for us’.81 
Close US–UK relations had been sought by British policy-makers as a means 
of  upholding British global interests since the end of  the Second World War.82 
Similarly, Harold Macmillan looked towards British membership of  the EEC as 
a mechanism for managing Britain’s changing international circumstances. 
Wilson’s government also sought a similar objective. Macmillan and Wilson, 
however, were both reluctant converts to the European project. They came 
to the conclusion that British membership of  the EEC was essential for main-
taining British relevance in a world dominated by the superpowers. They 
also believed that EEC membership could help to improve Britain’s economic 
fortunes. Heath’s Euro-centric policy should not, therefore, be viewed as revo-
lutionary in the field of  British foreign policy.83 
Heath differed from his predecessors, however, in that he was more passion-
ately committed to the European ideal. For Heath, British membership of  
the EEC was imperative, not only for ensuring Britain could continue a rele-
vant world role, but also for maintaining European peace and stability. As 
one commentator noted soon after Heath’s accession to office, ‘Mr Heath will 
use all his power’ to prove that Britain could win admission into the EEC.84 
First, Heath’s background made him a suitable candidate for trying to obtain 
membership to a club that had eluded both Macmillan and Wilson as he had 
been the chief  negotiator for UK membership to the EEC under the Macmillan 
government (1960–63).85 Witnessing Charles de Gaulle veto British member-
ship, and his citing of  the US–UK special relationship as the reason for his 
action, provided Heath with first-hand experience of  France’s suspicion 
of  the US–UK relationship.86 As Donald Maitland opined, Heath ‘drew the 
clear lesson from the events of  1962/63 that the French held the key’ to 
EEC membership.87 Given this, once in office, Heath would court France and 
sought to convince French president Georges Pompidou that Britain should be 
admitted into the EEC.
Why then was Heath determined to enter the EEC? Some have suggested 
that he was passionately committed to the ideal of  European integration as a 
means of  ensuring the continent’s future peace, stability and prosperity. Whilst 
this view is not without merit, Heath’s policy was also driven by pragmatism 
and a desire to ensure that the UK could retain an influential role in world 
affairs. Heath, however, also wanted to move further and faster towards an 
integrated political Europe, which would have common foreign and defence 
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policies. Indeed, it was Heath’s intention to utilise the expansion of  the EEC as 
a vehicle for promoting this ambition in 1973. It was this feature of  Heath’s 
European policy that marked his fundamentally different approach to that of  
his predecessors.88 
Regardless of  the actual route taken, the fact remained that British member-
ship of  the EEC would have a profound impact upon US–UK relations. Obviously, 
if  the British followed the protectionist trade and monetary policies as practised 
by the EEC, this would have ramifications for US economic interests. Politically, 
given the notion that the EEC would create some type of  ‘common’ foreign 
and political policies, this would at the very least change the nature of  US–UK 
diplomacy.89 
What then of  US policy? Since the creation of  the EEC, successive US admin-
istrations had encouraged British membership as it was commonly believed 
this would revitalise the British economy and ensure Europe was driven by a 
friendly power.90 The Nixon administration did not automatically subscribe to 
such thinking. Certainly, the president reassured both Wilson and Heath on 
multiple occasions that the US supported British membership.91 Furthermore, 
Nixon even offered clandestine US support for Britain’s application.92 Given that 
this was the flagship policy of  the Heath government, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that the president would make such utterances in a bilateral conversation. 
If, however, one studies the documentary record of  the internal debates in 
Washington, it becomes clear that considerable anxiety about British member-
ship of  the EEC existed. 
Soon after coming to power, the Nixon administration undertook a serious 
review of  US policy towards EEC enlargement. Nixon’s economic advisers were 
pushing the president to reconsider US support for EEC expansion and, reiter-
ating the types of  argument put forward since the mid-1960s, they suggested 
that EEC expansion would have a detrimental impact upon US economic inter-
ests. Nixon came under further pressure from domestic constituents with the 
Republican leadership advising that he should be more robust in challeng-
ing the protectionist trading practices of  the EEC.93 As Sonnenfeldt recalled, 
some US policy-makers were concerned about the possible development of  an 
economic ‘fortress Europe’.94 
John Connally, the confidant of  Nixon and US Treasury Secretary, was 
especially vocal in emphasising such thinking. In Connally’s opinion, EEC 
enlargement would only have negative consequences for US economic interests 
because it would increase the number of  countries that would adopt protec-
tionist policies.95 Connally appears to have been somewhat of  a bête noire for 
British policy-making elites. Greenhill noted that Connally ‘roughly handled’ 
the British chancellor of  the exchequer, Anthony Barber, during meetings. 
Heath was equally frustrated with Connally and he remarked that they had 
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‘killed the wrong man at Dallas’. Officials tasked with Britain’s EEC negotia-
tions even speculated as to whether Connally was advising Nixon against 
supporting British membership.96
Economic arguments, though important in the opinion of  Nixon, were not 
critical in determining US policy towards British membership of  the EEC. Nixon 
accepted that Heath was determined to obtain British membership of  the EEC 
and, as a result, US economic interests were likely to suffer. This, though, would 
be counterbalanced by the political benefits derived from British membership.97 
As the president candidly explained, the ‘economic guys’ should be ‘screwing’ 
one another, and ‘there ought to be a lot of  screwing going on’ but fundamen-
tally ‘the political aspects of  our relations should be overriding for both sides’.98 
In a less robust fashion, Nixon issued a memorandum in January 1971 that 
explained US economic policy had to ‘maintain close coordination with basic 
foreign policy objectives’.99 In the final assessment, Nixon was not prepared 
to sacrifice the political–military relationship with Europe for short-term 
economic gains.100
As the president made clear, the political aspects of  EEC enlargement 
were what fundamentally mattered. On this topic, Nixon’s political advisers 
presented conflicting advice. Walter Annenberg, the US ambassador to the UK, 
argued that British membership would advance US interests as it increased the 
likelihood that Europe would have a more ‘outward’ looking mentality, imply-
ing that Europe would assume a greater role in the global containment of  
the USSR. It also created the potential that the EEC would assume a greater 
proportion of  the European defence burden.101 Similar advice was provided 
by the State Department which supported their position by bringing in wider 
European questions, notably concerns about West Germany. They suggested 
that British membership was required because it would act as a natural coun-
terweight to West German dominance of  the EEC. Perhaps these arguments 
held particular resonance with the president given his ongoing concerns vis-à-
vis West Germany’s policy of  Ostpolitik.102 
The State Department’s advice was largely a regurgitation of  what it had 
recommended throughout the Kennedy–Johnson years.103 Unsurprisingly, 
given the growing bureaucratic squabbling between the State Department and 
Kissinger, such advice was met with little sympathy from him or his aides.104 
In October 1969, after prompting from his subordinates, Kissinger ordered a 
review of  US policy towards EEC enlargement.105 Kissinger himself  was reticent 
about EEC enlargement, given that his tendency to see international relations 
through a realist perspective provoked apprehension towards the emergence 
of  another bloc of  powers.106 As Kissinger had written in 1965, ‘European 
unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic disagreements. In many respects it 
may magnify rather than reduce differences.’107 Kissinger articulated similar 
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arguments when in government, arguing that an ‘independent Europe could 
prove to be a competitive power center with the US’.108
Such evidence should not be taken as indicative of  Kissinger’s European 
policy. It has to be remembered that Kissinger balanced such judgements by 
arguing, ‘Our security and our prosperity are both insolubly linked with the 
security and prosperity of  Western Europe’.109 For Kissinger, American secu-
rity could not be divorced from that of  Western Europe. Moreover, economics, 
which was being pushed so heavily as a reason against supporting EEC expan-
sion, was actually of  marginal concern to Kissinger. He was notorious for 
demonstrating a lack of  knowledge of, or interest in, economics during his 
early years in office. As Arthur Burns, the chairman of  the Federal Reserve, 
noted, Kissinger was, self-admittedly, ‘ignorant’ about economics.110 
The report ordered by Kissinger about EEC enlargement was largely support-
ive of  the concept and it noted that it was, in the main, in the interests of  the 
US. As the report reasoned, if  Britain failed to gain entry into the EEC, it ‘might 
well leave us saddled with the UK and the pound in a permanent client status’. 
This would have obvious negative economic consequences, but any hopes of  
increased military burden-sharing would also be negated.111 A month later, 
another paper on EEC expansion was produced that largely repeated this argu-
ment.112 These internal working papers were finally established as a National 
Security Decision Memorandum which concluded that the US would ‘support 
… expansion of  the membership of  the Community’.113
Nixon thus re-affirmed the earlier policy of  the Kennedy–Johnson adminis-
trations of  supporting British membership of  the EEC. This did not, however, 
cement US policy. Rather, highly influential US officials continued to question 
the wisdom of  pursuing this course. Nixon’s economic advisers continued 
with their onslaught of  advice, suggesting a more proactive approach should 
be taken to defend US economic interests.114 It was clear during the break-
down of  the Bretton Woods system in 1971 that Nixon was following some 
of  this advice. Whilst his economic advisers were far from unanimous in their 
support for taking a tougher line in trade disputes, the advice from the likes of  
John Connally won through.115 Accordingly, as Donald Rumsfeld noted, Nixon 
decided to ‘grab the old shotgun and pull the trigger’.116 This took the form of  
halting dollar–gold convertibility and placing a 10 per cent surcharge on all 
imports. These decisions were reached in the utmost secrecy and took scant 
regard for America’s allies. By the beginning of  1972, it is right to conclude 
that, at least in the economic realm, US–European relations had turned into a 
‘competitive relationship’.117
Kissinger and his staff  also remained less than convinced that US interests 
were best served by encouraging British membership of  the EEC. Sonnenfeldt 
took his concerns to the president, where he complained about the EEC’s lack 
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of  leadership and the unwillingness of  the European states to contribute more 
fully to the NATO alliance. Nixon agreed with this assessment, noting that there 
was a ‘vacuum of  leadership in Europe which we must fill’. Even Annenberg 
had tempered his earlier advice, warning: ‘Heath is thinking “Britain first” and 
wants Britain to command respect in the world. As we noted in our last exami-
nation of  British foreign policy last December this assertive attitude is bound to 
result in differences between us.’ US policy-makers, whilst officially supporting 
British membership of  the EEC, were privately far more reticent.118
Regardless of  US policy, it became increasingly obvious that Britain would 
attain membership of  the EEC. Following a long meeting between Heath and 
Pompidou in May 1971, a fundamental agreement had been struck to allow 
British entry into the EEC. Following further negotiations, it was confirmed 
that Britain would enter the EEC on 1 January 1973.119 This clearly signified 
that the British had, at some level at least, accepted that their future inter-
ests would largely be bound to those of  the European region. No longer would 
the UK seek a global role on the scale that it had done previously and it also 
signalled that the Heath government was determined to operate within the 
framework of  the EEC. This would mean that the UK would be looking to estab-
lish not only common economic policies with their EEC partners but political 
ones also.120 All of  this created the potential for US–UK disagreements in the 
near future. 
 Détente and its consequence
Since taking office, Nixon had sought to reconfigure US foreign policy in order 
to confront the myriad problems facing the US. Amongst the most pressing 
included the American extrication from Vietnam, along with the worsening 
economic situation. For Nixon, the US was facing a gradual decline in its global 
power and this needed to be tackled. Détente was the policy through which 
these circumstances were managed.121 The establishment of  détente with the 
USSR, the opening to the PRC, and the subsequent impact this would have 
upon US foreign policy actions – notably during the India–Pakistan War – had 
profound ramifications for US–UK relations. Negotiations encouraged by the 
détente process, notably the CSCE and MBFR, also produced US–UK difference 
but also considerable diplomatic consultation. 
During Nixon and Heath’s first meeting, the president insisted he wanted 
close US–UK consultation which would not only occur during moments of  
crisis but would rather become a routine activity.122 Throughout the ensuing 
years, this declaration would prove rather hollow. For example, Nixon’s 
opening to the PRC was conducted without any prior consultation with the 
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British. Likewise, Nixon’s major Vietnam policies, including the incursion into 
Cambodia, the Easter bombings, and the Christmas bombings of  1972, were 
taken without even a modicum of  discussion with their British ally taking 
place.123 The deepening of  US–USSR bilateral diplomacy also largely excluded 
the British. Ironically, since the governments of  Macmillan and Wilson, British 
policy had sought to achieve superpower détente. Once achieved, it was now 
viewed as being just as irksome as superpower confrontation!124 As Kissinger 
astutely noted in his memoirs, détente had created a predicament where the 
Europeans ‘dreaded a US–Soviet condominium’.125 Or, as he suggested in 
private conversation, the real reason the Europeans were distrustful of  détente 
was that they ‘didn’t do it themselves’.126 As another commentator stated in 
1970, ‘for Europeans, contemporary America is doubtless a less certain protec-
tor, a less committed partner’.127 Certainly, such descriptions applied to many 
parts of  the British policy-making establishment.
Before assuming office, both Nixon and Kissinger had argued that the US 
had to engineer a rapprochement with the PRC.128 Once in the White House, 
the president set out to accomplish this and by November 1971, following 
many months of  intricate and secretive diplomacy, US efforts paid off. Nixon 
was invited to the PRC; his visit was set for February 1972.129 There should 
have been very little in Nixon’s rapprochement with the PRC to have caused 
US–UK disagreement. British policy had traditionally been more amenable to 
Mao’s China than that of  the US and Britain had officially recognised the PRC in 
January 1950 (leading to disagreement between London and Washington).130 
Moreover, when Heath had taken power, he too was seeking to improve rela-
tions with the PRC.131 US–UK problems largely existed due to the manner 
in which the president established his opening to the PRC, because Nixon 
demanded that the US–PRC rapprochement be conducted with the utmost of  
secrecy – only four days prior notification was given to British officials regard-
ing the president’s forthcoming visit to the PRC.132 This was hardly a sufficient 
amount of  time for Britain to proffer advice on Nixon’s endeavours. The limited 
pre-warning, coupled with the total lack of  consultation, contradicted Nixon’s 
earlier espousal of  a desire for ‘close and continual’ US–UK consultation. Heath 
was also personally piqued by Nixon’s actions, because he had kept the US fully 
informed of  his own efforts to improve relations with the PRC. Nixon’s conduct 
stood in stark contrast to this.133 
Aside from upsetting Heath personally, the opening to the PRC had other 
discernible effects upon US–UK relations. The most obvious ramification was 
the policy pursued by the US during the India–Pakistan War (December 1971), 
which was governed by wider geopolitical considerations to the neglect of  the 
realities driving the conflict on the ground.134 Border disputes between China 
and India had led to war in 1962 and China had subsequently supported 
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Pakistan as a counterweight to Indian power (which was in turn supported 
by the USSR). Indian–Pakistani tensions were running high over the future 
of  East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh), and the possibility of  an Indian–
Chinese confrontation mounted. From the perspective of  the Nixon White 
House, the signing of  the Indian–Soviet treaty of  August 1971 confirmed their 
long-held suspicions about Indian ‘neutralism’ in the Cold War and height-
ened the possibility of  an Indian–Soviet conflagration with China–Pakistan.135 
This context, together with the importance Nixon attached to the PRC 
opening, resulted in the US ‘tilting’ towards Pakistan during the India–Pakistan 
war.136 With the war barely three days old, Pakistan was faring badly, and the 
naval losses of  two destroyers and a submarine gave naval superiority to Indian 
forces. Further, the Indian army – if  not supreme – was forcing its Pakistan 
counterpart to retreat from East Pakistan.137 The Nixon White House watched 
the unfolding events with increasing alarm, and therefore sought a ceasefire 
agreement in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which was designed 
to halt the fighting and leave the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan.
US policy was designed primarily with a view to supporting Pakistan’s presi-
dent Yahya Khan, as Pakistan under his rule provided a useful bulwark against 
what the US perceived was Soviet-backed Indian expansion in the region. Thus, 
the US ambassador at the United Nations, George H. Bush, labelled the Indians 
as the aggressor in the war, and called for a ceasefire which would return East 
Pakistan to Pakistani control.138 This turn of  events, however, brought US 
and UK policy into direct conflict. British officials believed that the war had 
erupted as a result of  Pakistani provocation. Moreover, the British did not view 
the conflict through the Cold War lens that Washington did and concluded 
that Indian actions were in response to local factors and were not designed 
as a smokescreen for possible Soviet aggrandisement in the region. For these 
reasons, Heath rejected the US ceasefire terms.139 
Following further fighting, East Pakistan was annexed and declared indepen-
dent by India. US moves to influence the outcome had been largely ineffective. 
For instance, the despatching of  a US naval task force to act as a ‘signal’ to the 
USSR against interfering was unable to prevent the Pakistani army suffering a 
military defeat at the hands of  Indian forces.140 In Washington, recrimination 
was the order of  the day. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that if  the British 
had supported their UNSC Resolution then the war could have been stopped 
before Pakistan’s defeat.141 Not all shared this assessment, and other US 
officials had little sympathy with Kissinger’s ‘tantrums’. Nixon’s chief  of  staff, 
H. R. Haldeman, believed the US response to the war had been ill-conceived and 
that Kissinger’s actions had created a diplomatic ‘loss’ for the US. In his assess-
ment, blaming the British was solely designed by Kissinger to deflect attention 
away from this fact.142 
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Whether the British supporting a UN resolution would have made much 
difference is largely a moot point. What mattered for US–UK relations was the 
fact that both Nixon and Kissinger believed the British had undermined their 
policies. Therefore, a president–prime minister summit scheduled to take place 
in Bermuda in December 1971 was perhaps an impromptu moment for such 
an event to be held. Nonetheless, as Sonnenfeldt noted, it gave the opportunity 
for Britain and America to ‘mend fences’.143 British diplomats welcomed this 
American attitude. The FCO was especially keen to exploit the summit; they 
saw it as an opportunity to repair some of  the fallout over both the Bretton 
Woods collapse and the India–Pakistan war.144 
At the summit, Nixon and Kissinger elaborated on their recent policy initia-
tives. They explained why they had not been able to communicate their decision 
over the China opening but promised that, ‘We’d like to keep you informed on 
a personal basis’ about US policy in the upcoming months. They also explained 
their policy regarding the India–Pakistan war. Again, Nixon promised to estab-
lish firmer US–UK consultations to avoid future misunderstandings of  one 
another’s policies. Nixon also explained why he had adopted his economic poli-
cies during the year.145
In addition, US–UK nuclear cooperation was discussed with the ongoing 
Polaris Improvement Project, initiated soon after Heath had won office, being 
of  greatest importance, given that it required additional US assistance. The 
president gave his personal assurance that this cooperation would continue.146 
The discussions appeared to have met the FCO’s ambition of  ensuring recent 
US–UK difficulty did not impinge upon the wider relationship. Moreover, Nixon 
had announced at the beginning of  the conference that the US would abolish 
the 10 per cent surcharge upon all imports that it had enacted earlier in the 
year.147 While not undertaken because of  Heath’s diplomacy, the fact remained 
that the timing of  the announcement coincided with the start of  the Bermuda 
talks, thus affording the prime minister the allure of  international influence 
upon US policy decisions.
Theory and reality
The Bermuda Conference gave an impression that recent difficulties in US–UK 
relations were in the past. As one newspaper reported, the US–UK relation-
ship was embarking upon a ‘new era’, but one in which the Atlantic alliance 
remained as the ‘cornerstone of  the free world’s defence’.148 Publicly, the pres-
ident’s press secretary, Ron Ziegler, also gave the impression that Nixon had 
enjoyed his talks with Heath.149 When Heath arrived back in London, he 
conveyed a similar impression that recent US–UK difficulties were now settled. 
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He informed his colleagues that he had managed to get US agreement for 
increased diplomatic consultation and that the US would keep his government 
fully informed about the developing superpower relationship.150 US officialdom 
did little to disabuse their British counterparts of  such an opinion.151
This new era in US–UK openness was quickly shown to be illusory. Nixon’s 
visit to the PRC (21–28 February 1972) illustrated that the assurances he 
had given to Heath were little more than words.152 British officialdom received 
no more information regarding the US visit than any other European power. 
Thus, the FCO had to rely upon television coverage to gauge how the visit was 
progressing. Moreover, such a predicament heightened British suspicions of  US 
motives and about what the US was actually discussing with the PRC.153 
Lord Cromer was subsequently ordered to ‘smoke out’ Kissinger to ascer-
tain the US’s motives.154 Cromer, for his part, was clearly more relaxed about 
the American silence than his colleagues. Whilst Nixon had declared his visit 
to the PRC as ‘the week that changed the world’, Cromer believed that the lack 
of  communication could be attributed to American embarrassment at not 
having reached any substantive agreements with the PRC. This view was also 
shared by the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).155 A survey of  the memo-
randums of  the conversations which took place between Chairman Mao, 
Prime Minister Chou En Lai, President Nixon, and Henry Kissinger appear to 
somewhat undermine such an assessment.156 The subject of  Taiwan, though 
originally dismissed by Kissinger in his memoirs as having been a peripheral 
issue and thus mentioned only briefly, was discussed in detail.157 Obviously, 
a potential change in America’s military and legal commitments to Taiwan 
would have practical implications for Asia. Moreover, the Shanghai communi-
qué – coupled with the geopolitical implications of  the visit – demonstrated the 
rising significance of  the US–PRC relationship on the global stage.158 
Despite Cromer’s personal assessment, he followed his instructions and 
sought to learn more from Kissinger. The British ambassador was to have little 
success. Unable to gain an audience with Kissinger, he had to make do with 
a debriefing from William Rogers. Cromer was under no illusions as to what 
Rogers would be able to divulge and complained to London: ‘I doubt whether 
we shall learn a great deal from this source.’159 President Nixon’s personal 
correspondence with Heath also produced little more information. British 
officials had little unique US information with which to determine the outcome 
of  Nixon’s China visit. Instead, their assessments were drawn from the 
Shanghai communiqué, Secretary Rogers’ briefing to NATO, and discussions 
with minor US officials.160 
Nixon’s personal promise to keep Heath informed regarding his thinking on 
world affairs was not apparent during his visit to the PRC. It should not be forgot-
ten, however, that Heath did actually support Nixon’s rapprochement with the 
02_Strained_partnership_024-072.indd   43 18/11/2013   09:37
44 A strained partnership?
PRC. Indeed, British support of  Nixon’s PRC policies won him approval. The 
British had been ‘damn good’ about the PRC opening, Nixon declared during 
a private meeting. ‘We couldn’t have a better ally’ was the opinion of  William 
Rogers.161 Evidently the British government had presented an outward impres-
sion of  warmth to their American colleagues, but the lack of  consultation over 
the PRC opening generated resentment in London. The prime minister wanted 
to be better informed than he was. Washington, however, was not forthcom-
ing on this occasion.
The reason for this was manifold. As outlined above, the Nixon administra-
tion had conducted their diplomacy with the PRC in an extremely secretive 
fashion. The possibility of  US–PRC interaction being leaked prior to Nixon offi-
cially opening relations was something the president was not prepared to risk. 
There was, however, a wider structural issue at play, and that was simply that 
the UK was no longer important or powerful enough to warrant close consul-
tation on all facets of  US foreign policy.162 UK policy-makers certainly would 
have preferred deep consultative discussions with their US counterparts. Given 
the importance attached to Hong Kong by the British, perhaps there was a 
legitimate basis of  complaint. Regardless, the Nixon administration appeared 
none too interested in British sensibilities. As the president summed up in 
conversation: 
Heath – comes here, he loves to talk about, ‘Oh, how was your trip to China?’ 
He likes to talk about the Russian arms, what we’re going to do about 
[unclear] of  course he does. And what’s going to happen in the Mideast, and 
what can we do. But he knows, as he talks to me, that what the British do 
doesn’t make a damn bit of  a difference in the world anymore. It’s too bad, 
but it’s true.163
SALT and Moscow
Following Nixon’s visit to the PRC, he once again shocked onlookers by 
announcing a visit to the USSR. As with the PRC opening, the strictest secrecy 
was employed in engineering this summit. Again, the British were only given 
brief  notice about the visit.164 British officials were deeply concerned about 
Nixon’s latest gambit and the FCO commissioned a paper that would pre-empt 
any ‘fait accomplis’ that Britain would have to face as a result of  the Moscow 
summit. A US–USSR summit was seen to hold much greater potential for 
damaging British interests than the US–PRC rapprochement not least because 
of  the nuclear negotiations that these talks entailed. Of  particular concern was 
the subject of  SALT because the Moscow summit would potentially conclude 
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some agreement which British policy-makers feared would undermine existing 
US–UK nuclear arrangements.165
The SALT process had begun during the Johnson administration and, even 
though US involvement in Vietnam had strained US–USSR relations, by 1968 
Lyndon Johnson had decided to visit the USSR where nuclear arms limitation 
was to be a topic open for serious discussion. Events, however, interceded in 
such plans and the USSR’s invasion of  Czechoslovakia in August 1968 made 
it politically impractical for the US president to visit the USSR, and thus the 
proposed trip was cancelled. With the visit cancelled, progress on SALT stalled 
and it was not until the Nixon administration took power in January 1969 that 
SALT would begin again.166 
For the Nixon administration, SALT was to be taken as one point in the over-
arching policy of  linkage. SALT, therefore, would be linked to advances in other 
areas of  US–USSR interaction. In particular, the US government was deter-
mined not to move on SALT until a satisfactory Berlin agreement had been 
reached with Moscow.167 SALT was also conducted on a bilateral basis between 
the two superpowers. As Nixon candidly put it in discussion with the Soviet 
ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin:
Let’s be realistic. The key to this sort of  thing [SALT] is what the two major 
nuclear powers will do. It is a question of  leadership at the top – I don’t mean 
at the top of  governments, but at the top of  this group of  five.168
Such an attitude was worrying from the British perspective as any SALT agree-
ment could have consequences for British interests. A general concern was 
that SALT would gradually erode the US nuclear guarantee to NATO. This, of  
course, was hardly a new phenomenon. Since the origins of  NATO, a perennial 
British concern had been that the US would loosen its nuclear commitments. 
More specifically was the worry that the US would agree a SALT treaty that 
would prevent future US–UK nuclear cooperation.169 
It should not be forgotten that Heath’s government supported the general 
concept of  SALT because it was deemed to promote long-term British interests 
as it would halt a needless arms race and encourage a more stable interna-
tional order.170 Nonetheless, there were specific points of  interest where SALT 
concerned the British government. These included the possibility of  an Anti-
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, a ‘No Transfer’ agreement and a reduction in 
Forward Base Systems. Perhaps the most worrisome aspect was the possi-
bility that SALT would curtail existing and future US–UK nuclear weapons 
cooperation. The ‘No Transfer’ possibility was, therefore, viewed with particu-
lar concern. Officials within the MOD had ascertained that the US had agreed 
with the Soviets to not circumvent a SALT agreement by providing ‘significant’ 
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nuclear weapons to a third party. It also suggested that nuclear assistance, i.e. 
providing other states with nuclear technology, would be limited or entirely 
outlawed.171 
This had obvious ramifications for Britain’s Polaris deterrent yet the US 
had made no mention of  this directly to them.172 Instead, the British govern-
ment learned this information from Raymond Garthoff, a member of  the US 
SALT negotiating team. However, Garthoff  did not represent White House 
policy because Nixon preferred to negotiate the substance of  SALT through 
Kissinger’s backchannel with Anatoly Dobrynin.173 This was obviously prob-
lematic from the British perspective as they were unaware of  the content of  
these meetings. While the British received briefings on the general thrust of  US 
policy (something Nixon had insisted on, much to the chagrin of  his defense 
secretary, Melvin Laird), the fact remained that British policy-makers felt they 
were not adequately briefed about US intentions.174 As such, we can see from 
British documentation that a general trend can be discerned: as US–USSR 
détente established itself, British fears of  US–UK nuclear cooperation being 
curtailed increased.175 
Once Nixon’s visit to Moscow was under way (May 1972), Heath sought 
to gather as much information as possible about the trip. Establishing the 
finer details of  the SALT agreement was viewed as fundamentally important. 
Compared to China, British officials were much more successful. To be sure, 
the British ambassador in Moscow, John Killick, reported that he had nothing 
of  substance to inform London. ‘We seem to be out in the cold’ was Solly 
Zuckerman’s appraisal.176 Heath, however, was not as much ‘out in the cold’ as 
such reports would suggest. Unbeknownst to Killick and Zuckerman, Kissinger 
had agreed to keep Trend privately informed of  American negotiations at the 
summit.177 Regardless of  this channel, British officials continued to suspect 
that the Americans were not supplying them with the full picture. To compen-
sate for this, Douglas-Home ordered the British Embassy in Washington to try 
to elicit further information from Kissinger. While gaining more knowledge, 
the British remained sceptical about US policy.178 
Though British officials may have been nervous about the likely contents 
of  a US–USSR nuclear arms agreement, the ones reached, in particular the 
interim SALT I agreement and the ABM treaty, were on balance viewed opti-
mistically.179 The ABM treaty was generally interpreted as being in the British 
interest because it had prevented the widespread deployment of  ABMs. Those 
tasked with analysing such matters believed that widespread ABM deployment 
would have led to serious questions about the credibility of  Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent. Therefore, the final US–USSR agreement to limit their ABM deploy-
ment to only two sites, and for the ABMs to total only 100 interceptors apiece, 
was seen to have prevented their widespread deployment.180
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The US was not ignorant of  potential British and NATO concerns about 
what SALT meant for future security cooperation. Nixon had sought to reas-
sure Heath that the US government would never enter into an agreement with 
the Soviet Union that would undermine Britain’s nuclear ability.181 The presi-
dent also publicly sought to reassure his allies and in a joint session of  Congress 
Nixon stated that:
By the same token, we must stand steadfastly with our NATO partners if  
negotiations leading us to a new détente and a mutual reduction of  forces 
in Europe are to be productive. Maintaining the strength, integrity, and 
steadfastness of  our free world alliances is the foundation on which all of  
our other initiatives for peace and security in the world must rest. As we seek 
better relations with those who have been our adversaries, we will not let 
down our friends and allies around the world.182 
None of  these reassurances did much to alleviate suspicions within the FCO or 
MOD in London. Thus, both departments continued to advise the prime minis-
ter that he should seek to bilaterally utilise his relationship with Nixon to gain 
more information about US policy.183
These continued British feelings of  marginalisation were reported to 
Washington, which presented an interesting conundrum for US policy-
makers. Since the outset of  détente, key US officials had feared this could create 
the ‘atmospherics of  peace’, which in turn could be exploited by the USSR.184 
Superpower détente could also easily be perceived as superpower duplicity 
and British officials made this known to Kissinger and Rogers on numerous 
occasions.185 Given Nixon’s exploits in China, along with the signing of  the 
SALT and ABM agreements, US policy-makers were especially conscious of  
such accusations.186 Consequently, the president attempted to sooth British 
concerns about a potential superpower condominium. Nixon assured Trend 
that the US would not ‘go off ’ with the USSR and establish agreements that 
would negatively infringe upon the allies of  the US. Nixon offered ‘very private 
President to Prime Minister talks through the White House Channel’ to further 
explain the content of  US–USSR diplomacy.187
Nixon’s offer of  bilateral contact did little to quell British suspicions. Reports 
continued to arrive in Washington about British concerns towards détente, 
superpower summitry and SALT. Kissinger’s visit to Moscow in September 1972 
was reported by David Kennedy, the US permanent representative to NATO, to 
have raised particular concern.188 Such reporting was, however, contradicted 
by Secretary Rogers. He informed the president that the British were satisfied 
with the consultation they were receiving over US–USSR bilateral diplomacy 
with Kissinger’s personal briefings being particularly appreciated.189
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In private, British assessments were much more in keeping with the analy-
sis offered by Kennedy. British officialdom remained highly sceptical about the 
entire direction of  the détente process. As the highly influential JIC argued, 
whilst superpower summits were unlikely to fundamentally alter the foreign 
policy of  either superpower, the increased communication between the two 
superpowers underscored the ‘special nature’ of  their relationship. This would 
set in motion the opportunity for further exclusive superpower summits which 
increased the likelihood of  a superpower settlement that would undermine 
British security interests.190 
The US engaging more heavily in bilateral diplomacy with the USSR thus 
served to increase British concerns about détente. Indeed, at the Moscow 
summit in May 1972 the two superpowers had gone some way to institution-
alising their relationship when they signed an agreement of  ‘basic principles’ 
which would underpin US–USSR conduct of  foreign affairs.191 Interestingly, 
this increased superpower bilateralism appears to have had a direct impact on 
Britain’s European policy as the extension of  superpower bilateral diplomacy 
supported Heath’s argument that EEC membership was essential for safe-
guarding Britain’s interests in a world dominated by two superpowers.192 As 
one Cabinet briefing paper stated: ‘The spectacle of  the two superpowers locked 
in private talks for over a week, with most of  the US Government machin-
ery excluded, reinforces the need for progress towards a common European 
foreign policy.’193 The Nixon administration’s level of  briefings on the PRC and 
Moscow openings irritated officials in Whitehall. The president did not feel he 
needed to consult with Britain in order to achieve what he wanted. On the 
actual substance of  the talks, this was clearly the case. The US could consult 
the British if  they desired, but ultimately British opinion was of  little weight. US 
policy, however, was hardly conducive to alliance solidarity.
On the one hand we can appreciate why British officials continued to be 
sceptical about American policy. The Nixon administration was never really 
forthcoming in providing the level of  detail about their discussions with the 
USSR which could have perhaps alleviated British fears. Added to this was 
the fact that the British government was at this stage in the process of  analys-
ing whether or not their own strategic nuclear deterrent, Polaris, required 
upgrading and, if  it did, then deciding what the preferred method for achiev-
ing this was. Obviously, reaching a decision would be dictated in large measure 
by the American attitude, and the likely American response to any British 
request for further nuclear assistance would be influenced by the US’s own 
strategic arms programmes and any legal obligations to which they had 
committed. Even in such a context, British fears that the US would perma-
nently undermine the US–UK nuclear relationship in order to secure a 
US–USSR nuclear arms agreement were slightly exaggerated. The Nixon 
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administration did not believe it had to reach any agreement on ‘third party’ 
nuclear weapons in order to achieve a SALT agreement. As Nixon and 
Kissinger had made clear during private conversations with Soviet officials, 
the US would not enter into negotiations with the USSR about the British 
nuclear deterrent.194 Nevertheless, British concerns about the reliability of  the 
United States continued. 
CSCE and MBFR
As the US and USSR continued their détente agenda, other areas of  interna-
tional diplomacy continued to be a source of  US–UK disagreement. The first of  
these related to the possibility of  a CSCE. The USSR had sought a CSCE since 
the 1950s, because it saw this as a potential opportunity for ratifying the post-
World War II borders of  Europe.195 Regardless of  actual Soviet intentions, this 
was how the Nixon administration viewed Soviet motives.196 Until the begin-
ning of  the 1970s there had been limited progress on the CSCE. Previously, 
the USSR had insisted that the CSCE should be conducted exclusively between 
the USSR and European states. This insistence to exclude the US realistically 
prevented any further development on the CSCE. By 1970, however, the USSR 
accepted that the US should be present in the CSCE negotiations. The CSCE 
was now a subject that could no longer be ignored. As Kissinger explained to 
Nixon, a refusal to engage in the CSCE would give the USSR an easy propa-
ganda victory. More worryingly, US obduracy could result in Western Europe 
negotiating bilaterally with the USSR, and reaching an agreement which could 
undermine US interests.197 
For the Nixon administration, such changes were unwelcome. The CSCE 
was seen by the president and Kissinger as an irritant. One of  Kissinger’s aides 
claimed that Kissinger viewed the CSCE with ‘disdain’.198 Certainly, if  you go 
through the US documentation pertaining to the CSCE, you will find numer-
ous examples of  both Nixon and Kissinger casting scorn upon the entire 
CSCE process.199 This lack of  interest in the CSCE has been noted by several 
writers.200 Nevertheless, all of  this misses a broader point. While the Nixon 
White House had little enthusiasm for the CSCE, it was viewed as another tool 
in which the US could exert leverage upon the USSR. This meant progress on 
the CSCE would be linked directly to matters deemed more important, such as 
Vietnam, SALT and a Berlin settlement. Washington believed that the Soviets 
were enthusiastic about the CSCE; delaying movement on the CSCE then was 
seen as having the potential to soften Soviet policy in other areas. Accordingly, 
US policy directly linked progress on a Berlin settlement with movement on the 
CSCE.201
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Senior members of  Heath’s government were equally disdainful about 
the idea of  a CSCE. Douglas-Home, for instance, told American officials 
that he would prefer the CSCE to never take place. The CSCE was a ‘horrify-
ing prospect’, he later told William Rogers.202 Lord Carrington made similar 
views known. For Carrington, the CSCE would create the impression that 
the USSR no longer posed a threat to Western security, and would critically 
undermine efforts to improve NATO’s defence commitments.203 In spite of  
this, the British understood that given that East–West relations were improv-
ing within the broader climate of  détente, resisting the CSCE would become 
increasingly difficult. Other states, notably West Germany and France, were 
looking to the CSCE as a means of  significantly improving East–West rela-
tions and were actively pursuing a policy that would see one come into being. 
In a sense, Douglas-Home was correct when he claimed that the CSCE was 
‘unavoidable’.204 
While the Nixon administration was seeking to extrapolate concessions in 
other areas of  US–USSR diplomacy for participating in the CSCE, the Heath 
administration sought a quick conclusion to the project. For the British, this 
would ensure that nothing of  substance would be dealt with. Furthermore, it 
would also prevent any type of  superpower deal that would trade the CSCE for 
some larger prize. The British, therefore, sought to be actively engaged in the 
negotiations in order to craft the CSCE according to their interests. This position 
was reported to Washington and one telegram noted, the British government 
believed: ‘The West does not stand to gain from a CSCE so the Allies should try to 
get the Conference over with quickly rather than dawdle unduly over probably 
fruitless efforts to secure substantive results’. Internal studies in Washington 
only confirmed that this was actual British policy.205
Clearly, US and UK policy towards the CSCE contradicted one another. The 
US sought a long, drawn-out negotiation as a means of  convincing the USSR 
to take a softer line in other areas of  its foreign policy. The British, mean-
while, wanted a speedy resolution to the project and a CSCE which dealt with 
little in the form of  substance. Nonetheless, it was not until 1972 that these 
differences began to have a practical effect upon US–UK relations. With the 
signing of  the first protocol on a Berlin settlement in September 1971, Western 
European enthusiasm for a CSCE grew. This only encouraged the British to find 
a common Western negotiating position regarding the CSCE. The US, mean-
while, was encouraging its Western allies to delay progress. Nixon, having 
achieved Soviet movement with regards to Berlin, decided now to delay prog-
ress on the CSCE until the Soviets had made substantive moves on MBFR and 
arms control.206 
This policy shift in Washington did not sit well with those in London. As 
Denis Greenhill complained to his deputy, Thomas Brimelow:
02_Strained_partnership_024-072.indd   50 18/11/2013   09:37
Re-assessing foreign policy 51
I find the American attitude ... rather disturbing. If  they are going to lie low at 
the Conference it will greatly weaken our defences against a Russian attempt 
to steam roller an undesirable Declaration of  Principles. The Americans may 
not like the idea of  the conference any more than we do and may rightly 
blame the Europeans for permitting it to come about. But it would be very 
serious if  they abandoned us at this point and let the Russians have a major 
propaganda victory.207
That there was a tactical conflict in US and UK policy should not have come 
as a surprise to Washington. Douglas-Home had informed Rogers that trying 
to stall the CSCE would only provide a propaganda coup for the USSR and as 
such the West should seek its swift conclusion. Both Nixon and Kissinger were 
aware of  British thinking: ‘The British believe that a Conference is an unavoid-
able evil, should be given short shrift, and closed out as quickly as possible with 
minimum damage’.208 
Being aware of  British policy did not mean that the Nixon administration 
was happy with it and they continued to seek to delay the CSCE. Indeed, it was 
their stated ambition to avoid any CSCE agreement in 1972.209 However, British 
negotiators at the CSCE were pushing for a resolution to the project. From 
the perspective of  the US, British policy was clearly undermining their wider 
foreign policy objectives. Simply put, if  the British managed to force through a 
CSCE agreement then the US would have less leverage in persuading the USSR 
to adopt a less hostile stance on matters deemed to be of  greater importance 
by Washington, i.e. arms control and MBFR. The president, therefore, took 
the opportunity during a meeting with Burke Trend to repeat US policy and 
admonish British behaviour at the CSCE negotiations. As Trend reported to 
London, Nixon claimed that Britain’s CSCE policy had harmed Western inter-
ests. The US wanted the negotiations to be dragged out for as long as possible 
as this would allow the West to enact a degree of  influence on other areas of  
Soviet policy. The line which British policy was pursuing had squandered this 
political leverage.210 
While aware of  US dissatisfaction, it did little to affect the course of  
British policy. More broadly, British efforts were all rather moot given the 
evolution of  events. A swift resolution to the CSCE appeared unlikely 
given that the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, which convened in November 
1972, had representatives from over 35 countries. Aside from the simple 
mass of  countries present was the more important problem that little common 
agreement existed between them. Thus, it was always likely that finding 
a common agreement would be an arduous process. Events would later 
prove this to be the case, given that the CSCE would not be concluded until 
August 1975. 
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In spite of  US–UK disagreements over the CSCE, it should not be seen as 
indicative of  a relationship fraught with difficulties.211 Certainly differences of  
opinion existed regarding the substance of  what a CSCE should contain and 
the tactical approach each side should take towards it. However, there were 
no major ramifications for US–UK relations. Differences on the CSCE were not 
seriously impairing good relations, as both countries were kept informed of  
one another’s policy intentions. Such differences are better viewed as a natural 
policy schism between two countries. Furthermore, the CSCE was simply not 
important enough at this stage to have serious consequences for bilateral 
relations. 
MBFR
The spectre of  MBFR was an area of  deeper concern for US and UK policy-
makers. As Kissinger expressed, if  the MBFR was not handled correctly, it 
had the potential to ‘screw’ the entire NATO alliance.212 Likewise, the British 
government believed MBFR could potentially damage its security interests. 
British concerns centred on a large reduction in NATO’s conventional forces 
on a symmetrical basis. This meant that both sides would reduce their forces 
equally. Internal studies produced by the British Ministry of  Defence revealed 
that NATO’s conventional force position would relatively worsen vis-à-vis the 
Warsaw Pact if  such a policy was enacted. Accordingly, NATO would have 
to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons for occasions when their use would 
have been deemed inappropriate. As such, a ceiling approach to the negotia-
tions was preferable which meant that an agreement on a set number of  forces 
which each side could possess would be sought.213 
Regardless of  the actual specifics, Heath’s government wanted the MBFR to 
be vigorously analysed within NATO. Substantive policy was to be agreed in 
this forum and only then would serious negotiations with the Warsaw Pact 
begin. Heath’s government clearly attached great significance to this given 
that, during the first high-level meeting with the Nixon administration, both 
Carrington and Douglas-Home made their reservations known about MBFR. 
Both argued that NATO required force modernisation, and that an MBFR agree-
ment would only undermine efforts to convince NATO members to improve 
their defence efforts.214 
When he assumed the presidency, Nixon gave little attention to MBFR and 
it was only by the middle of  1971 that this position began to alter due to a 
number of  interlocking factors. Economics was clearly one reason behind 
this change given that the balance of  payments difficulties facing the US had 
become particularly acute by 1971. MBFR was, thus, viewed as an opportunity 
02_Strained_partnership_024-072.indd   52 18/11/2013   09:37
Re-assessing foreign policy 53
to reduce America’s military burden and help ease such economic prob-
lems.215 MBFR was also seen as an attractive way of  hedging against unilateral 
reductions in military forces by NATO members. The thinking ran that NATO 
members would enact force reductions regardless of  any MBFR settlement 
being reached. Therefore, an MBFR agreement could allow NATO to reduce its 
forces without having to suffer the strategic consequences of  this being done 
unilaterally.216 
Domestic politics were also prevalent in altering US policy. Confronting 
a hostile Congress which demanded troop reductions globally (in 1971 the 
Democrat Senator George McGovern, who would contest the 1972 presidential 
election, called for the halving of  American forces in Europe), the MBFR offered 
a way for Nixon to reduce America’s commitments while maintaining a rough 
equivalence with the USSR.217 Melvin Laird was especially conscious of  the 
domestic pressures being placed upon the administration. Although initially 
against NATO troop reductions, Laird advised Nixon that NATO troop reduc-
tions were needed to mitigate Congressional demands. In particular, Senator 
Mike Mansfield was leading a sustained attack against the administration’s 
unwillingness to reduce its global military presence, and its failure to convince 
its allies to increase their own military efforts. As such, Laird wanted the US 
to inform NATO that it would have to accept an increased reliance on tactical 
nuclear weapons for its defence, unless greater burden-sharing was enacted.218 
Kissinger was also feeling the effect of  Congressional opinion and the rejec-
tion of  the Nixon administration’s foreign aid budget gave added emphasis 
to the growing reluctance of  the US Congress to continue to fund the US’s 
global defence efforts.219 Following further pressure from Mansfield to reduce 
America’s European force levels, Kissinger suggested to Nixon that a ‘visible 
effort to get MBFR underway’ was needed to placate Congress.220 This then 
serves as a reminder to scholars that domestic political factors can have a 
profound impact upon the course of  foreign policy decisions.221 
As a consequence of  these factors, US MBFR policy was built upon twin 
pillars. It would seek to convince NATO to contribute more to the alliance. If  
this was achieved, then the US could reduce its own commitments without 
affecting the overall make-up of  NATO’s conventional forces. If  this was unsuc-
cessful, then the US would seriously negotiate with the USSR on an MBFR 
settlement. Nixon’s position, however, was to avoid reaching any hasty settle-
ment. Rather, US policy was designed to give an impression to Congress that 
the administration was seriously seeking to reduce America’s military burdens 
in Europe.222 The president had no intention of  being forced into finding a 
quick agreement by US Senators. 
Heath’s government found this shift in US policy all rather disconcert-
ing. Douglas-Home and Carrington still believed NATO would likely be 
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disadvantaged by any MBFR agreement. While understanding Nixon’s need to 
placate Congressional critics, they remained concerned that even beginning 
MBFR negotiations could seriously damage British security interests.223 British 
officials communicated these concerns clearly to their American counterparts 
and Annenberg reported that ‘the more the British look at MBFR, the more 
they dislike it. They see only a very small margin of  safety for NATO in such 
negotiations.’224 At the highest level, Heath expressed British worries to Nixon 
and Douglas-Home repeated similar concerns to Rogers.225 
Such complaints were met with little sympathy within the Nixon admin-
istration. As one aide informed Kissinger, ‘As you know, NATO generally 
takes a more pessimistic view of  the conventional balance in Europe than 
our own inter-agency analysis has shown’.226 However, the US was keen to 
placate their British ally and so Nixon informed Heath that MBFR was only 
being countenanced as it was a necessary ‘holding action’ against his domes-
tic critics and offered further ‘consultation and discussion’. Despite Nixon’s 
efforts, reports continued to arrive in Washington outlining British concerns 
towards MBFR.227 
Like the CSCE negotiations, the long drawn out process of  establishing an 
MBFR settlement was to be a continual source of  disagreement between British 
and American officials. This, however, must be viewed in its proper context. The 
differences over MBFR were not seen as a point of  major difficulty at this stage. 
Rather, it was a subject which both US and UK officials discussed at consid-
erable length amongst themselves. Indeed, such a state of  affairs should be 
deemed a natural part of  diplomacy between states. Disagreement on matters 
as intricate and detailed as MBFR are always likely to occur between two coun-
tries which varied so much in what each would deem to be their vital national 
interests. The fact that such disagreements were discussed often and at length 
between US and UK officials is perhaps indicative of  a close, though not harmo-
nious, relationship between the two countries’ policy-makers.
Conclusion
In opposition to existing accounts that tend to paint an overly dark assessment 
of  US–UK relations during 1969–72, many aspects of  US–UK cooperation 
functioned remarkably smoothly.228 Public and private support for Nixon’s 
policies in Vietnam was provided by the prime minister. Likewise, Heath would 
articulate public support for Nixon’s détente project more generally.229 In a 
similar fashion, Heath received the public backing from the president with 
regard to British membership of  the EEC. Moreover, US–UK interaction was 
maintained and reinvigorated in this period. This was clearly demonstrated 
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in the intelligence realm where the ‘JIC Net’ continued. In keeping with other 
eras, the station chief  of  the CIA was also invited to attend the meetings of  
the JIC. The National Security Agency (NSA), and its British counterpart, 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), continued their intelli-
gence relationship. On the nuclear side, US–UK working groups, which had 
been put on hiatus in the Wilson era, were once again resurrected to discuss 
potential avenues for upgrading Polaris.230 
Nevertheless, one should not paint an overly optimistic picture of  US–UK 
relations at this time. Many of  the key foreign policy objectives of  each state 
were causing deep concern in their respective capitals. British policy towards 
the EEC was met with deep scepticism in Washington. The policies emanating 
from détente created resentment and distrust in London. As one British news-
paper had correctly predicted following Nixon’s inauguration, the spectre of  
superpower negotiation would create ‘anxieties’ in London.231 These anxiet-
ies were predicated upon the belief  that superpower discussion would lead to 
superpower condominium, and, in turn, see vital Western security interests 
being sacrificed. Few predicated, however, that superpower détente would have 
larger ramifications for US–UK relations. This was seen throughout Nixon’s 
efforts to court the PRC and the impact this had upon US policy throughout the 
India–Pakistan war. Nixon’s international economic policies, most obviously 
in halting dollar to gold convertibility, again resulted in problems between the 
two countries. It also led to calls in London for closer US–EEC interaction. Most 
importantly, several unresolved points of  difference (namely, Britain’s role 
within the EEC) would have severe ramifications for US–UK bilateral relations 
throughout 1973–74. It is to this that we now turn. 
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A year of discord
1973–74
No special relations. Correct. They’ll [Britain] have the relation 
with the French. 
President Nixon to Henry Kissinger, 9 August 19731 
A year of discord
At the onset of  1973, the US–UK relationship was entering a new epoch. The 
East of  Suez withdrawal had lessened Britain’s global commitments and Britain 
officially entered the EEC on 1 January 1973. Heath was determined to chart 
a more Euro-centric British foreign policy, which would involve the creation of  
common political, foreign, monetary and energy policies within the EEC. The 
US had also undergone a re-assessment of  its global position and the Nixon 
administration had reconfigured US foreign policy with its détente agenda. The 
Paris Peace Accords (January 1973) officially ended the US’s involvement in 
Vietnam, and superpower détente had resulted in the opening to the PRC and 
the establishment of  US–Soviet bilateral diplomacy. 1973, therefore, presented 
new circumstances in which US–UK relations would be conducted, and it was 
the adaptation to this that created a number of  problems for US–UK relations.2
First, Britain’s membership of  the EEC created procedural difficulties for 
bilateral interaction, given that the EEC was seeking to produce common poli-
cies on a plethora of  topics, including monetary, trade and energy cooperation. 
It also envisaged the establishment of  common political and foreign policies. 
How the US would interact with the expanded EEC was a source of  continued 
difficulty for American and British policy-makers. Aside from procedural prob-
lems, Heath was determined to operate as a fully-fledged member of  the EEC. 
This meant that US–UK diplomacy could not be an avenue for solving US–EEC 
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matters. This was another area which caused much angst in Washington and 
led to profound consequences for US–UK relations, including the short-term 
postponement of  nuclear and intelligence cooperation.
All of  these US–UK difficulties were surrounded by the gradual erosion of  
President Nixon’s authority because of  the Watergate scandal.3 Even though 
Kissinger would dismiss Watergate as a ‘school boy prank’ and equated it to 
‘a bunch of  dogs snapping at the heels’ of  the president, the issue would soon 
dominate Nixon’s agenda.4 It was, as Kissinger noted, obvious that foreign policy 
issues were no longer Nixon’s top priority, and testament to this is that the anno-
tations and comments the president had always provided on briefing papers were 
now no longer made. Nixon – who was seriously considering firing Kissinger at 
the beginning of  1973, and who had promoted James Schlesinger to defense 
secretary in part to temper Kissinger’s dominance of  foreign policy – reluctantly 
accepted that US foreign policy would largely be directed by Henry Kissinger.5
Watergate and the impact it had upon the foreign policy decisions taken 
by the Nixon administration would also have a malign impact upon US–UK 
relations. For instance, UK policy in a number of  areas was informed by the 
president’s domestic problems. One of  the most important was the bearing it 
had upon Heath’s decision to upgrade Polaris. Likewise, US foreign policy deci-
sions could hardly be immune from Watergate. US policy-makers believed that 
Nixon’s domestic troubles explained, in part, why Britain refused to embrace 
the ‘Year of  Europe’. Such beliefs contributed to the more antagonistic policies 
undertaken by the US throughout 1973–74.6
This chapter is broken into three parts with the ‘Year of  Europe’ comprising 
the opening third. Following this is an assessment of  US−UK relations during 
the fourth Arab−Israeli war. Finally, the oil crisis which followed, along with 
the Washington Energy Conference of  February 1974, which was convened 
to solve this, are analysed within the context of  US−UK relations. For US–UK 
relations, the common theme throughout 1973–74 is largely one of  acrimony. 
British policy-makers, including the prime minister, believed Kissinger’s ‘Year 
of  Europe’ was a ploy designed to dominate the nascent common foreign policy 
of  the EEC. For their part, US policy-makers believed that a valuable bilateral 
relationship with the UK was being replaced by one built upon distrust and 
competition. The seriousness of  such political disputes resulted in the more 
practical aspects of  US–UK cooperation being affected. On two occasions, the 
US temporarily halted intelligence and nuclear cooperation because of  broader 
political disagreements. This occurred as a form of  political punishment, but 
it was also seen as a policy tool by Kissinger. In sum, Kissinger utilised US–UK 
bilateral cooperation as a means of  encouraging the British to take a less hostile 
approach to American political initiatives. This was witnessed during the ‘Year 
of  Europe’ as a means of  altering the perceived antagonistic policies of  the British 
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government; in the immediate aftermath of  the fourth Arab−Israeli war, in order 
to prevent the British pursuing a policy which would undermine Kissinger’s 
‘shuttle diplomacy’; and throughout the Washington Energy Conference, as a 
means of  ensuring that the British government supported Washington’s energy 
proposals. This coercive element in Kissinger’s foreign policy is something tradi-
tionally associated with his approach in relation to America’s adversaries, but, 
as shown below, it was applied to America’s British ally as well.7 
In spite of  these political differences, and serious bilateral disputes, US−UK 
cooperation continued in a number of  highly sensitive realms. For instance, 
Kissinger tasked Thomas Brimelow with drafting the US–USSR Prevention of  
Nuclear War Agreement.8 By November 1973, Heath had decided to upgrade 
Polaris. This required additional US assistance which Nixon approved in 
January 1974.9 Finally, throughout the Washington Energy Conference of  
February 1974, the Heath government worked closely with the Nixon admin-
istration even at the cost of  sacrificing EEC cohesiveness. This was largely done 
in order to protect Britain’s oil interests. Presented below then is a picture 
which highlights an antagonistic relationship between the two countries, but 
one which, although strained to near breaking point, survived intact and, 
indeed, by the time Edward Heath left office in February 1974, had been rein-
vigorated by the nuclear agreements between the two sides. 
‘Year of Europe’: Origins and motives 
The ‘Year of  Europe’ had its genesis in the autumn of  1972. The creation of  
superpower détente and finding a solution to the Vietnam War had dominated 
the agenda of  the president’s first term, and throughout the administration 
there was a belief  that the US had somewhat neglected their relationship 
with Europe. As Donald Rumsfeld recollected, the fact that he was appointed 
as Nixon’s third representative to NATO in February 1973 – following David 
Kennedy’s resignation some eight months earlier – suggested that the Nixon 
‘administration’s interest in [NATO] was at best modest’.10 More important 
still was that Nixon believed that relations with Europe were taking on a new 
competitive form. Certainly, throughout 1969–72, the US–EEC economic rela-
tionship had manifested in fierce competition, and political changes that were 
evolving would present new challenges for US–EEC relations. The most pressing 
was that the EEC was seeking to formulate an independent voice in interna-
tional affairs. Clearly, regardless of  what form this actually took, it would have 
some bearing on the future course of  US–EEC relations.
With EEC expansion confirmed at the beginning of  1973, Nixon sensed this 
was an opportune moment to address the situation.11 What then did the recently 
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re-elected president envisage? Simply, Nixon had the ambitious agenda to 
re-conceptualise US–EEC relations. In practical terms, this meant that all aspects 
of  US–EEC relations would be dealt with as a whole; discussions pertaining to 
monetary or trade matters would no longer be conducted in total isolation from 
those in the military/security realm. This, in British circles, took the moniker of  
the ‘one ball of  wax thesis’.12 It appeared, more appropriately, as an extension of  
Nixon’s linkage approach to foreign policy. Linkage, as seen in US foreign policy 
towards the USSR, would now be more explicitly applied to Europe.
US motives behind the ‘Year of  Europe’ created considerable debate, with 
Henry Kissinger providing his own weighty analysis. Kissinger suggested the 
initiative was required to revitalise relations with both Europe and NATO. 
NATO’s conventional force position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact was steadily wors-
ening and, in an age of  nuclear parity, NATO’s nuclear deterrent was deemed 
to have become less credible. US–EEC economic disputes were also jeopardising 
the political–military relationship. As such, a Declaration of  Principles would 
be created. This would outline the future basis of  US–EEC practices and over-
haul NATO’s conventional forces. Finally, it would prevent economic disputes 
having a detrimental impact on US–European political–military affairs.13 
A number of  authors have largely accepted Kissinger’s argument.14 Without 
doubt, one of  the motivating factors behind the ‘Year of  Europe’ was genu-
inely to improve NATO’s force posture, given that both Nixon and Kissinger 
had raised serious concerns about NATO’s capabilities ever since assuming 
office. Nixon had even opined that NATO was ‘finished’ unless a modernisation 
programme was undertaken and in February 1973 repeated such concerns.15 
Kissinger largely agreed with Nixon’s view of  NATO and had a long history, 
dating back to his time at Harvard, of  suggesting that NATO needed to over-
haul both its conventional and nuclear forces. Likewise, as a part-time adviser 
to the Kennedy administration, he had made similar arguments.16
Assessments drawn up for Kissinger in the 1970s only endorsed these 
pessimistic views. Two of  Kissinger’s aides, for instance, described NATO as 
‘decaying’ and, during one conversation between Kissinger and secretary of  
defense James Schlesinger, both men agreed that a conventional arms attack by 
the Warsaw Pact would lead to the collapse of  NATO!17 Attention upon NATO 
in 1973 was also consistent with earlier policy espousals, given that Kissinger 
had suggested in 1971 that once SALT and British membership to the EEC had 
been settled, the issues surrounding NATO would be tackled.18 Therefore, at 
one level, the ‘Year of  Europe’ can be viewed as an attempt to improve NATO.
Other commentators have interpreted Kissinger’s motives differently, with 
Robert Dallek suggesting that the ‘Year of  Europe’ was designed as a means 
to focus attention away from Watergate. Others have been more cynical in 
their interpretation of  US motives with the argument being put forth that the 
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‘Year of  Europe’ was devised to re-establish US ‘hegemony’ over Europe and to 
prevent the EEC challenging US leadership of  the Atlantic alliance. For Mario 
Del Pero, Kissinger’s policy was even darker. Kissinger employed ‘classical 
realist’ traits in seeking to ‘divide and rule’ the EEC, which would ensure that 
the EEC’s attempts to establish a common foreign policy would not be formed 
on an independent basis. Rather, it would accord, generally, to the contours 
of  US wishes and, even more importantly, would not be able to challenge US 
primacy within the Atlantic alliance.19 
Watergate as an explanation for Kissinger’s ‘Year of  Europe’ is only part of  
the story. While domestic factors can have a strong influence upon the course 
of  US foreign policy, and were certainly important during the Nixon admin-
istration, the reality is that the ‘Year of  Europe’ had its origins in September 
1972, some five months before Watergate became a political problem for the 
president.20 This chapter also rejects the argument that the ‘Year of  Europe’ 
was a means of  ensuring US hegemony over the EEC’s emerging common 
foreign policy. No archival evidence is used to support these claims and there is 
also little wider evidence provided that convincingly illustrates that the ‘Year 
of  Europe’ was designed to ensure the US could dominate the EEC.
As Kissinger suggested in his memoirs, the ‘Year of  Europe’ was calculated 
to re-invigorate NATO and to provide a symbolic gesture of  Atlantic solidar-
ity.21 This was not, however, the sole intention behind the project. Rather, the 
president and Kissinger decided that a ‘Year of  Europe’ was necessary in order 
to encapsulate all aspects of  US–EEC relations. This meant that the continu-
ing imbalance between the military contributions of  the US and the European 
powers to the defence of  Europe could no longer persist. The expansion of  
the EEC meant trade and monetary practices which were disadvantageous to 
the United States could not be negotiated in complete isolation from military-
security matters. US policy, therefore, sought to ensure that the EEC could not 
continue to operate bilaterally in the economic realm, whilst still expecting the 
US to contribute so considerably to Europe’s defence needs. In sum, the Nixon–
Kissinger theory of  linkage was to be applied to US–EEC relations.22 Kissinger 
himself  best summarised the US objectives in conversation with Nixon: 
Eventually we can force them [EEC] into a position where they have to talk to 
us on these matters [economics], or we will talk separately on our matters. 
And they can’t insist that MBFR, nuclear treaty, and so forth, we cannot 
operate without consultation ... I would use this, at least – at a minimum, 
you’ll get out of  it a better tone in the other discussion.23
This does not mean, however, that the ‘Year of  Europe’ was designed to 
enforce US hegemony over Europe. Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger wanted 
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to ensure that the US remained the dominant partner within NATO. This, 
however, would not be achieved by dividing and ruling the EEC. Rather, in 
their assessment, this would occur naturally because of  simple power realities. 
It should be pointed out that documentary evidence does exist that illustrates 
that the US was seeking to ‘divide and rule’ the EEC. Nevertheless, this was not 
the original intention of  the ‘Year of  Europe’ project. Rather, it was simply a 
tactic that was employed once US policy-makers realised that the EEC was not 
going to cooperate in producing their much-wanted Declaration of  Principles. 
The ultimate objective was not to divide the EEC; it was to reconfigure US–EEC 
relations that accepted the new economic, military and political realities of  the 
alliance.
Gaining economic advantage from Europe’s reliance upon US military guar-
antees was also a peripheral objective of  the ‘Year of  Europe’. Nixon was not 
prepared to forfeit the political relationship with Europe solely to achieve 
economic advantages.24 This was a position Kissinger agreed with. As one of  
Kissinger’s closest advisers reminded him, it was not in the interests of  the 
US to sacrifice the US–European security relationship for ‘citrus fruits’.25 For 
Kissinger, political considerations would predominantly outweigh economic 
factors. US policy sought to mitigate the economic consequences of  EEC expan-
sion, but this would not be achieved at the cost of  permanently alienating 
America’s European allies. 
Theory and practice
In September 1972, Nixon discussed his intention to refocus upon US–
European relations once his re-election had been guaranteed.26 Such thinking 
was rapidly transmitted to British officials, and was positively met, with 
Burke Trend informing Kissinger that such an initiative would be welcome.27 
With Nixon securing his re-election in November 1972, this re-appraisal began. 
However, the atmosphere for such an initiative was less than ideal given that 
the US Christmas bombing campaign of  North Vietnam had been roundly 
condemned by Europe’s leaders. This soured Nixon’s opinion towards such 
critics and, indeed, made him re-assess the nature of  the entire NATO alliance.28 
As Nixon articulated in conversation, NATO ‘had been an alliance of  interest 
and friendship’; now it was ‘just an alliance of  interest’.29 Clearly the president’s 
personal feelings towards European leaders were less than ideal for re-affirming 
the solidarity of  transatlantic relations, but the exception to this was Nixon’s 
attitude towards Edward Heath. Heath’s personal relationship with Nixon may 
have ended in ‘mutual contempt’ but at the beginning of  1973 Heath was held 
in high regard by the president. Heath, alone amongst European leaders, had 
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given his public support for US actions in Vietnam, and such support had not 
gone unnoticed in the White House.30 British officials observed that Nixon’s atti-
tude towards Heath had warmed. Indeed, Lord Cromer suggested Nixon viewed 
Britain as the ‘blue eyed boy’.31 
Heath’s visit to Washington and Camp David in February 1973 presented 
an opportunity to exploit this favourability. Kissinger termed the visit ‘inter-
esting but inconclusive’.32 The minutes of  the meetings largely corroborate 
Kissinger’s assessment as decisions pertaining to nuclear cooperation, trade, 
monetary reform and re-configuring NATO’s force posture were all deferred 
for a future date.33 It was only on the issue of  the CSCE and MBFR that real 
policy differences were discussed. With SALT achieved, a peace treaty signed in 
Vietnam and the establishment of  triangular diplomacy, Nixon was now deter-
mined to settle other matters. In particular, the president wanted progress on 
SALT II and on MBFR. To support such ambitions, Nixon and Kissinger envis-
aged some type of  linkage between the MBFR and CSCE negotiations.34 They 
argued that the CSCE should be quickly settled, on the proviso that MBFR nego-
tiations would begin soon after. In anticipation of  this, Nixon wanted NATO to 
agree upon their MBFR objectives, with September 1973 being given as a final 
date by which this should all be settled by.35 
The Nixon–Heath meeting also indicated that the US would no longer toler-
ate the criticism it had received for trying to settle a number of  East–West 
issues. Kissinger argued that SALT and MBFR were necessary, both for domes-
tic and strategic reasons, and that he would not accept open hostility to them 
from America’s allies. Kissinger warned Heath:
Europe really must stop being so suspicious about the risk of  a bilateral deal 
between the Soviet and United States Governments in this matter. If  the 
Europeans went on pestering Washington on this issue, the United States 
Government might be driven to the point where they had no alternative but 
actually to conclude a deal of  this kind. 36
In April, Kissinger repeated a similar message to Trend.37 This was in general 
accordance with Kissinger’s private complaints about Britain’s attitude 
towards SALT and MBFR. According to Kissinger, the British had a ‘desire to be 
a spokesman in NATO against the US’.38 
This shift in emphasis towards the CSCE and MBFR left Heath’s government 
uneasy. Certainly, Heath had sought a swift resolution to the CSCE since 1970, 
but since then two years had passed and the negotiations had become broader in 
scope and more complicated in design. For the British, trying to find a common 
Western negotiating platform in Kissinger’s timeframe would be difficult, and 
even more concerning for British policy-makers was the possibility that a hasty 
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settlement could result in the West agreeing to terms not properly considered.39 
This is a point which Trend and Sykes conveyed to Kissinger in June 1973, but 
they were unable to convince him of  the merits of  their argument.40 As the 
year progressed, the CSCE and MBFR discussions became ensnared in wider 
US–UK difficulties pertaining to the ‘Year of  Europe’. What were once seen as 
‘natural’ policy differences had now assumed vital significance. 
During the Camp David talks, Nixon took the opportunity to explain how 
the following year would be used to refocus upon the US–European alliance. 
Nixon revealed his preferred method for implementing such changes: ‘We must 
try to recreate the wartime habit of  getting together for really intimate and 
deep discussions in a relaxed atmosphere – discussions which range over the 
whole field of  the problems, political, military and economic, which we faced 
together.’41 Heath’s response is not recorded in the British memorandum of  the 
conversation, but his subsequent actions indicated his disinclination to react 
positively to such a proposition because the prime minister told his Cabinet 
colleagues that Britain should cooperate with the US only after full consulta-
tion with Britain’s EEC partners.42 Given his determination for Britain to act 
as a fully-fledged member of  the EEC, it would have been contradictory for 
Heath to have agreed to solve US–EEC matters on a US–UK basis. Nevertheless, 
it should not be overlooked that Heath had not ruled out negotiations. Heath 
simply differed with Nixon on how these would be conducted. Given this, the 
Daily Telegraph newspaper was quite correct to predict that ‘hard bargaining’ 
between the US and the EEC lay ahead.43 
Heath may have been averse to operating bilaterally with the US, but the 
opposite impression was transmitted to Washington. On 5 March 1973, 
British officials met with Kissinger and Nixon’s plans for US–EEC relations 
were discussed. Kissinger suggested private US–UK talks be held to discuss the 
subject and the British delegation gave their approval. The British record of  
this meeting does not explicitly state that agreement was given to Kissinger’s 
proposal but from the memorandum of  the meeting this obviously occurred 
because Trend enquired when this meeting should convene. Secondly, the 
FCO’s internal history on the ‘Year of  Europe’ noted that British agreement to 
Kissinger’s offer was given during this meeting.44
Within the British policy-making bureaucracy there was an element of  
disagreement (or misunderstanding) over the direction of  British policy. Heath 
was opposed to US–UK bilateralism for solving matters concerning the EEC. 
Heath’s officials, however, had given the reverse impression to Kissinger, and 
this is a point which existing scholarship has crucially overlooked. British 
policy, as articulated to Kissinger, ran contrary to Heath’s wishes, and it was 
this contradiction in British policy that would contribute to the US−UK diplo-
matic furore throughout the summer of  1973.
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Kissinger launched the ‘Year of  Europe’ publicly on 23 April 1973 in 
a speech that had not even been seen by the State Department prior to its 
announcement.45 Perhaps if  it had, the speech writers would have worded his 
statements a little more delicately as the announcement for a ‘Year of  Europe’ 
caused enormous offence in European capitals. Kissinger proposed that the US 
and the EEC would issue a Declaration of  Principles which would institution-
alise US–EEC relations. This would be achieved by interconnecting all aspects 
of  US–EEC interaction in some type of  formal document, which would then be 
signed by the respective leaders later in the year. Kissinger also envisaged that 
the ‘Year of  Europe’ would encompass an overhaul of  NATO’s military struc-
ture. It is interesting to note that Kissinger’s proposals had distinct similarities 
with earlier arguments he had made prior to obtaining office. Also, a National 
Security Council study memorandum, composed in July 1970, had many simi-
larities. Kissinger’s initiative appears, therefore, to have been the manifestation 
of  his earlier thinking.46
Kissinger’s speech, however, contained a less than flattering analysis about 
the role Europe could play on the global stage. In private, Kissinger had described 
Europe as ‘basically irrelevant’ in shaping global events. The president and 
other senior US officials were also expressing similar sentiments.47 Kissinger’s 
analysis of  Europe in his speech, while not as blunt as those espoused privately, 
did make it clear that Europe’s interests were strictly regional whereas, in 
contrast, the US had global interests and responsibilities. Such insights, even if  
accurate, hardly created the ideal atmosphere for re-confirming Atlantic soli-
darity, or, more importantly, winning support for his proposals. As Kissinger 
retrospectively acknowledged, ‘It may not have been wise to make reality 
explicit’.48 Indeed, it appeared so and, as Raymond Garthoff  has pointed out, 
‘The Europeans were not amused to be assigned a “year” by the Americans’.49 
This certainly applied to Heath, who was furious with Kissinger. ‘For Henry 
Kissinger to announce a Year of  Europe without consulting any of  us was 
rather like my standing between the lions in Trafalgar Square and announc-
ing that we were embarking on a year to save America,’ Heath lambasted.50 
Another unnamed European official equated Kissinger’s proposal as akin to an 
unfaithful husband’s declaration of  a ‘year of  the wife’.51
In spite of  Heath’s personal intransigence, Kissinger’s proposal was given 
serious attention in British circles. Cromer sent his opinion to London, explain-
ing that Kissinger wanted the declaration to produce substantive conclusions, 
rather than woolly phraseology. Britain would, thus, have to respond in this 
spirit and do so in a timely fashion, given that the US was eagerly awaiting 
the European response. Trend produced a similar analysis for the prime minis-
ter. As Trend advised Heath, despite its vague content and other shortcomings, 
‘it would not be in our interest to rebuff ’ Kissinger’s proposals. As he further 
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warned the prime minister, the Nixon administration was attaching significant 
importance to this project, and the British would thus be wise to react accord-
ingly.52 Indeed, few could be in any doubt as to the degree of  importance Nixon 
was personally attaching to the ‘Year of  Europe’ as he made it known to the 
media that he desired the Europeans to respond in the same spirit as that which 
greeted the Marshall Plan in 1947.53 
The president was soon to be disappointed by the European response. ‘The 
speech is clearly an important one with a constructive intent’ was the FCO’s 
public reaction.54 Privately within the FCO, a rather more cautious atti-
tude was adopted. For the MOD, the proposals were welcome as long as the 
initiative brought real improvements to NATO. The majority of  British scep-
ticism emanated from the Treasury, which feared that an all-encompassing 
declaration would result in Kissinger exploiting Europe’s reliance on US secu-
rity guarantees to the economic advantage of  the US. The Treasury was also 
nonplussed at the American initiative because it trampled over European 
efforts to coordinate EEC monetary policy. In April 1973, a European reserve 
fund had been established that was designed to streamline EEC monetary 
policy, yet Kissinger’s ambition to seek US–EEC monetary reform would clearly 
challenge this.55
The concern that the US would use its military contributions to Europe 
for economic gain was not unique to the Treasury. Senior policy-makers and 
officials across various departments, including the prime minister, were scep-
tical of  establishing a single framework in which US–EEC relations should be 
conducted.56 As Paul Lewis, the US editor for the Financial Times, perceptively 
noted: 
Dr Kissinger clearly implies a connection between the economic concessions 
the US wants from the Common Market and its readiness to remain 
committed to Europe’s defence – although this ‘linkage’ has always been 
opposed by the Europeans.57 
Though British officials differed with Kissinger on the substance of  a Declaration 
of  Principles, they had not rejected its creation. Instead, they wanted further 
negotiations on the subject. How this would be done created a problem for the 
prime minister. Heath wanted to fully consult his EEC partners about wider 
US–EEC negotiations. The obvious problem of  pursuing such a course was 
that the EEC had no foreign minister who could undertake this task. Kissinger 
therefore proposed that the declaration could be negotiated bilaterally with 
individual EEC members, yet when Nixon had suggested such a course earlier 
in the year Heath had been against it. The prime minister’s position appears 
not to have concerned Burke Trend all that much given that in May 1973 he 
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again expressed British interest in bilateral discussions. Trend did add some 
caveats to his support, warning that it would be difficult to persuade France 
to support Kissinger’s ideas. As such, it was preferable for Kissinger alone to 
convince the French of  his plans. Regardless, the fact remained that British 
officials had again indicated their support for Kissinger’s bilateral approach in 
creating some sort of  declaration.58 
What is curious about all of  this is that Heath was being supplied with full 
briefings of  the Trend–Kissinger meetings. Why then did the prime minister 
never instruct Trend to inform Kissinger of  his true thinking regarding the 
creation of  the declaration? Perhaps Heath simply never read the relevant 
papers. Alternatively, the prime minister could have felt it was a matter that 
was easily reconcilable. Maybe, however, Heath was happy for Trend to mislead 
Kissinger in order to avoid any recriminations. Whatever the reason behind 
this confusion, the point remained that Kissinger believed the UK was willing 
to operate bilaterally in establishing a declaration. Such evidence undermines 
arguments that it was the ‘obsessive secrecy’ of  the Nixon administration that 
created US–UK misunderstandings throughout the ‘Year of  Europe’.59 These 
arguments have largely accepted the accusations levelled at the Nixon admin-
istration by British officials at the time. Not surprisingly, these officials blamed 
their US counterparts for US–UK antagonism and failed to highlight how 
their own actions may have contributed to difficulties. On closer inspection of  
the documentary record, it becomes apparent that the British government’s 
own bureaucratic inertia was just as instrumental in creating the US–UK 
misunderstanding.
British reversal 
This Trend–Kissinger agreement collapsed in the following months and 
US–UK bilateral discussion on the declaration also came to a halt. Kissinger 
has suggested that British membership of  the EEC explains this. According to 
Kissinger, the need to appear as a ‘good European’ resulted in Britain following 
the French, who had taken an extremely negative attitude towards the idea. 
US–UK bilateralism was therefore stopped to appease French wishes.60 This 
argument is not without merit as the prime minister was certainly concerned 
with causing an Anglo–French dispute because of  the ‘Year of  Europe’ 
concept.61 The French factor was, however, just one determinant behind the 
British reversal in operating bilaterally with the US. Two fundamentally impor-
tant reasons were also behind this reversal. First, Heath had never supported 
the bilateral approach and, secondly, British officials who gave their agreement 
to operate bilaterally in creating the declaration began to question Kissinger’s 
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motives and decided bilateralism was a dangerous path to pursue. As the year 
progressed, Kissinger’s declaration was no longer seen as an opportunity to 
reconfigure US–EEC relations, but rather as a device in which Kissinger could, 
at best, ensure American primacy within the alliance. At worse, it was seen as 
a US attempt to establish a new framework for US−EEC relations that would 
allow the US to dominate the nascent common foreign policy of  the EEC and 
extract preferential economic treatment from the EEC.
In May 1973, Heath departed for Paris where he discussed the declaration 
with the French president, Georges Pompidou. French scepticism towards the 
project was evident and Pompidou even alleged it was a Kissinger ploy to ‘divide 
and rule’ the EEC. Less cynically, Pompidou suggested that it was designed to 
flatter the ego of  President Nixon. Interestingly, Heath rejected this assessment 
and made a robust defence of  the US-inspired ‘Year of  Europe’ and then urged 
Pompidou to undertake the necessary preparatory measures so the project 
could seriously progress. Such appeals, however, made little impression upon 
the French president.62
Subsequently, when Heath returned to London he convened a meeting of  
the European Unit. Here, the ‘Year of  Europe’, France’s attitude, and the likely 
consequences for British interests were discussed at length. After much deliber-
ation, the prime minister concluded that the British tactic would be to ‘lie low’. 
Only once Pompidou’s meeting with Nixon (scheduled for 30 May to 1 June 
1973 in Reykjavik) was finished could a firm British response to the ‘Year of  
Europe’ proposals be put forward.63 This, then, was the beginning of  the British 
decision to reverse bilateral cooperation with the US over the ‘Year of  Europe’. 
Following the US–Franco summit in Reykjavik, the French foreign minister 
Michel Jobert publicly rejected Kissinger’s desired procedural process for creat-
ing a declaration.64 For Heath this was troublesome, as he realised that any 
sort of  US–French confrontation over the ‘Year of  Europe’ was likely to force 
the British to ‘takes sides’ and harm British interests. Heath, therefore, came 
to the conclusion that the best way to safeguard the British position was to 
react with a non-reaction. Consequently, London informed Washington that 
it would take no further action until this US–Franco disagreement had been 
resolved.65 Jobert’s public announcement also scuppered the ambitions of  
Trend and Brimelow. They had accepted the idea that US–UK working groups 
should be established to work on draft versions of  the declaration but follow-
ing Jobert’s démarche, this idea was scrapped. Clearly, British policy was being 
influenced by France and, as Alistair Noble has rightly suggested, the ‘British 
were anxious to demonstrate their European credentials’.66 
In London, deliberation about the next course of  action was the order of  
the day. Advice provided by Trend and the FCO still suggested that the British 
should react positively to Kissinger’s ‘Year of  Europe’ proposals, and that they 
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needed to go some way to producing a draft version of  the Declaration of  
Principles. As such, the British should ask Kissinger to provide them with a 
draft version of  the declaration, from which they would then consult with West 
Germany and produce a response. Once UK–West German consultation had 
been completed, the two would then present their response to France, and from 
here tripartite discussions could commence and produce a unified European 
response to the ‘Year of  Europe’.67
The prime minister partially accepted this advice and instructed his officials 
to obtain a draft of  the declaration from the US, which would then be discussed 
with the West Germans. However, Heath added the caveat that Britain 
should try to create two separate declarations which would specifically sepa-
rate economic and security matters.68 Unfortunately for the British, this plan 
quickly came unstuck, because the discussion of  the draft declaration with the 
US and West Germans was to remain secret – yet, unbeknownst to the prime 
minister, the French had learned of  these discussions. Thus, a rather embar-
rassing situation for Heath developed when he met with Jobert on 2 July 1973, 
and the French foreign minister made it clear that he knew of  the UK–US–
West German efforts to create a declaration, and that he was unhappy with the 
situation. Indeed, it appears as if  a rather acrimonious discussion took place 
between Heath and Jobert, leaving the British in no doubt that the French 
were not prepared to establish a declaration in this fashion, and, moreover, the 
French even suggested that the creation of  any declaration was unnecessary.69 
In spite of  Jobert’s reaction, the British decided that they would seek to win his 
support for the declaration later that month but they were simply wasting their 
time as Jobert again rebuffed any talk of  creating a declaration. Added to this, 
the French remained angry with the British for trying to move forward with 
the ‘Year of  Europe’ in a manner that would emphasise US–UK bilateralism. 
In their assessment, all of  the members of  the EEC had to act in unison, and 
would all have to be properly consulted before any progress towards creating a 
Declaration of  Principles could be made.70
Heath’s policy was now broken. He had sought to produce two declarations 
that would explicitly separate economic and security issues but, by attempt-
ing to push the process forward by engaging in US–UK and UK–West German 
bilateralism, he had attracted the scorn of  France. With Heath’s policy ruined, 
he altered course and decided that bilateralism could no longer continue and 
that the EEC would have to act as a collective. Consequently, Heath outlined 
to Nixon that US–UK bilateral discussions pertaining to the declaration would 
be transmitted to all EEC member states. Furthermore, UK–EEC discussion 
on the declaration would remain private, i.e. out of  the purview of  the US.71 
Heath had therefore effectively closed down the US–UK path for establishing 
the declaration. 
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In part, Heath was driven to this because he wanted to lessen French antag-
onism towards Britain. Heath also realised it would have been superfluous to 
have presented a US–UK agreement to France if  it was likely to be rejected out 
of  hand. The prime minister was, therefore, attempting to convince the French 
of  the merits of  the declaration, and from here a common EEC response to the 
US initiative could be given.72 This does not, however, explain the entire situ-
ation. Heath, along with other senior policy-makers and officials, suspected 
from the outset of  1973 that the US could be tempted to extract preferential 
economic terms from the EEC by exploiting its continuing security commit-
ments to Europe.73 These deep-rooted anxieties began to come into the open as 
the year continued.
British policy-makers pointed to a number of  actions in Kissinger’s behav-
iour that suggested his policy towards the EEC was less than altruistic, and that 
his diplomacy was designed to exploit the differences between the EEC member 
states for the gain of  the US. For instance, Kissinger had informed the British 
that a draft version of  the declaration had been made exclusively available to 
them. Heath was concerned that Kissinger was being less than frank with him 
and he was right to be suspicious as Kissinger had established backchannel 
communications with French and West German officials, and in this realm he 
was also providing them with ‘exclusive’ draft versions of  the declaration.74
Kissinger’s rivalry with Secretary Rogers further contributed to British 
suspicions. Rogers contradicted Kissinger’s claim that the Americans had not 
drafted different versions of  the declaration, and had informed Douglas-Home 
that at least four competing versions existed. In contrast, Kissinger was claim-
ing that he had only created one version of  the declaration. Given this, it is easy 
to appreciate why the British reached the opinion that Kissinger was providing 
competing versions of  the declaration to different countries in order to maxi-
mise his negotiating position.75 
This, then, was the background in which Burke Trend was to liaise with 
Kissinger at the end of  July 1973. Trend should have expected that this meeting 
was likely to be uncomfortable, because four days prior to his arrival Nixon had 
despatched a scathing letter to Heath. In it Nixon had lamented Heath’s deci-
sion to cancel US–UK bilateralism for creating the declaration and outlined a 
number of  other areas where US–UK relations were becoming difficult.76 In his 
memoirs, Kissinger described his meeting with Trend as a ‘painful session’.77 
This was somewhat of  an understatement because the meeting descended 
into near acrimony. Nixon had instructed Kissinger to give Trend ‘my worst’ 
if  he ‘was being difficult’.78 As the record of  the meeting suggests, Trend, in 
Kissinger’s analysis, was presumably ‘being difficult’.
In the actual meeting, Trend refused to provide Kissinger with FCO memo-
randums of  UK–EEC discussions about the declaration. ‘If  old friends treated 
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the US Government like that, the US would deal with them as they did with 
Luxembourg,’ Kissinger blasted. Kissinger continued with his warnings and 
explained that there would be ‘major consequences’ for the US–UK relation-
ship if  Heath insisted on making their bilateral conversations known to other 
EEC members.79 This obviously had the desired effect because Trend, on a ‘one 
time basis’, handed the requested records to Kissinger.80 That evening, Trend 
contacted Kissinger via telephone, and whilst the conversation was concilia-
tory in its tone, Kissinger’s fundamental point, that US–UK bilateralism should 
be restored in order to create the declaration, remained. It was obvious now 
that whatever the intentions behind the ‘Year of  Europe’, it had clearly turned 
‘into an adversary procedure’.81 
Kissinger’s behaviour in this meeting provoked a serious examination in 
British circles. Richard Sykes, who was present at the Kissinger–Trend encoun-
ter, sent his analysis to Thomas Brimelow and suggested that the pressure 
emanating from the Watergate scandal was forcing President Nixon to seek 
quick foreign policy successes. The slow British reaction towards the ‘Year 
of  Europe’ had therefore angered the president and resulted in Kissinger’s 
reaction.82 Given the domestic problems engulfing Nixon, this was not an 
unreasonable conclusion. Nevertheless, this analysis fundamentally missed 
the point that from Kissinger’s perspective the British had agreed to bilater-
ally discuss and draft the declaration. The British had reneged on this, and this, 
therefore, was the real source of  the US’s irritation toward Britain. 
One day after the Kissinger–Trend meeting, Kissinger noted the ‘Year of  
Europe’ could go into ‘low gear’.83 The sincerity of  this is betrayed by Kissinger’s 
actions and he was still determined to establish some sort of  substantive agree-
ments. Kissinger now altered his tactics and, instead of  bemoaning the lack of  
US–UK cooperation, he enacted a series of  measures to ensure a more amenable 
policy from the British. What should be remembered is that Kissinger’s policy 
of  producing a declaration which accepted linkage had not changed. What 
had altered was Kissinger’s tactics in achieving this objective. In conversation 
with his staff, Kissinger made it clear that ‘They [UK] can’t milk us for every-
thing in the name of  special channel’.84 Kissinger explained how he would now 
attempt to influence British policy. ‘We are going to try to bust the Europeans. 
The French can be useful in this. We hit the British, ignore the French and deal 
with the Germans and Italians.’ As Kissinger concluded, ‘We must break up the 
Europeans’.85
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Hitting the British
As Nixon wrote in 1980, ‘diplomacy can be used either as a sword or as a 
needle – as a weapon or an instrument of  union’.86 To influence British policy, 
the president took the ‘sword’ approach on this occasion. Similarly, America’s 
other principal European allies were also to face the wrath of  the Nixon admin-
istration. Kissinger apparently intimated that he would use his influence 
on Wall Street to ‘wreck’ the French economy, and threats of  withdrawing 
US troops and curtailing military assistance to West Germany were also made.87
How the British would be dealt with became clearer in the following weeks. 
The area in which the Americans decided to apply pressure concerned the 
closest area of  the US–UK relationship, namely intelligence and nuclear 
weapons cooperation. The US thus suspended its existing intelligence and 
nuclear cooperation with the UK. ‘I am cutting [Britain] off  from intelligence 
special information they are getting here,’ Kissinger informed the president. 
‘No more special relations,’ Nixon agreed.88
US–UK nuclear cooperation was the next area to be used by Kissinger as 
a means of  influencing British foreign policy. Suspending nuclear cooper-
ation was perhaps the most powerful tool in the US arsenal, because Britain 
depended significantly on US assistance with its Polaris force. For example, one 
report supplied to Heath (November 1970) suggested that, ‘The British stra-
tegic deterrent is at present entirely dependent upon our continued access to 
US information and material’.89 UK reliance was further exacerbated by the 
programme to update Polaris, as only the US would be able to provide the 
necessary technical cooperation for the timely and safe update to Polaris.90 
Given this obvious area of  vulnerability, nuclear cooperation was the next 
area of  US–UK cooperation that American policy-makers sought to utilise to 
bring about a change in British policy. First, James Schlesinger postponed a 
meeting with British officials regarding the upgrading of  Polaris. Schlesinger 
cited his inability to review the necessary briefing material as he had only 
recently been appointed as secretary of  defense, but in reality it was a plan 
concocted with Kissinger to pressure the British into engaging bilaterally over 
the declaration. At the end of  the month, Schlesinger was still refusing to meet 
with the British about Polaris, and in spite of  British officials being ‘desper-
ate’ to ascertain the American position on whether Poseidon (the latest US 
Submarine Launch Ballistic Missile nuclear weapons system) would be sold to 
the UK, he refused to yield.91
Further to this, Kissinger also instructed US Treasury Secretary George 
Shultz to stop any special information being given to the British pertaining 
to ongoing monetary discussions. As he reasoned: ‘I want to get your area 
synchronized with ours so that they [Britain] can’t claim a special relationship 
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in one field and really put it to us in other fields’.92 In sum, under Kissinger’s 
direction, US policy had created a coherent and coordinated response towards 
the UK’s unwillingness to cooperate in regard to the ‘Year of  Europe’ proposals. 
Kissinger had targeted the most sensitive areas of  US–UK bilateralism to invoke 
a policy change in London, and in the following weeks this would come about.
Kissinger’s actions got the desired effect from London and caused a consid-
erable stir throughout British policy-making circles. Four meetings of  the JIC 
were convened throughout August and September to discuss the American 
action. Other British officials hypothesised about American behaviour.93 More 
importantly, the combined actions of  Kissinger and Schlesinger had a signif-
icant impact on British policy as the British now took the ‘lead’ in trying to 
formulate the declaration with the EEC.94 This saw the British engaging in 
active diplomacy with their EEC colleagues, especially France. Indeed, it was 
mooted as to what concessions Britain could offer to France in return for a more 
constructive attitude. Such efforts failed to shift French policy and Jobert made 
it clear that France would not be rushed into producing a draft declaration.95 
It has to be pointed out that since the outset of  the ‘Year of  Europe’ Heath 
had sought agreement with the US over the declaration and had made multi-
ple attempts to convince the French to go along with the idea. Whilst US action 
hastened the British into trying to produce the declaration, it had not funda-
mentally altered what the British wanted to achieve. Most obviously, the 
British would still not agree that the declaration had to interlink all aspects of  
US–EEC interaction, and they still sought a declaration that explicitly separated 
economic and security aspects of  the relationship.
Where US pressure on US–UK bilateral cooperation had its greatest success 
was in reversing Heath’s decision to refuse to discuss the declaration bilaterally. 
Heath’s other policy, to provide full records of  US–UK discussions on the decla-
ration to the EEC, was also dropped. Indeed, a total reversal of  British policy was 
enacted; but it also went further. The British now briefed the US on their discus-
sions with EEC members about the declaration. This was undertaken by Richard 
Sykes who met with Helmut Sonnenfeldt and informed him about British inten-
tions towards the upcoming EEC conference in Copenhagen. Sykes articulated 
that this was being done as Heath wanted to ‘maintain a firm bilateral relation-
ship’. Heath had written to Nixon declaring his intention to maintain ‘close’ 
bilateral contact, and this was evidently the manifestation of  this desire.96
By the beginning of  September 1973, the EEC was reaching some limited 
decisions on the contents of  the declaration. For example, it was decided to 
establish a spokesperson for the EEC who would then act as the main repre-
sentative for US–EEC interaction. However, even this ran afoul of  Washington 
given that, earlier in the year, Kissinger had shown his opposition towards 
such an idea, and this latest announcement only soured his opinion further.97 
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Nevertheless, some positive progress did also appear to be developing as the EEC 
announced how the declaration would be completed procedurally and what it 
would (provisionally) contain. Such was the speed of  this that a draft version of  
the declaration was delivered to the US on 19 September 1973.98
Though the EEC had produced this draft in a relatively short space of  time, 
Kissinger was far from pleased with it and, during his meeting with Douglas-
Home on 24 September 1973, he made his displeasure known.99 During this 
meeting Kissinger was extremely forthright in bemoaning the conduct of  both 
the EEC and the British throughout the previous months, and complained that 
‘It was worse than dealing with the Soviets’. Douglas-Home refused to engage 
in reprisals and instead claimed that the US and UK fundamentally agreed that 
a declaration needed to be created. Where the two countries differed was in 
how this would be achieved procedurally.100 Douglas-Home was being disin-
genuous, given that a fundamental difference with Kissinger did exist. The 
UK did not want US–EEC relations to be institutionalised according to the 
American concept of  linkage. Moreover, their enthusiasm for the project had 
only been reignited following the coercive diplomacy enacted by the US against 
key British interests.
At the end of  Douglas-Home’s visit, US officials began to evaluate the 
contents of  the EEC’s draft declaration. Sonnenfeldt informed Kissinger that it 
was ‘sound’ in places, but in others it was ‘ludicrous’.101 The EEC draft explicitly 
separated economic, political and security issues, which clearly contradicted 
Kissinger’s intention to interconnect such areas. Moreover, it indicated that US 
bilateral pressure upon the UK and wider EEC had failed to convince them that 
this should be applied to US–EEC relations.102 Whilst differences in substance 
still persisted over the declaration, the EEC had shown itself  willing to negotiate 
and further progress in creating the declaration took place in the latter half  of  
September 1973. Events in the Middle East, however, would come to intercede 
in the creation of  the declaration. The differences which emanated from this 
would threaten to cause lasting damage to the US–UK relationship.
The nadir for US–UK relations
On 6 October 1973, war broke out between Israel and the axis of  Egypt–
Syria. US intelligence was largely caught unawares by the outbreak of  war. As 
Ray S. Cline, the director of  the Bureau of  Intelligence and Research, opined, 
US intelligence assessments had been ‘brainwashed by the Israelis’, who in 
turn had ‘brainwashed themselves’ into believing that the Arab states would 
not launch a pre-emptive strike.103 British intelligence was equally poor. One 
day prior to the war, Sir Philip Adams, UK ambassador to Cairo, reported 
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that Egyptian military moves were not indicative of  preparations for war. As 
he informed London, ‘There has been no, repeat, no, evidence of  panic here 
or offensive intentions.’104 As subsequent events showed, this assessment was 
somewhat inaccurate.
On a number of  distinct issues US and UK interpretations on how to respond 
to the conflict clashed. The first area of  US–UK debate revolved around the use 
of  British airbases in Cyprus for reconnaissance overflights of  the warzone. 
The second concerned how a ceasefire should be negotiated within the UNSC. 
The US airlift to Israel was to be the third area of  US–UK antagonism. The final 
point related to the US DEFCON III decision of  25 October 1973. 
That US and UK policy differed was perhaps to be expected given that their 
respective policies towards the Middle East had often clashed since the begin-
ning of  the Cold War. With Heath coming to office this only continued, and his 
ambition of  resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict caused further US–UK disagree-
ment. Heath had signalled his intention to find a resolution to the Arab–Israeli 
conflict soon after assuming office and this solution, as Douglas-Home publicly 
declared in October 1970 during a speech at Harrogate, would be based on the 
general contours of  UN Resolution 242. Briefly summarised, this meant that 
Israel would have to surrender the land it had occupied following its victory 
in the 1967 Six Day War.105 Given Nixon’s ‘even-handed’ policy towards the 
Arab–Israeli dispute, there should have been little problem in supporting 
Heath’s approach. Indeed, William Rogers’s peace proposals, dubbed the 
‘Rogers Plan’, were largely in line with Heath’s own thinking. However, it was 
soon apparent that Nixon was undermining his secretary of  state’s ambitions, 
and in 1971 Nixon authorised a large-scale military shipment for Israel and 
little pressure was placed upon Israel to reach an agreement with its Arab 
neighbours. By 1972–73, Nixon had, in real terms, dropped the Rogers Plan 
and was pursuing a more traditional pro-Israeli policy.106
When conflict erupted in October 1973, longer-term political differences, 
coupled with recent US–UK antagonism, were likely to see relations strained.107 
This said, shorter-term problems were, from Kissinger’s perspective at least, 
immaterial and the seriousness of  the conflict meant US–UK differences had 
to be put to one side.108 Events would show this not to be the case, and US–UK 
discord was obvious from the outset. This stemmed from longer-term differ-
ences towards implementing a lasting political settlement in the region, and 
shorter-term difficulties contributed to a suspicious atmosphere towards each 
other’s policy objectives. Fundamentally, however, US and UK policies were 
seeking competing objectives. Heath wished to remain ‘neutral’ through-
out the conflict as this would safeguard British oil supplies, and he wanted 
to find a lasting political solution that would largely endorse UN Resolution 
242. The US, under Kissinger’s direction, saw things differently. According to 
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Kissinger’s thinking, the war presented an opportunity for a lasting political 
settlement that would predominantly exclude the USSR from the region. It was 
this competing idea then, on how a lasting Arab–Israeli settlement would be 
created, which really led to severe US–UK animosity. 109
The ceasefire
When fighting broke out in the Middle East, policy-makers in Washington and 
London expected a swift Israeli victory. Indicative of  this is the fact that during 
a meeting of  the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), convened on 
6 October 1973, all of  the advice proffered suggested that Israel would achieve 
a rapid military victory. 110 Thus, for Nixon and Kissinger, the biggest concern 
was that the USSR would intervene to prevent a military humiliation of  its 
Arab allies. Events soon showed that believing an easy Israeli victory would 
come about was misplaced. Rather than Israel turning the Syrian front into 
a ‘turkey shoot’, it was the Israelis who found they were retreating across the 
Golan Heights.111
The information coming out of  the region was unclear and, to better deter-
mine the balance of  the conflict, the United States Air Force (USAF) wanted 
to undertake reconnaissance overflights of  the warzone. British airbases in 
Cyprus were ideally situated geographically to launch such overflights, and a 
request was put to the Heath government to utilise these facilities. The British 
deliberated this request at length and various ideas were put forward. It was 
suggested that if  the flights could remain secret, or at least plausible deniabil-
ity could be ensured, then approval should be given. Heath remained reluctant 
because he suspected that the US would provide the Israelis with the intelli-
gence gathered from these reconnaissance overflights. Of  course, this would 
have undermined his efforts to remain neutral during the conflict and he there-
fore refused to grant approval for the American request.112 
In spite of  this early warning sign that British policy would not be amena-
ble to US requests, Kissinger refused to take heed. Now the US secretary of  state 
sought assistance from the British in the UNSC. Kissinger proposed that the 
British table a ceasefire resolution in the UNSC, which would call for a ceasefire 
and a return to the status quo ante bellum.113 London was less than enthu-
siastic with Kissinger’s idea and, when he had initially suggested this course 
to Lord Cromer, British reluctance was evident. Indeed, the British ambas-
sador rejected Kissinger’s offer because British information indicated that 
the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, would reject such ceasefire propos-
als. Kissinger was unwilling to demur, and again he contacted Cromer and 
attempted to convince him of  his ceasefire plan. Kissinger guaranteed that 
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Egypt would accept a ceasefire resolution if  it was tabled by Britain. Cromer 
relented and suggested that it was ‘well worth the effort’ if  Egypt would agree 
to such terms.114 
Cromer reported his conversations with Kissinger to London.115 Kissinger’s 
argument that Egypt would agree to a ceasefire that insisted on a return to the 
status quo ante bellum ran in contradiction to the information received from 
the British ambassador to Cairo, Philip Adams. Accordingly, Douglas-Home 
ordered Adams to meet with Sadat, in order to learn his real position about 
ceasefire terms. Adams duly reported on his discussions and confirmed that 
Sadat would not accept a ceasefire which insisted on a return to the status quo 
ante bellum.116 
On 13 October 1973, Heath convened a meeting at Chequers where the war 
was discussed in detail. Maintaining Britain’s oil supply was clearly at the top of  
his agenda, and he reasoned that the current tactic of  neutrality assured that 
the British government could not be accused of  being pro-Israeli and would 
hopefully prevent any possible oil embargo by the Arab states being enacted 
against the British. Coupled with this, it was also apparent that Kissinger’s 
ceasefire proposal was viewed as either some sort of  ‘trick’ or as a means of  
preserving superpower détente. Again, British anxiety towards Kissinger’s real 
foreign policy intentions surfaced and it was concluded that Britain would not 
table any ceasefire resolution proposing a return to the status quo ante bellum. 
In the UNSC, Kissinger’s ceasefire proposal had effectively collapsed.117 
The airlift to Israel proved to be the third area which witnessed US–UK 
disagreement. At the onset of  hostilities, the Israelis had lobbied the Americans 
for military aid, but this had been met coolly in Washington. As Schlesinger 
had warned during the WSAG of  6 October 1973, ‘Our shipping any stuff  into 
Israel blows any image we may have as an honest broker.’118 Consequently, 
Israeli demands for F-4 Phantom II fighter jets and M60 tanks were rebuffed.119 
Agreement was given, however, to re-supply Israel with ammunition, but even 
this was conditioned on the fact that Israel had to provide its own airliners 
to pick it up. Three days into the fighting, Israel had endured serious military 
losses, with a total of  over 250 tanks and 49 fighter jets being lost. The Israeli 
ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, consequently stepped up his lobby-
ing for American assistance and this was partially successful because Nixon 
agreed to supply five F-4 Phantom IIs. Crucially, the stipulation that Israel had 
to provide its own transportation remained, thus allowing the Americans to 
retain the impression that they were not directly re-supplying Israel.120
This created a dilemma for Kissinger. His entire response to the conflict was 
driven by his overarching ambition of  excluding the USSR from the region, and 
designed so that all of  the belligerents realised that only the US could establish 
a lasting political settlement. As such, the ceasefire proposal was built upon the 
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proviso that Israel would, at the very least, be militarily dominant on the Syrian 
front, because this would ensure the Arab states would be willing to negoti-
ate. As Kissinger put it: ‘Our interests are not identical with Israel’s. We want 
Israel to win so the Arabs will turn to us.’121 As such, American involvement 
in re-supplying Israel had to be kept to a minimum so as to present an image to 
Egypt and Syria that the US was not seeking to advance Israel’s position at their 
expense. This would enable the US to appear as an ‘honest broker’ and assume 
the position of  kingmaker in any political settlement. Unfortunately for the US 
secretary of  state, military events on the ground would intercede and made 
such an approach impossible to pursue.122
Events in the war soon led to further Israeli calls for US assistance. An Israeli 
counter-attack on the Syrian front had ground to a halt because of  a lack of  
equipment, and now they demanded that the US re-supply them directly via 
airlift. With Israeli calls becoming more vehement for a re-supply, Washington 
was forced into making a decision.123 Whilst Kissinger remained reluctant, 
Schlesinger advised Nixon that the US undertake the re-supply with its own 
transport planes. The US secretary of  defense suspected that if  the US refused 
to provide Israel with the needed material it could well be militarily defeated. 
In turn, this could lead Israel into being tempted to utilise its nuclear arsenal 
to ensure its security.124 Making an Israeli military defeat more likely was the 
fact that the USSR was re-supplying both Egypt and Syria.125 Nixon understood 
that supplying Israel with any sort of  material would attract criticism, so he 
concluded that the US may as well supply Israel with what it actually required 
to win the war. As Nixon simply put it: ‘You’ll get as much blame for three 
[aircraft] as for twenty-five ... Do what will do the job.’126 Thus, the president 
ordered a full re-supply via airlift for Israel.
The airlift was to act as the catalyst for the third schism in US–UK relations. 
With the president ordering an open airlift to Israel, the question of  how this 
would be conducted had to be determined. The USAF wanted to use its transport 
planes from European airfields, because this would both shorten the flight time to 
the warzone and increase flight safety. This request was to prove problematic for 
the British as agreeing to it would clearly undermine Heath’s policy of  neutral-
ity. The likelihood that Britain would agree that US aircraft could re-supply Israel 
from its airbases, given the earlier refusal to even allow reconnaissance over-
flights from British bases in Cyprus, was therefore slim. Heath had demonstrated 
his desire to remain neutral when he had refused to support Kissinger’s cease-
fire proposal in the UNSC, and had also refused to supply ammunition and spare 
parts for British-made Israeli Centurion tanks. Walter Annenberg was surely 
correct then to inform Washington that a US request to use the US airbase at 
Mildenhall would be rejected. As Kissinger wrote, ‘There was never a formal 
refusal on the airlift because it had been made plain that we should not ask.’127
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Nuclear alert
The collapsed ceasefire proposal and the refusal of  the British to acqui-
esce in the airlift deeply irritated key policy-makers in Washington.128 
However irksome this was, it was a matter that need not have resulted in 
a great US–UK quarrel. Testament to this was the fact that Kissinger dismissed 
using US–UK nuclear cooperation as a form of  leverage in obtaining a more 
amenable British policy.129 At this juncture, Kissinger did not feel that US–UK 
political disagreement warranted such a stern US reaction. In the following 
days this was to change because of  US–UK differences over the US response to a 
letter received by the Soviet premier, Leonid Brezhnev. The US decision to move 
their military, including their nuclear arsenal, to a heightened state of  alert, 
DEFCON III, was to prove deleterious for US–UK relations.
With both superpowers now openly airlifting material to their respec-
tive allies, a further round of  diplomatic activity was undertaken which saw 
Kissinger flying to Moscow, Tel Aviv and London for various talks.130 A cease-
fire agreement was the result of  these efforts but, once back in Washington, 
Kissinger found his brokered ceasefire had already begun to crumble. After a 
further round of  diplomacy, UN Resolution 339 was passed, which insisted a 
ceasefire be enacted along an unspecified line and for a UN observer force to be 
despatched to the region.131
Whilst the diplomacy was being acted out, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army. Sadat realised that his army was 
on the verge of  destruction, and even more worrying was that, if  the Third 
Army collapsed, the road to Cairo was open for the IDF.132 Consequently, Sadat 
despatched a letter to Nixon which called for direct US intervention to imple-
ment the ceasefire. Sadat went as far as to suggest: ‘I am formally asking you to 
intervene effectively, even if  that necessitates the use of  forces, in order to guar-
antee the full implementation of  the ceasefire resolution in accordance with 
the joint US–USSR agreement.’133 The Egyptian leader was to be disappointed 
because Nixon’s reply made it clear that the US would not despatch military 
forces to establish the ceasefire.134
Kissinger, meanwhile, was concerned that Sadat would reach out to the 
USSR and offer the same terms as those suggested to the US. As Kissinger 
lamented to the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, ‘if  the Soviets put some 
divisions in there then you will have outsmarted yourselves’.135 As Kissinger 
feared, Sadat did just this and asked the USSR to deploy forces into the region 
to prevent the further destruction of  his military. This now led to a series of  
telegrams between the US and USSR which gradually became more confronta-
tional in their tone.136 On 24 October 1973, Brezhnev delivered a letter which 
requested that a joint US–Soviet force be despatched to the region. As Brezhnev 
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wrote: ‘Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States, urgently 
dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American contingents, with their mission the 
implementation of  the decision of  the Security Council of  August 22 and 
23...’137 More vital yet, Brezhnev outlined that: ‘I will say it straight that if  
you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced 
with the necessity urgently to consider the question of  taking appropriate steps 
unilaterally.’138 
Historians have debated whether or not this letter should have been inter-
preted as a Soviet threat to deploy forces into the region and much ambiguity 
still clouds what motivated Brezhnev to send this letter to Nixon.139 Regardless, 
in Washington at least, Brezhnev’s letter was viewed as a Soviet notice to invade 
the Middle East, with Kissinger explaining to Alexander Haig, now the presi-
dent’s chief  of  staff, that he had ‘just had a letter from Brezhnev asking us to 
send forces in together or he would send them in alone’.140 At the time, other US 
policy-makers had reached a similarly dark conclusion, with Admiral Thomas 
Moorer, the chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, describing Brezhnev’s letter 
a ‘real piss-swisher’.141 
A meeting of  the WSAG was thus convened to decide the US response. 
Kissinger chaired the meeting and it was here that it was decided that US forces 
should be placed onto a heightened state of  military alert: DEFCON III.142 Along 
with this, the US moved two of  its aircraft carriers closer to the conflict zone, 
placed on alert its troops in Europe, alerted the 82nd Airborne Division, and 
recalled a number of  its strategic bombers from the Pacific region.143 ‘Words 
were not making our point – we needed action, even the shock of  a military 
alert,’ Nixon retrospectively argued.144 
Given Nixon’s domestic problems, the decision to move to DEFCON III can, 
perhaps, be viewed as an offshoot of  this. Kissinger would note in conversa-
tion with Alexander Haig that US domestic troubles were having a bearing on 
the course of  US foreign policy. More importantly, Kissinger believed that the 
actions of  the USSR were being driven by Nixon’s weakening domestic position. 
As he remarked, ‘You cannot be sure how much of  this is due to our domes-
tic crises’.145 Aside from this, there was an overarching concern that the USSR 
would commit troops to the Middle East, and from the outset of  the conflict it 
had been US policy to marginalise the USSR from the Middle East. Agreeing 
to a joint US–Soviet task force would have contradicted this objective. As Odd 
Arne Westad has correctly pointed out, détente had its limitations vis-à-vis 
US–Soviet cooperation.146 Or, as Anatoly Dobrynin more bluntly noted: ‘The 
rivalry would remain. Détente had its limits.’147 
America’s European allies were not informed, much less consulted, on the 
decision to move US nuclear forces to DEFCON III. As one newspaper exclaimed, 
the NATO alliance had been ‘kept in the dark’.148 This has long been believed 
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to have applied to the UK as well.149 Whilst the WSAG may not have consulted 
with the British on moving to DEFCON III, Kissinger did inform Cromer about 
the decision. Kissinger made a point in showing how privileged Britain was 
to receive this information, as Cromer was the only European ambassa-
dor informed about the contents of  the Brezhnev letter that had sparked the 
DEFCON III alert.150 Cromer failed, however, to convey this message to London 
prior to the DEFCON III move having become public knowledge. Quite why this 
happened is unclear, and the seriousness of  this led Heath to order an inquiry 
into why this had occurred. Whatever the cause, Heath was never informed 
prior to the US move becoming public knowledge, but this was the result of  
London’s bureaucratic failings.151
Kissinger had, therefore, informed the British of  the DEFCON III move, 
and in doing so he also requested Britain’s ‘very strong support’.152 The fact 
remained, however, that the prime minister believed the American military 
moves had been undertaken without prior warning, and he therefore publicly 
rebuked the American action.153 This hardly accorded with the ‘very strong 
support’ Kissinger had sought. The move was also viewed with trepidation in 
London, and MPs in the House of  Commons went as far as to cast aspersions 
about the mental stability of  President Nixon.154 While the foreign secretary 
dismissed these claims, his own ambassador to Washington was filing reports 
that expressed the very same thing!155 
Events would fortunately see superpower confrontation averted. Moscow 
picked up the American military moves, and Nixon had also sent a concil-
iatory note to Brezhnev on 25 October 1973. Together these convinced the 
Soviet leader that he should retract his statement to despatch Soviet forces to 
the conflict zone. The UNSC thus agreed that a ‘police force’ could be sent to 
the region, but it would not be allowed to consist of  any troops from the United 
States, USSR, UK or France, and with this agreement in place the spectre of  an 
immediate US–Soviet confrontation abated.156 
For US–UK relations, events in the Middle East had led to a number of  acri-
monious altercations. However, the fact that the British attempted to distance 
themselves from US policy should hardly have come as a surprise. On the 
first day of  the conflict, Kissinger had been warned that Britain (and other 
Western European states) would ‘dissociate themselves from the US in order 
to insure access to Arab oil’.157 Likewise, during the WSAG of  6 October 1973, 
William Simon, William Colby and James Schlesinger had all suggested that 
the European states would be hit hardest by an oil embargo and would ‘begin 
to scream’ if  one were to be enacted.158 Nonetheless, Kissinger thought that 
the UK would support US actions, but events proved that this was not to be the 
case. The UK had not acted in the fashion Kissinger expected and, moreover, he 
believed he had been personally let down by the course of  British policy. In his 
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estimation, the British were ‘jackals’ who had ruined his UN ceasefire propos-
als at the beginning of  the conflict.159
The information Kissinger obtained later on only confirmed his nega-
tive view of  British policy, because he learned that the British ambassador in 
Cairo, Phillip Adams, had actively scuppered his efforts at introducing a cease-
fire over the course of  12–13 October 1973.160 British opposition to the airlift 
and nuclear alert had also demonstrated a frustrating degree of  opposition to 
American policy. As a result of  this, Kissinger – after prompting from Schlesinger 
– wanted to ‘reconsider our European policy’.161 For US–UK relations this even 
touched the ‘most special’ area of  the relationship, that of  intelligence coop-
eration. As William Colby stated in the WSAG convened to discuss American 
Middle East policy, ‘they [UK] can’t have a special relationship with us and do 
what they are doing’.162 Kissinger evidently concurred, as he again temporar-
ily ordered a suspension of  US–UK intelligence cooperation.163 
In London, Heath believed that Nixon’s domestic problems had driven the US 
decision to move to DEFCON III, which, in turn, was seen as a grossly dispropor-
tionate reaction to the situation.164 Perhaps the prime minister was correct to 
think that domestic politics had played a part in the decision. However, he failed 
to grasp that US policy was determined to exclude the USSR from the region, 
and US actions were conditioned in pursuit of  this ambition. Regardless, Heath 
was nonplussed by American actions and was determined to ascertain why 
the US had employed the tactics they had. He therefore ordered the JIC assess-
ment staff  and the FCO to analyse US conduct throughout the war. When both 
of  these reported, they only endorsed the prime minister’s earlier thinking that 
the American response had been overblown, and was driven by the domestic 
problems engulfing the president.165
The allure of oil 
As a means of  influencing international support against Israel, several of  the 
Arab oil-producing states enacted an oil embargo following the outbreak of  
the fourth Arab–Israeli war. As one author has noted, the oil embargo ‘threat-
ened the unity and prosperity of  the West’.166 Likewise, the repercussions of  
the oil embargo threatened to deal a permanent blow to the US–UK relation-
ship. The Washington Energy Conference, convened in February 1974 to solve 
this oil crisis, was also seen by Washington as an opportunity to confront 
French leadership of  the nascent common foreign policy of  the EEC. The UK 
was seen as useful in achieving such ambitions, and by applying pressure upon 
British policy-makers – in the guise of  threatening a permanent severance in 
US security commitments to Europe unless support for US-inspired oil plans 
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were made, and threatening to outbid all competitors for spare oil, thus forcing 
its price higher – Kissinger believed the British would break with competing 
French ideas towards the oil conference. As events would demonstrate, this 
was an astute assessment. 
For the Heath government, the severity of  the oil embargo and the decisions 
taken to solve it served as a seminal moment in the foreign policy of  his govern-
ment. As the energy conference illustrated, Heath was able to work intimately 
with Washington in order to safeguard British security and economic inter-
ests. This approach, however, critically undermined his wider foreign policy of  
operating collectively within the framework of  the EEC. Ultimately, therefore, 
Heath sacrificed his wider European ambitions to secure British interests, thus 
demonstrating the pragmatism inherent within his approach to foreign policy.
Such an argument, however, must be carefully qualified. US foreign policy 
at the Washington Energy Conference was not seeking to dominate EEC 
foreign policy, and such allegations are over-exaggerated and are not actu-
ally grounded in documentary evidence.167 Certainly, Kissinger was in a 
combative mood towards the European states and was not prepared – as he 
put it – to ‘keep financing them’ because they continued ‘screwing us in the 
Middle East’.168 Nonetheless, this only explains a part of  Kissinger’s overarch-
ing approach towards the ongoing energy crisis. Rather, US policy was built 
around the premise that EEC foreign policy could no longer be dominated 
by French Gaullist ideas, which the Americans believed would take an anti-
American agenda. It would also guarantee that Kissinger’s evolving Middle 
East diplomacy would not be undercut by any Euro–Arab dialogue that had 
emerged following the outbreak of  the October War.169 
Likewise, British policy at the Washington Energy Conference must be care-
fully explained. Only reluctantly did the Heath government accept US demands 
for collective consumer action in response to the oil embargo. The break with 
France at the energy conference was something that Heath only endorsed once 
it became apparent that they would not agree to collective consumer action, 
which would, in his estimation, result in the price of  oil rising steeply and do 
untold damage to both the British economy and his political position. Once 
Heath had decided upon this course (by mid-January 1974), he showed once 
again that he was quickly able to engage in close US–UK contact in order to 
secure his objectives.
Heath had long been concerned about the West’s increasing dependency 
upon Middle East oil, and he rightly suspected that the Arab states would, in 
the fullness of  time, seek to gain control over their oil reserves. Moreover, he 
believed a future Arab–Israeli war would cause severe disruption to Western 
oil supplies.170 Such fears were soon realised once the fourth Arab−Israeli 
war broke out as, on 16 October 1973, Arab oil-producing states increased 
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the per barrel price of  oil from $3.01 to $5.12. At the Kuwait City summit 
on 17 October 1973, the Arab oil producers announced a reduction in oil 
production of  5 per cent per month. This would continue until an Arab–
Israeli settlement predicated upon UN Resolution 242 was achieved. The 
Arab oil producers further announced that only ‘friendly’ countries could 
purchase oil. This status would only be afforded to states that demonstrated 
their commitment to finding an Arab–Israeli settlement according to UN 
Resolution 242.171
This created a myriad of  problems for Heath as, in comparison to the US, 
Britain relied much more upon the continued supply of  Arab oil. For instance, 
over 60 per cent of  Britain’s petroleum usage was sourced from the Arab 
states.172 Escalating oil prices also harmed Britain’s balance of  payments 
position, and not only was this economically deleterious for Britain, but for 
the prime minister it was also becoming a political liability.173 Because of  the 
potential for an oil shortage, Heath asked the British public to curb their energy 
use. This even involved a plea that British households limit their heating 
use to one room! Petrol rationing was seriously debated within the Cabinet, 
and it was eventually decided to implement speed restrictions on British roads 
as a means to conserve British petroleum reserves. For Heath, then, the oil 
embargo was as much a domestic as an international issue.174 
On 6 November 1973, the EEC declared that it would seek to find a reso-
lution to the Arab–Israeli conflict according to UN Resolution 242, which 
Heath fully endorsed. As he argued, it was essential to support this so as to 
prevent the oil embargo being applied to Britain. On one level, Heath’s deci-
sion was a success given that Britain was categorised as a ‘friendly’ nation 
and thus ensured the right to continue purchasing Arab oil. Further, on 18 
November 1973, the Arab oil-producing states met in Vienna where it was 
announced that, in ‘appreciation’ of  the EEC’s position, the 5 per cent cutback 
in oil production that was supposed to begin at the end of  that month would 
be postponed. Heath’s tactics had ensured Britain retained access to Arab oil, 
both safeguarding oil access and preventing further damage to the British 
economy.175
The prime minister’s actions were not without wider consequences, and for 
US–UK relations his decisions had a deeply negative impact. British support 
for the EEC declaration irritated Washington and, retrospectively, Kissinger 
would describe Heath’s decision as ‘horrible’.176 Cromer was next to face 
Kissinger’s wrath, and throughout November Kissinger levelled his dissatis-
faction with British policy on at least three occasions.177 Schlesinger also lent 
his weight to Kissinger’s complaints and during a meeting of  NATO repre-
sentatives he accused Britain of  ‘decayed Gaullism’.178 Privately, American 
assessments were even more scathing. In Schlesinger’s estimation, the British 
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had demonstrated throughout the entire Middle East crisis that they were 
simply ‘incompetent’. For Kissinger, the British had acted like ‘shits’.179
By the end of  November, Kissinger was declaring that the ‘special relation-
ship’ was collapsing. With a touch of  flamboyance, Kissinger warned Cromer 
that if  British policy was to be antagonistic towards the US then, ‘This was the 
worst decision since the Greek city states confronted Alexander’.180 Kissinger 
also had a policy paper drawn up that analysed various avenues for punishing 
the British. The paper concluded that long-term punishment was inadvisable 
because it would only damage US interests. While accepting this, Kissinger 
decided that a short-term punishment was necessary, and thus decided to once 
again halt US–UK intelligence cooperation.181
Kissinger’s ferocious response can be explained by the fact that British 
actions appeared to undermine his efforts to find a long-term Arab–Israeli 
settlement. At this point, the US secretary of  state was engaged in his Middle 
East ‘shuttle diplomacy’ and was attempting to find an agreement on which 
Israel would withdraw from the lands it had occupied during the latter stages 
of  the recent war. While this was ongoing, the British – along with their EEC 
partners – had publicly articulated that UN Resolution 242 should be the 
basis of  any final Arab–Israeli settlement (thus Israel would have to with-
draw from the land it had occupied in the Six Day War in 1967). Given this, it 
was hardly unreasonable for Kissinger to conclude that this public diplomacy 
was going to undermine his own efforts. Moreover, Kissinger had no inten-
tion of  finding an agreement according to UN Resolution 242, because in his 
assessment it was simply impractical to expect Israel to accept such conditions; 
he privately referred to such demands as a ‘joke’.182 More importantly, Sadat 
was also making it known to the US secretary of  state that this was an unnec-
essary precondition for Egypt to agree to a lasting political settlement. Given 
this, in Kissinger’s opinion, European efforts – via their ‘Euro–Arab’ dialogue 
– to implement UN Resolution 242 only complicated his efforts to establish a 
ceasefire agreement and find a permanent political solution.183 
While Kissinger continued to broker an Arab–Israeli agreement, the Arab 
oil ministers met in Kuwait. Here, they decreed that the 5 per cent cuts which 
they had cancelled for December 1973 would be re-imposed upon those states 
which ‘don’t provide concrete evidence of  friendliness such as by showing 
they are putting pressure on the United States or Israel’.184 This was a clear 
signal to the European powers that continued access to oil was conditioned 
upon their efforts to convince the US secretary of  state to seek an Arab–Israeli 
settlement according to UN Resolution 242. The dilemma facing Heath was 
therefore clear: if  access to Arab oil was to continue, the separate policy initia-
tive towards an Arab–Israeli settlement would have to continue. This, however, 
would run the risk of  infuriating the US further.185
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Even though Britain enjoyed the right to purchase Arab oil, it still had to 
absorb the price increase – which was particularly unpalatable given the wors-
ening state of  Britain’s economy. For Heath, the oil embargo could not have 
struck at a more inopportune moment, given that the ongoing miners’ strike 
was restricting the amount of  coal (still Britain’s largest source of  energy) 
available at the very moment that Britain’s second largest source of  energy, 
oil, was undergoing extreme price increases. This was having a ruinous effect 
upon Britain’s industrial and social well-being, not to mention the negative 
effect it was having upon Heath’s political popularity. These domestic reasons 
alone meant that from Heath’s viewpoint it was imperative to find some sort of  
solution to the oil embargo.186
From the perspective of  the US, the status quo was also undesirable given 
that it was faced with a full Arab oil embargo, and that bilateral oil deals were 
forcing the price of  oil that it could purchase even higher. For instance, oil from 
Nigeria was commanding around $17 per barrel, and Japan was purchasing 
oil from Egypt at just over $10 per barrel. To place this in context, at the outset 
of  October 1973 oil was trading at just over $3 per barrel. The price of  oil had, 
therefore, at least trebled in less than three months.187
Given these circumstances, it was no exaggeration when Nixon declared 
that the US faced an energy crisis in November 1973. To overcome this, Nixon 
launched ‘Project Independence’ which would seek to make the US energy 
self-sufficient by 1980.188 Such was the seriousness of  the situation that US 
policy-makers even discussed a possible invasion of  the Middle East in order to 
secure the oil fields. Kissinger, for instance, told a group of  journalists that the 
Arab states had better find a way of  cooperating with the consumer nations 
‘if  they don’t want to go the way of  the Greek city states’.189 James Schlesinger 
was making similar comments.190 Yet, in spite of  such rhetoric, it appears as if  
Kissinger and Schlesinger had little intention of  actually militarily seizing the 
oil fields. Indeed, the fact that Kissinger had made his point to a group of  jour-
nalists indicates that such statements were designed to be made public in order 
to exert political pressure against the Arab oil states.191 
Therefore, both the US and UK had a strong interest in seeking some sort 
of  a solution to the oil embargo. The form it would take, however, was to be a 
point which would again result in disagreement between the two countries. 
This stated, the process illustrated several important things regarding Heath’s 
approach to foreign policy. During the lead-up to the conference, Heath 
engaged in secret bilateral diplomacy with the US. Heath also broke with his 
ambition to establish common EEC policies, and followed the US’s lead for a 
collective consumer response to the oil embargo. By doing this, Heath revealed 
his ability to work closely with Washington when he believed that it better 
promoted British interests. 
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Prior to a meeting of  NATO representatives, Cromer suggested that some 
type of  gesture to affirm US–UK solidarity should be made to placate US 
anger.192 The prime minister was in no mood to be offering such gestures. From 
the record available, Heath’s thinking on this matter appears to be most pecu-
liar. In an official ‘Note for the Record’, it is recorded that Heath did not believe 
US–UK relations were confronted with any particular problems.193 Perhaps 
this can be explained as a secretarial error? However, if  this was Heath’s think-
ing then he may have been suffering from a short-term memory lapse given 
that recent political differences had seen the suspension of  US–UK intelligence 
and nuclear cooperation. Nor does it equate with how Heath was acting in 
other fields relating to US–UK relations. For example, the British decision to 
opt for the Super Antelope upgrade to Polaris was not relayed to the US at 
this moment. The reason for the delay was because of  wider US–UK polit-
ical differences. Heath was also deeply angered by the behaviour of  senior 
US policy-makers and complained to the Italian prime minister about Henry 
Kissinger’s ‘schizophrenic’ approach towards Europe.194 
It was thus left to Douglas-Home to mollify the US. Privately, Douglas-Home 
agreed with the prime minister that Kissinger’s approach during the ‘Year of  
Europe’ was the reason for all of  the US–UK acrimony, but he followed Cromer’s 
advice and despatched a conciliatory letter to the US secretary of  state.195 In 
it, Douglas-Home explained that Britain viewed the US as the ‘lynchpin’ of  its 
foreign and defence policies, and wanted to reassure Kissinger that it was not 
the intention of  the British government to deliberately take contrary policies to 
those pursued by the US.196 Such efforts failed to calm Kissinger and the British 
found that he was in a pugnacious mood at the NATO conference. Complaints, 
akin to those he had been making to Cromer in Washington, were repeated 
in this arena.197 Interestingly, other US officials were less rambunctious than 
Kissinger, and Schlesinger, who had been scathing about recent British actions, 
had reportedly been attempting to ‘mend fences’. Even Kissinger’s anger 
appeared to be directed more at the European powers than Britain.198 
Kissinger in London
As the oil embargo continued, Western states sought bilateral agreements 
with producer states to maintain their oil supplies. Heath’s government was 
no exception to this and quickly secured an agreement with Iran in November 
1973. Kissinger watched this with increasing dissatisfaction and reasoned 
that such action would only push the price of  oil upwards and be self-defeating 
in the long term. For the US secretary of  state, the continuation of  such poli-
cies was simply ‘suicidal’.199 Kissinger, therefore, proposed that a collaborative 
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consumer response to the oil embargo be found, and during his trip to London 
(12 December 1973) he took the opportunity to publicly articulate such think-
ing. Here it was suggested that a small group of  senior officials should convene 
to formulate a collective energy policy which would prevent ‘beggar thy neigh-
bour’ bilateral oil deals; i.e. the decrease in supply would be mitigated by 
lowering demand through the implementation of  oil-sharing programmes and 
making collective bids to other oil producers.200
Publicly, Heath gave his strong support to Kissinger’s proposals, which 
naturally won his approval, and a rather sycophantic letter was subsequently 
delivered to the prime minister. Under the surface, US–UK differences were 
more apparent, and Heath scrawled ‘Pompous ass’ on the top of  Kissinger’s 
letter.201 Others, meanwhile, were rather more suspicious of  Kissinger’s 
motives, and Julian Amery, a Conservative MP and adviser to Douglas-Home, 
suggested Kissinger’s goal was to ensure US dominance of  the oil industry.202 
While British officials scrutinised Kissinger’s proposals, the US secretary of  
state began to gauge support for an energy conference, and, following further 
oil price increases, Kissinger announced his intention to form an Energy Action 
Group which would assemble in the near future, find common agreement, and 
seek to break the oil embargo.203 
At this stage, Heath wanted some form of  collective consumer approach and 
Kissinger had, at the very least, provided one alternative with his Energy Action 
Group, but this also presented a number of  interlinked difficulties. The first of  
these surrounded what Kissinger’s intentions actually were. Throughout the 
entire ‘Year of  Europe’ process, Heath had been concerned with allowing 
the US too much influence over the formulation of  EEC policies. Kissinger’s 
proposed Energy Action Group, regardless of  the actual form it took, would 
have some consequences for ongoing EEC discussions on energy cooperation, 
and potentially it could limit EEC cooperation in this area. Heath, therefore, 
did not want to accept Kissinger’s idea if  it destroyed his wider EEC ambitions 
of  collective political/economic cooperation. Some of  Kissinger’s other ideas 
on what the Energy Action Group would seek, especially the notion of  actively 
driving down the price of  oil, were simply deemed to be unrealisable objec-
tives. This stated, Heath thought Kissinger’s idea was not without merit and 
he agreed with the basic premise that a collective consumer approach had to 
be found. Where Heath differed was with the substance, rather than with the 
fundamental idea, of  an Energy Action Group.204
Nevertheless, Heath was still confronted with a problem in relation to the 
EEC as the French had made their opposition to Kissinger’s latest plans abun-
dantly clear. Instead, France suggested that bilateral oil deals should continue 
until a collective EEC energy policy was formulated, and only once this had 
been achieved could EEC members engage with other powers about energy 
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matters. For Heath this appealed little, for he well knew that creating a collec-
tive energy policy within the EEC would take some time. Moreover, continuing 
with bilateral oil deals would only drive the price of  oil higher, damaging the 
British economy further by increasing the cost of  consumer goods and thus 
importing inflation into the economy. Such a set of  circumstances was hardly 
designed to help a prime minister who was already struggling to maintain his 
political popularity.205 
As the British debated what the preferred course of  action was, the US took 
the initiative in trying to alleviate the damage caused by the oil embargo. 
Nixon had agreed to Kissinger’s idea to hold an energy conference amongst 
the principal consumer states, and thus invited Britain to attend this energy 
conference in Washington. The following day this invitation was reiterated 
publicly during a press conference held jointly by Kissinger and the US ‘Energy 
Czar’ William Simon, where the world’s principal consumer nations of  oil were 
invited to meet in Washington in February 1974. Following this, Nixon deliv-
ered a formal letter of  invitation.206 
As Kissinger realised, a public invitation would force the British to make a 
decision: they would either support his proposals or they would continue to 
engage in bilateral oil deals.207 Either way, the US would have confirmation of  
British intentions and could react accordingly. Heath had to decide whether 
Britain would attend the conference and then how Britain would actually be 
represented (either as an individual state or as a member of  the EEC). It also 
forced the British to decide on their course of  action, and in essence they had 
two real choices. They could follow the US lead and agree to collective action, 
but this would mean forsaking bilateral oil deals and risking a confrontation 
with France. Alternatively, Heath could support the French line: find an EEC 
common energy policy, and continue with bilateral oil deals in the interim. 
Heath soon showed that he would back Kissinger’s plan and did so because, 
in the final assessment, it was far preferable to the one being proposed by the 
French.
In Brussels, little common agreement existed on how best to react to 
the US invitation but French hostility to the entire Kissinger-inspired scheme 
was evident. Nevertheless, on 15 January, Nixon’s invitation was discussed at 
the EEC Council of  Ministers and an agreement was reached that the EEC would 
be represented at the conference by the president of  the Council of  Ministers. 
As this was a rotating position, individual member states were free to send their 
own representatives, and Heath therefore accepted Nixon’s invitation.208 
Interestingly, Heath had decided to attend the energy conference regard-
less of  the position of  the EEC.209 Heath was not going to jeopardise Britain’s 
oil supplies because the EEC could not formulate an agreed position and he 
was fully aware that Britain had to ensure it had access to affordable oil. The 
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most obvious concern was that Heath’s political authority in the UK was being 
undermined by continuing industrial relations problems, which, in turn, were 
being exacerbated by the oil crisis. The rising price of  oil was also having severe 
inflationary effects upon Britain’s economy, resulting in a sharp increase in 
the price of  food and energy. The economic and social problems which were 
magnified by the oil embargo were encouraging Heath’s opponents within the 
Conservative Party to seek his removal. It is not too much of  an overstatement 
to claim that the oil embargo was threatening the political life of  the prime 
minister.210 Attending the energy conference would thus afford Heath the 
opportunity to tackle these problems. If  the conference could formulate some 
collective consumer response to the oil embargo then it would have the benefit 
of  stabilising the price of  oil because it would rule out competitive bidding and 
prevent price escalation. Heath, therefore, was set on attending the conference, 
regardless of  what the EEC’s Council of  Ministers decided.211 
In relation to foreign policy, Heath had demonstrated his ability to work 
closely with the Nixon administration when he decided it suited his and British 
interests to do so. The prime minister resorted to US–UK bilateralism to ensure 
the energy conference would be successful, and was quite prepared to under-
mine EEC unity in order to achieve this. First, Heath sent Sir John Hunt, the 
British Cabinet secretary, to the US to speak confidentially with Kissinger.212 
This visit was designed to be kept secret from Britain’s EEC partners. Kissinger, 
however, was rather less circumspect in keeping this meeting confidential, as he 
informed Dan Rather, the CBS journalist, of  the clandestine British visit. Heath 
also sent Jack Rampton, the permanent under-secretary at the Department of  
Energy, to liaise with the Nixon administration, and knowledge of  this meeting 
was also to be withheld from the wider EEC. For Heath, the seriousness of  the oil 
crisis, coupled with the EEC’s inability to reach a workable solution to combat 
it, meant that he was prepared to seek solutions with the US.213
Following US–UK discussions, the US delivered an aide memoire which 
outlined the finer details of  the upcoming energy conference. This suggested 
that the energy conference would seek to reverse the price increase in oil, create 
a new institution that would complete follow-up work from the conference, 
and would also look to intensify ‘economic and monetary policy cooperation 
to deal with the consequences of  the present situation’.214 Such suggestions 
caused concern within the British policy-making elite, because throughout 
the ‘Year of  Europe’ initiative Heath had wanted to avoid interlinking US–EEC 
economic cooperation. Now it appeared as if  Kissinger was once again propos-
ing such a course. 
On 5 February 1974, another European Council Meeting convened and it 
was here that a mandate which laid down a series of  ‘ground rules’ for the 
upcoming energy conference was created.215 The French were of  the opinion 
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that this mandate meant that all members of  the EEC agreed that pre- 
existing institutions, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, would undertake the follow-up work resulting from the conference. The 
French thought that the EEC had agreed that it would not accept the American 
proposal to create a new institution to deal with any follow-up work. As Jobert 
bluntly told one British official, ‘no follow up – full stop’.216
Heath’s government deliberately interpreted the mandate differently, and 
certain officials went as far as to suggest that the mandate did not forbid agree-
ment to follow-up machinery being created. Hugh Overton, of  the North 
American Department, suggested Britain should sign up to Kissinger’s Energy 
Action Group. Other officials were less direct but articulated much the same 
opinion. Indeed, Douglas-Home concluded that the EEC mandate would not 
prohibit a positive outcome from the conference. As Douglas-Home was fully 
aware, the US regarded a positive outcome as one where the conference agreed 
to create a new institution to deal with the follow-up work. It appears then as 
if  the Heath government was countenancing the possibility that the British 
should break with the EEC and support the American plans, in order to secure 
Britain’s oil interests.217 
For Kissinger, this played directly into his wider objectives in relation to 
Europe. In particular, Kissinger was trying to prevent French domination of  
the EEC’s policy agenda, which he believed would result in a common foreign 
policy premised on an anti-American agenda. As Kissinger candidly put it in 
one conversation, ‘We must break up the Europeans.’218 Kissinger, therefore, 
was actively seeking to exploit the differences between EEC members, so as 
to cause friction and discord between the various states, and in turn prevent 
the other states of  the EEC from simply acquiescing in French decisions. As 
such, the EEC would less likely follow the more independent and, as perceived 
in Washington, belligerent policies that France pursued in its bilateral dealings 
with the United States. 
Nevertheless, the prime minister remained ambivalent towards many 
aspects of  Kissinger’s energy plans, and US statements to attempt to roll back 
oil prices were met with particular incredulity. US ideas of  coordinating US–EEC 
monetary and trade practices were met with equal disdain. Heath, however, 
accepted the need for an energy conference and was also prepared to counte-
nance the creation of  a new institution to solve the oil crisis. British support 
existed behind the fundamental idea of  international energy cooperation and 
it was only the details of  this which now divided US and UK policy-makers.219 
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Bandaid on a cancer
In Washington, France remained the bête noire for US policy-makers and, when 
Jobert again made it clear to Kissinger that France would not be supporting 
any common consumer solutions to the oil crisis, it only annoyed opinion 
further.220 As James Schlesinger would recollect, at this point relations with 
France were experiencing a ‘rather irritating period’.221 At the time, he was 
rather more candid. The ‘worst bastards’ was Schlesinger’s appraisal of  French 
policy. ‘Unadulterated bastards’ was Kissinger’s even more abrasive assess-
ment.222 Such comments were evidently not restricted to private audiences, 
as one British newspaper reported that Kissinger had described the EEC as 
‘jackals’.223
In spite of  this, Kissinger was determined that his plans for the energy 
conference would not be scuppered by France. To ensure success, Kissinger 
explained that it was his intention to isolate France within the EEC and he 
would achieve this by winning British and West German support for his energy 
proposals by being as ‘brutal’ as necessary.224 In practical terms this involved 
a twofold approach. First, this required Kissinger articulating that if  a collec-
tive consumer response to the oil embargo could not be agreed then the US 
would outbid all of  the competition in order to secure oil. Given the economic 
power of  the US, this was a threat which the US could see through. The second 
phase involved linking the continuation of  US military-security guarantees to 
Europe directly to support for his energy plans. Nixon queried whether this was 
a sensible stratagem, and Kissinger himself  accepted that his tactics were akin 
to that of  putting a ‘bandaid on a cancer’. Nevertheless, the US secretary of  
state’s argument won through.225 
Interestingly, Kissinger never suggested that US–UK nuclear or intelligence 
cooperation would be revoked if  support for his energy conference was not 
forthcoming. In fact, Kissinger recommended to Nixon that additional support 
for Britain’s Polaris fleet should be given in January 1974, which Nixon 
accepted.226 Such actions may at first appear contradictory to Kissinger’s 
broader policy agenda. However, Kissinger decided that linking US–UK nuclear 
and intelligence cooperation to finding an energy agreement was not required 
at this point. Rather, he emphasised in conversation with British officials 
that if  a common consumer response could not be found then the US would 
respond by simply outbidding all other consumer states.227 Clearly such utter-
ances demonstrated just how much importance the US attached to finding an 
agreement at the upcoming energy conference. Further to this, Kissinger and 
other US officials were making it known publicly that they viewed the energy 
conference as a ‘crucial – perhaps even a final – test of  Western political 
cooperation’.228 This dual tactic had the desired effect upon British 
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policy-making elites. As such, Lord Carrington – now serving as the British 
secretary of  state for energy – informed Walter Annenberg that Britain would 
support the US ‘100 per cent’ at the upcoming energy conference.229 
The conference opened on 11 February 1974. Kissinger tabled his plans for 
overcoming the oil embargo, and outlined that the Western consumer nations 
should establish a coordinating group. This would establish a coordinated 
consumer response to the oil embargo and, once an agreed upon position had 
been established, a foreign ministers’ conference between the consumer and 
producer states would convene to find a settlement to the oil embargo.230 As 
Kissinger had expected, Jobert opposed his proposals.231 This, however, was 
not really all that problematic from Kissinger’s perspective, because US policy-
makers had understood prior to the conference that there was little possibility 
of  obtaining an agreement between all of  the parties present. Rather, the US 
objective was to obtain approval for Kissinger’s plans from as many of  the 
other delegates as possible. As events unfolded, the US came to see that this 
approach would be successful. In Douglas-Home’s plenary speech he accepted 
Kissinger’s proposal that some sort of  follow-up machinery should be estab-
lished and representatives from other EEC nations, notably the West Germans 
and Dutch, made statements along similar lines. Jobert was therefore alone 
in opposing the follow-up machinery. With Douglas-Home then confirming 
that Britain would support the creation of  a new institution to deal with global 
energy matters, the image of  a united EEC was completely erased.232 
As the first day of  the energy conference drew to a close, Kissinger assessed 
the situation for Alexander Haig. ‘So far so good,’ the US secretary of  state 
reported.233 For Kissinger, things were indeed looking favourable given 
that Douglas-Home had given British agreement for establishing follow-up 
machinery and the West German and Japanese delegations had also lent their 
support.234 In sum then, the world’s largest consumers of  oil had agreed to work 
collectively with the United States. More significant still was the fact that all the 
EEC members, except France, had agreed that they would approve Kissinger’s 
proposals as national governments if  common EEC agreement could not be 
found.235 ‘It’s not us against Europe, it’s France against us,’ Kissinger explained 
to Nixon.236 Indeed, Jobert’s refusal to agree to follow-up machinery had left 
him isolated, and Kissinger’s adroit diplomacy at this stage had gone some way 
to engineering this situation.
The decision by the other EEC members to operate as single representatives 
had isolated France, and importantly it averted a confrontation between the 
US and the EEC. Instead, the situation resulted in France being outside of  the 
consensus opinion of  the conference, and French officials could only publicly 
bemoan the behaviour of  the other EEC states and accuse the US of  ‘seeking 
to impose a Pax Americana on her would-be satellites in the West’.237 This 
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outcome delighted Kissinger, who boasted to his deputy Brent Scowcroft that: 
‘We have broken the Community, just as I always thought I wanted to … I think 
its [sic] going to be a good lesson to the French not to monkey around with 
us.’238 
The British position was rather less jubilant than this, given it had been 
Douglas-Home’s intention at the beginning of  the conference to obtain collec-
tive agreement. This now appeared unlikely and his last-minute efforts to 
obtain French agreement were futile.239 Regardless of  French opposition, a 
communiqué was issued in which it was agreed that an emergency oil-shar-
ing programme would be established for dealing with the ‘next crisis’. An 
International Energy Agency was also created which would oversee this 
emergency oil-sharing programme, and which would also create a means of  
‘harmonizing and making parallel the energy policies of  the Western coun-
tries’.240 The communiqué also explicitly made the linkage between energy, 
trade and monetary matters, as it stated:
General Conclusion. They [the states who signed the communiqué] affirmed, 
that, in the pursuit of  national policies, whether in the trade, monetary 
or energy fields, effort should be made to harmonize the interests of  each 
country on the one hand and the maintenance of  the world economic 
system on the other.241 
This is an important point often overlooked by commentators when assessing 
the ‘Year of  Europe’. Throughout the year, Heath had fought against American 
efforts to apply linkage to US–EEC relations; yet at the Washington Energy 
Conference, Heath, to some degree, accepted this. Kissinger had also demon-
strated at the conference that US leadership of  the Atlantic alliance had been 
assured and, as viewed in Washington, the French challenge to American 
primacy in the Western alliance had been overcome. 
Lessons for the future
Publicly, the Nixon White House gave an impression of  satisfaction with the 
results of  the Washington Energy Conference. Privately, however, Nixon’s 
thinking was rather more mixed. The conference had failed to achieve the 
spectacular results which the president believed could have dissipated some 
of  his domestic critics.242 In spite of  this, Nixon and Kissinger believed the 
Washington Energy Conference had achieved important political aims vis-
à-vis the EEC. As Nixon articulated, ‘The point is the European Community 
instead of  having that silly unanimity rule, learned they can’t gang up against 
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us and we can use it now, we can use it on trade, security, with everything 
else’.243 Kissinger was equally elated by the results and in conversation with 
the president explained: ‘Last week, Mr President, the Community took a deci-
sion and today they split apart on it eight to one. It is a lesson to everybody.’244 
As Kissinger noted to Brent Scowcroft, ‘It taught us an important lesson, if  we 
really throw our weight around we can have our own way’.245 
The Washington Energy Conference was, then, an important event from the 
standpoint of  the Nixon White House, because it provided a valuable lesson in 
how to operate towards the EEC. It would not be unfair to suggest it was some-
what of  a watershed for the Nixon administration’s foreign policy towards the 
EEC. Nixon and Kissinger had questioned the wisdom of  supporting EEC expan-
sion and British membership of  the EEC, and by 1973 both had concluded that 
this was no longer always in the American interest. As Nixon told one former 
US ambassador to West Germany, ‘I share your concerns with European unity. 
It is no longer necessarily desirable’.246 As Nixon had feared, the EEC would 
act in unison in opposition to American interests, and this fear had become a 
reality throughout the ‘Year of  Europe’. The British had shown that they were 
quite prepared to stand in opposition to American policy throughout the year, 
and it was membership of  the EEC that was believed to have caused this new, 
uncooperative attitude in London. As such, for Schlesinger, ‘It was a mistake 
getting Great Britain into the Common Market’. In Kissinger’s opinion, ‘It was 
a tragic mistake’.247 
US policy-makers may have lamented this changed international dynamic, 
but it also provided them with an opportunity to alter the trajectory of  events. 
Or, as one scholar has neatly noted, it afforded US policy-makers the chance to 
rescue ‘choice from circumstance’. In essence, although the likes of  Kissinger 
were restrained by the structure in which they operated, they still had to make 
decisions which could affect the course of  events positively or negatively for 
US interests.248 The decisions which were undertaken in the lead-up to the 
Washington Energy Conference, and the effects these had upon the policies 
pursued by London, demonstrated that Washington could garner the neces-
sary support for its policies if  it was willing to be forceful enough. As Kissinger 
had promised Nixon earlier in the year, ‘the Europeans will be on their knees by 
the end of  this year’.249 By the end of  the Washington Energy Conference, the 
US secretary of  state had certainly delivered on this promise. 
British officials fully understood that the energy conference would 
have profound political ramifications for the future course of  British foreign 
policy. Denis Greenhill has suggested that it demonstrated the primacy 
of  the US in the transatlantic relationship and, accordingly, those in 
Whitehall who had argued for a more Euro-centric British foreign policy 
were severely undermined.250 The Paris correspondent of  the Financial 
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Times perhaps best captured the wider ramification for Britain’s European 
policy, when he wrote:
The Washington Oil conference has at least one salutary result which 
has nothing to do with energy policies. It has shown up the absurdity of  
the so-called joint European positions based on texts which accommodate 
the conflicting positions of  all the nine partners and has demonstrated to 
France that it cannot hope to impose its views on the other Common Market 
member countries indefinitely.251 
Other British officials were rather more concerned that the EEC’s inability to 
formulate a common position would actively encourage the US to ‘divide and 
rule’ the Community. Or, as another put it, the results of  the energy conference 
would only encourage Kissinger to ‘impose his will’ upon Europe.252 For the 
prime minister, however, this was something which he was willing to risk. As 
he was well aware, obtaining agreement with the US was imperative if  bilateral 
oil deals were not to spiral out of  control.253 The fear that bilateralism would 
result in a ‘beggar thy neighbour’ approach – which would devastate Britain’s 
economy, and perhaps end Heath’s political career – convinced him that the 
UK had to lend its support to US energy proposals, even at the cost of  sacrific-
ing EEC unity. 
Conclusion 
When assessing this difficult period for US–UK relations, scholars should not 
forget that close cooperation between the two states continued. The intelligence 
and nuclear cooperation between the two countries continued throughout 
the year and, moreover, in January 1974, the US–UK nuclear relationship 
was re-energised when the British requested additional US assistance for their 
update of  Polaris. Likewise, US–UK diplomatic cooperation was quite unique in 
that Thomas Brimelow was given the responsibility by Henry Kissinger to help 
draft a US–USSR agreement on the prevention of  nuclear war.254 
Even recognising this, the level of  diplomatic and political acrimony between 
the two countries had led to the temporary suspension of  this cooperation on 
more than one occasion. More important yet was that the events of  the year 
clearly highlighted the disparity in power within the US–UK relationship. The 
US had re-asserted its authority and demonstrated that if  the UK was to pursue 
a policy path which Washington deemed would damage its vital interests, then 
this would not go unanswered. The practical demonstration of  what this meant 
had been given when the US had halted intelligence and nuclear cooperation in 
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response to political decisions taken by the Heath government throughout the 
year. This coercive diplomacy had the desired impact upon the course of  British 
foreign policy. Whilst Heath’s decision-making at the Washington oil confer-
ence was not solely dictated by American pressure, the US government believed 
that it could ensure its interests were better protected if  it decided to ‘throw 
its weight around’. Given this, it should not be a surprise that in the following 
chapters we will see that this was exactly the approach that the Nixon and Ford 
administrations would take when dealing with their British ally.
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You have to operate on the assumption that Great Britain is 
through.
Henry Kissinger to President Ford, October 19741
Introduction 
Heath’s final months in office were dominated by economic and social prob-
lems. Continuing trouble with the trade union movement had resulted in 
a three-day working week being enforced, and the ongoing oil embargo had 
led to the British public having to restrict their energy use. This set of  circum-
stances had led to what one popular British newspaper would term as Heath’s 
‘Long agony in No. 10’.2 Following continuing struggles with the trade union 
movement, the prime minister decided to call a snap general election under the 
mantra of  ‘Who runs Britain?’ The electorate gave Heath their answer and, in 
spite of  winning the majority of  the popular vote, Heath’s Conservative Party 
failed to achieve a parliamentary majority. Instead, Harold Wilson’s Labour 
Party had won the largest parliamentary contingent, securing him 301 out of  
a possible 635 seats. This, however, left him 17 seats short of  an overall parlia-
mentary majority, and Heath engaged in talks with the leader of  the Liberal 
Party, Jeremy Thorpe, about the possibility of  forming a coalition government. 
Following the inability of  the two sides to reach an agreement, Heath was 
forced to resign as prime minister, and for the third time in a decade Harold 
Wilson was in office.3 
For scholars studying US−UK relations, three distinct interpretations of  
Wilson’s final governments have emerged. One interpretation suggests that the 
US−UK relationship continued to deteriorate in its relevance largely because 
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of  Britain’s declining significance as a military and political ally to the United 
States.4 Others have contradicted such arguments, insisting that Wilson’s 
efforts to revive the ‘special relationship’ with Washington were indeed 
successful. To support this, these scholars point to the ongoing intelligence 
and nuclear relationship and also argue that the UK provided support and, 
more important still, exacted a degree of  influence over the United States’ wider 
Cold War policies.5 Other writers are more sceptical of  this interpretation. 
While they accept that personal relations between elite figures improved, they 
question what discernible benefits this achieved for British interests; however, 
they do accept that elements of  the special relationship were retained. As such, 
this period for US–UK relations was one where the special relationship waned 
politically but it retained its more practical elements.6 
The vast majority of  these accounts were written before access to large 
swaths of  government documentation was permitted and by utilising this 
new material such arguments are in need of  re-interpretation. Additionally, 
most accounts have largely marginalised British defence cuts within the 
broader context of  US−UK relations and even works that have focused upon 
this require clarification.7 This chapter also challenges the idea that certain 
areas of  US−UK cooperation, namely nuclear and intelligence cooperation, 
remained sacrosanct.8 To be sure, this cooperation did continue but existing 
accounts fail to illustrate that this was an area constantly used by US policy-
makers as a means for exerting political leverage upon the Wilson government. 
Throughout 1974–76, the US threatened to cancel US–UK intelligence and 
nuclear cooperation in order to lessen the severity of  Britain’s defence cuts. As 
will be shown below, this coercive diplomacy, which had worked successfully 
against the Heath government, was to be rather less successful when applied 
against Harold Wilson.
Wilson’s foreign policy
As shown previously, US–UK relations in Heath’s final year of  office were at 
a near crisis point, and a change of  personnel was always likely to improve 
relations amongst political elites. Harold Wilson, however, was hardly the ideal 
candidate, given that during his interaction with Nixon in 1969–70 he had 
personally irritated the president. His appointment of  John Freeman, an ardent 
critic of  Nixon, as UK ambassador to Washington in 1968 was especially 
unwelcome.9 Personal characteristics aside, Wilson’s insistence that Britain 
keep its accelerated plans for an East of  Suez withdrawal, along with his unwill-
ingness to offer a greater commitment to NATO, only vexed US policy-makers 
further.10 For Wilson, the fashion in which Washington ignored his efforts at 
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improving East–West relations and bringing a settlement to the Vietnam War 
hardly engendered a close relationship with Washington.11
Wilson may not have had the greatest track record with Nixon but, given 
recent experiences with Heath, his election was welcomed by both Nixon and 
Kissinger.12 The extent to which the president’s relationship with Heath had 
deteriorated is perhaps best illustrated by Nixon’s quip that his experiences 
with Heath had resulted in the improbable: he and Wilson were now ‘good 
friends’.13 Wilson’s return to office also marked a change in British foreign 
policy that would place a renewed emphasis upon the US–UK relationship. 
Heath’s seemingly Euro-centric foreign policy was to be reversed and Wilson let 
it known that he would not be trying to create common political policies within 
the EEC. In fact, Wilson’s renegotiation of  the terms of  Britain’s EEC entry even 
questioned Britain’s membership.14 
Wilson’s appointment of  James Callaghan as foreign and commonwealth 
secretary, coupled with the prime minister’s willingness to allow Callaghan a 
degree of  freedom in conducting foreign policy that was not afforded during 
his earlier premierships, further signalled the Labour government’s intention 
to move away from the European course that Heath had charted. Callaghan 
had opposed British membership of  the EEC and believed Heath’s European 
policies had been ill-conceived. On assuming the role as foreign and common-
wealth secretary, he was not shy in putting forward his anti-EEC feelings and 
stated his intention to re-affirm the US–UK relationship.15 
Such broad assessment must, however, be carefully defined because, despite 
the scepticism towards the EEC, Wilson and Callaghan did not wish for Britain 
to leave the Community. As noted elsewhere, the creation of  policy-making 
institutions within the EEC framework received the backing of  Wilson and 
Callaghan throughout the period.16 Indeed, the whole decision to renegotiate 
EEC entry was driven largely by internal Labour Party politics. The question 
of  EEC membership had been a deeply divisive topic within the Labour Party 
and, following EEC membership in 1973, the issue continued to provoke bitter 
debate.17 However, the focus had now shifted to debating the terms of  entry 
that Heath’s government had secured which were seen by EEC sceptics, includ-
ing Wilson and Callaghan, as being economically punitive. Wilson had, for 
instance, described the terms Heath had secured as ‘utterly crippling’ for the 
British economy.18 Therefore, the Labour Party manifesto of  1974 declared 
that it would renegotiate the terms of  EEC membership and, if  this was not 
achieved to the satisfaction of  Wilson, Britain would withdraw from the EEC.19 
The likelihood of  this happening, however, was improbable. Firstly, Wilson was 
very unlikely to be tied to his manifesto pledges given his penchant for flexi-
bly interpreting the meaning of  such pledges. The prime minister also had no 
real intention of  withdrawing from the EEC because he had reconciled that 
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membership was necessary for Britain’s longer-term economic and political 
well-being. As one British official remarked correctly, ‘The renegotiation was 
in fact largely a sham’.20 
Wilson’s approach was therefore based upon twin pillars. He wanted to 
re-establish intimate relations with the US, with the hope that this would 
provide him with unique access and influence over US foreign policy. 
Concurrently, Wilson intended for Britain to remain in the EEC, as this would 
allow Britain to derive the economic benefits of  EEC membership. In essence, 
the role Wilson had sought for Britain in the 1960s was to be largely trans-
ferred into the 1970s.21
The end of the ‘Year of Europe’
On assuming office, Wilson quickly contacted Nixon and informed him that it 
was his intention to put US–UK relations on a sounder footing.22 ‘The Labour 
government apparently wants to revive something closely akin to Britain’s erst-
while “special relationship” with the United States,’ the US ambassador reported 
from London.23 In June 1974, Kissinger corroborated this assessment.24 
Such an overt attempt to re-affirm the US–UK relationship was appreciated at 
the highest levels of  the US government, and Callaghan’s appointment was also 
seen as a positive for US interests.25 In a rather typical Machiavellian moment 
between Nixon and Kissinger, both men talked about how it was ‘useful’ that 
Wilson wanted to promote closer US–UK relations. Nixon, however, questioned 
whether Wilson would actually be able to deliver much of  substance and 
mocked that: ‘Harold is going to want to have some foreign policy – some little 
things for his bonnet and he may just start swinging a little weight around’.26 
Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger viewed Wilson’s foreign policy as useful in 
safeguarding against French domination of  the EEC and preventing it from 
pursuing an anti-American agenda. It would also ensure that the continuing 
Euro–Arab dialogue would not undermine US diplomacy in the Middle East.27 
Although Wilson had signalled an intention to re-emphasise the Atlantic 
relationship, this did little to alter the Nixon administration’s attitude towards 
Western Europe or have a calming influence upon its actions. In particular, 
the matter of  the Declaration of  Principles had still not been resolved and the 
Nixon administration now pushed for its conclusion. Kissinger was deter-
mined to exploit US security guarantees towards Europe to accomplish this. As 
Kissinger explained in conversation with Schlesinger:
The Europeans have no strategy. We have to create the impression that 
to cross us is at least as dangerous as to cross the French. We can’t let the 
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Europeans organise on an anti-American basis. We have a good opportunity 
now, with a new British government, and the Germans are weak ... If  Europe 
gets the idea that unity prevents them from talking to us, they will withdraw 
more and more from NATO in the EC. We want to counter Europe by using 
NATO.28
The question arises as to what Kissinger meant by using NATO to counter 
Europe. The answer to this soon became clear. During internal discussions in 
Washington, Kissinger concluded that the US should threaten to withdraw 
troops from Europe, because this would critically undermine their security in 
relation to the Warsaw Pact. This, in turn, would produce a more cooperative 
political attitude from the EEC towards the US.29 All of  this was coupled with 
a wider effort on Kissinger’s part to influence members of  the EEC by utilising 
American economic power.30 On 15 March 1974, Nixon deployed this tactic 
publicly during a speech at the Executives Club in Chicago. Here, the president 
explained that he would not tolerate ‘a situation where the nine countries of  
Europe gang up against the United States ... the United States which is their 
guarantee of  security’. The president was even more explicit in outlining 
that the EEC could not ‘have … US participation and cooperation on the secu-
rity front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the 
economic and political front’.31 Following the Washington Energy Conference, 
British officials feared that Nixon and Kissinger would start ‘throwing their 
weight around’ and, as shown earlier, this was the very ‘lesson’ that both 
Nixon and Kissinger had taken from the conference. Nixon’s speech, therefore, 
was another example of  the Nixon administration’s determination to more 
robustly defend US interests in relation to the EEC.
What is of  interest at this point is that Kissinger’s private conversations in 
Washington reveal that Nixon was making rather empty threats. In reality, 
the president and Kissinger had little intention of  reducing America’s mili-
tary commitment to Europe.32 As US internal assessments suggested, there 
were very few long-term methods available for punishing Western Europe that 
would not simultaneously damage US interests. Nevertheless, the US had been 
successful in manipulating British foreign policy decisions when Kissinger 
and Schlesinger had temporarily suspended intelligence and nuclear cooper-
ation in 1973. In a similar fashion, US threats to withdraw their forces had a 
profound impact upon European policy-makers. As Kissinger noted gleefully, 
his bluff  had not been called and the Europeans were ‘pissing in their pants’. As 
Kissinger reported, ‘The Germans have promised to have consultation with us 
before they take decisions. The British have gone even further.’33 In this light, it 
is perhaps not surprising that, on 19 March 1974, the president gave a concil-
iatory speech on the subject of  US–EEC relations.34
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What was meant by the British having ‘gone even further’ is unclear, but 
it probably referred to Callaghan’s promise to Helmut Sonnenfeldt (15 March 
1974) that Britain would engage bilaterally over the creation of  the Declaration 
of  Principles. This, Callaghan assured Sonnenfeldt, would be conducted 
without the knowledge of  Britain’s EEC partners.35 By April 1974, this process 
was under way when the newly appointed British ambassador to Washington, 
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, met with Kissinger to discuss the declaration.36 Perhaps 
this signalled a new level of  exclusive interaction between US and UK officials. 
Certainly, the Wilson government could point to the fact that it had secured 
US–UK private discussions prior to a ‘Big Five’ discussion about the mone-
tary and oil crises engulfing the Western powers.37 US policy-makers would 
also make their British counterparts aware of  their policy initiatives towards 
the ongoing SALT negotiations and the Middle East peace process.38 All of  this 
was undertaken, however, on the proviso that this information was to remain 
exclusively within the British government. Indeed, the US made it explicit that 
this information was not to be transmitted to Britain’s EEC partners. Of  course, 
the British were under no legal obligation to provide this information to their 
EEC allies. Nevertheless, as this illustrates, the US could have a profound impact 
upon Britain’s interaction with the EEC.
Even though the Wilson government had managed to secure a level of  inter-
action in US–UK relations which they believed had been missing under Heath, 
British officials still remained sceptical about the course of  US policy. ‘Despite 
the President and Dr. Kissinger’s recent public criticism of  Europe in general, 
Dr. Kissinger has gone out of  his way to be friendly to HMG [Her Majesty’s 
Government] since it took office,’ Wilson was warned. This was occurring 
because Kissinger wanted to ‘influence our policies at what he will judge to be 
a formative stage; and to ensure that we help steer Europe away from a course 
damaging to US interests’.39 The US had singled out Britain ‘for favourable 
mention’ but the trouble existed that ‘we may be unable to deliver what the US 
Administration expects of  us’.40 Several other senior British officials provided 
comparable advice and, given what was being stated privately in Washington, 
this advice does appear rather pertinent.41 
Even in the face of  such warnings, US–UK bilateral discussions continued 
as the ‘Year of  Europe’ slowly petered out. The Declaration of  Principles was 
eventually signed during the Ottawa conference (June 1974) but its eventual 
contents – as Kissinger lamented – were hardly the ‘far reaching embodiment 
of  shared purpose we had in mind’.42 Or as one unknown author argued in 
Foreign Affairs: 
What the United States had envisioned as the ‘Year of  Europe’, a period of  
imaginative updating and refurbishing of  the NATO alliance, capped with a 
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new Atlantic Charter, has become instead the year in which Washington’s 
relationship with its European partners has struck an all-time low.43 
Moreover, as one CIA brief  explained in August 1974, the new Declaration of  
Principles would not guarantee when and if  the EEC would ever act as a collec-
tive. As the brief  neatly summarised: ‘Since EC members retain the option to act 
independently on many issues, there is the even greater problem of  unpredict-
ability. The US can never be certain when, or if, the Nine will act collectively.’44 
Given this, it is hardly surprising that scholars refer to Kissinger’s initiative as 
‘the year that never was’.45
Discord in Cyprus
On 9 August 1974, Richard M. Nixon became the first man to resign the office 
of  the presidency and Gerald R. Ford was thus sworn in as the 38th president 
of  the US.46 Facing the new president were a multitude of  problems including 
Nixon’s potential pardon, rising inflation and unemployment, and the continu-
ing problems in Vietnam. Ford’s top priority was hardly, then, the conduct of  
US–UK relations.47 In spite of  this, the new president was soon confronted with 
something approaching a crisis in US–UK relations, because of  differences over 
the evolving situation in Cyprus.
The Cyprus crisis is important for understanding US–UK relations in the 
1970s for a number of  important reasons. It serves as a clear example of  how 
the US undermined the policy objectives of  the UK in trying to resolve the 
conflict. It further demonstrated that the US would pursue its own regional 
interests at the expense of  the concerns of  its British ally. If  further proof  were 
needed that the US−UK special relationship did not apply to all facets of  US−
UK interaction, then events during the Cyprus crisis would act as a timely 
reminder. As two scholars noted about the Suez crisis, ‘For Europeans, “Suez” 
stood for the moment when they had been shocked into awareness of  how … 
inferior in power they were to the United States, and how dependent on that 
power [they were]’.48 The Cyprus crisis demonstrated this fact once again.
On 15 July 1974, the Greek government inspired a military coup in Cyprus, 
which removed Archbishop Makarios and installed Nico Sampson as the new 
Cypriot leader which sparked an ethnic conflict between the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot populations.49 Though US intelligence had noted that relations on the 
island were steadily worsening, for both the American and British intelligence 
community events in Cyprus came somewhat as a surprise.50 For the British, 
events were worrisome on a number of  levels, because as a guarantor power – 
established under the 1960 Zurich Accords – the British had a legal obligation 
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to uphold the status quo in Cyprus.51 More important still was the likely reac-
tion of  Turkey and Greece, because Cyprus was comprised of  a mixed Turkish 
and Greek population. Nico Sampson was an ardent supporter of  enosis, 
meaning he wanted Cyprus to accede to Greece, and his firebrand personal-
ity and history of  political violence only increased the likelihood that the coup 
would lead to violence. In particular, the rights of  Turkish Cypriots were likely 
to be targeted by Sampson, and Turkey threatened to intervene militarily if  
Turkish Cypriots came under attack. Greece responded by declaring that such 
Turkish action would be taken as a casus belli.52 
From the British perspective this was all rather troublesome for a number of  
interconnected reasons. First, they feared that such a conflagration would have 
damaging repercussions for NATO. As the British ambassador in Athens, Sir 
Robin Hooper, warned, a war between Turkey and Greece would challenge the 
entire ‘credibility’ of  NATO. According to Hooper, at the very least a war would 
leave NATO’s southern and eastern flanks seriously weakened.53 Slightly less 
melodramatically, the FCO brief  on the conflict outlined that ethnic violence in 
Cyprus had to stop in order to restore stability to NATO’s position.54 
The other main anxiety for Wilson’s government was the status of  British 
sovereign bases on Cyprus, because they provided Britain with significant intel-
ligence abilities. Most obviously, they provided an important listening post into 
the Middle East. Cyprus also acted as Britain’s base into the Mediterranean, 
and had done so since the withdrawal from Egypt/Suez in 1956.55 The main-
tenance of  such facilities was, however, financially expensive, and contributed 
negatively to Britain’s balance of  payments. The Wilson government had 
therefore highlighted these bases for potential closure in its ongoing defence 
review. The possibility of  conflict in Cyprus would only add further burden to 
sustaining such facilities.56 Of  course, less geopolitical matters were also in the 
forefront of  British policy-makers’ concerns. While more mundane, the most 
immediate problem facing Wilson was how to ensure the safe passage of  British 
holidaymakers on the island.57
In order to prevent a Turkish–Greek war, British officials concluded that they 
would have to remove Sampson and re-install Makarios as president. This, it 
was felt, would prevent a Turkish invasion of  Cyprus, which would in turn 
avoid a wider conflagration, thus maintaining NATO’s integrity and protect-
ing Britain’s sovereign bases. 
Washington’s thinking
On learning of  the coup, Kissinger chaired a session of  the WSAG.58 Confusion 
reigned as to what had actually occurred in Cyprus, and it was still unclear as 
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to what had triggered the hostilities. US policy-makers, however, were deeply 
concerned about the probable actions of  the USSR.59 ‘I think our first objective 
should be to prevent any kind of  Soviet action. We must keep this as an internal 
affair and keep it from becoming internationalized,’ Kissinger concluded.60 The 
foremost worry of  the US, then, was preventing the USSR from gaining any 
sort of  advantage from the conflict. In keeping with the geopolitical vision of  
the Nixon–Ford administrations, events in Cyprus were of  importance, because 
of  the likely wider ramifications they could have upon the Cold War. One intel-
ligence briefing on Cyprus captures this thinking rather well: 
Cyprus is a foreign policy problem for the United States because strife 
between the Greek Cypriots and Turk Cypriots brings Greece and Turkey into 
military confrontation unhinging NATO’s southern flank; because Cyprus’s 
crises are invariably raised in the Security Council; and because such crises 
have the potential to complicate our evolving relations with the Soviets and 
affect the atmosphere in which the United States and the Soviet Union deal 
with the Arab/Israeli conflict.61 
A second WSAG was convened on 16 July 1974 and again – despite the uncer-
tainty regarding the details of  the coup – the clear consensus was that the US 
had to prevent Soviet intervention.62 The British idea of  returning Makarios to 
power was met with both consternation and trepidation in US policy-making 
circles, because it was believed that this would only encourage Makarios loyal-
ists to continue fighting, which would lead to a situation where they would then 
seek military aid from any source willing to provide it: i.e. the USSR.63 Moreover, 
Makarios was considered by Washington to be a communist sympathiser. His 
return to power, then, was not viewed as something which the US should be 
actively seeking to achieve. Kissinger was explicit in articulating this thinking 
during the WSAG meeting:
As I assess the situation, for us the best outcome would be a Clerides 
government. I just don’t understand why the Turks would want to bring 
Makarios back. I don’t think [the Turks] understand our analysis of  the 
situation. Somebody has to go to London and explain our position.64 
Kissinger then explained to the WSAG that the US would seek to utilise its influ-
ence with Turkey to make this point clear.65 
From the outset of  the crisis British and American objectives clearly differed. 
Claims from Callaghan that ‘our two countries were agreed on broad objec-
tives, we differed on procedures and tactics’ thus appear less convincing.66 US 
policy-makers viewed the coup predominantly as a potential opportunity for 
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Soviet aggrandisement. Returning Makarios to power was never an objective 
of  US policy either. More importantly from the perspective of  US−UK relations 
was that the US secretary of  state was actively charting a policy in direct oppo-
sition to that of  London and would over the course of  the next weeks pursue a 
diplomatic course that undercut British efforts at implementing both a cease-
fire and a lasting political solution. 
As the violence continued in Cyprus, Turkish and Greek representatives 
convened in London and, under the auspices of  British chairmanship, the terms 
of  a possible ceasefire were negotiated. At the conference, Callaghan declared 
that the ‘ideal solution’ was to see Makarios return to power and, in order to 
achieve this, Callaghan suggested that military intervention may be required.67 
Such thinking was anathema to US objectives. First, the return of  Makarios 
was not an ambition of  the US, and the idea of  utilising military force against 
a NATO member only soured US opinion further. Given recent American expe-
riences in Vietnam, coupled with Nixon’s domestic woes, one can appreciate 
why such a suggestion was met with incredulity. Kissinger therefore proposed 
that he would ‘work for a compromise in which neither Makarios or the other 
guy take over’, reasoning that this would prevent Soviet intervention in the 
conflict.68
Determined to ensure that the London conference did not reach any firm 
decisions without US representation, Kissinger had despatched Joseph Sisco, 
the under-secretary of  state for political affairs, as his envoy. On 18 July, Sisco 
reported back to Washington that Callaghan was still supporting the restora-
tion of  Makarios, and that he had still not ruled out the possibility of  utilising 
force to achieve this objective.69 Kissinger remained sceptical as to whether 
such rhetoric was really indicative of  likely British action.70 Meanwhile, as 
Washington continued to analyse likely British motives, the ceasefire negotia-
tions were stalling. By 19 July, it was apparent that Callaghan’s intermediary 
efforts had failed to break the Turkish–Greek impasse.71 Consequently, Turkey 
took a more direct approach in protecting their interests.
Invasion and coup
In the early hours of  20 July 1974, Turkey launched an invasion of  Cyprus. 
The Greeks responded by placing their military on high alert, and prepared 
for hostilities on their northern border with Turkey.72 Only direct threats from 
Washington to permanently withdraw all military aid from Greece prevented 
further Greek action.73 The evolving situation was deemed so serious by 
Washington that discussion took place as to whether the ruling Greek junta 
should be overthrown by some US-sponsored covert action. James Schlesinger, 
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in particular, was keen to pursue such a path. In contrast, Kissinger was rather 
more circumspect, and was reluctant to follow such a course. ‘I don’t like over-
throwing governments,’ Kissinger retorted. As Kissinger then explained, ‘I’m 
not sure the Greek government will last out the week, anyway. It seems to me 
there is no way it will survive.’74
Events in Greece would prove Kissinger’s assessment correct, as the Greek 
military junta’s Cypriot adventure led to a collapse of  its authority. Subsequently, 
the ruling junta was replaced by the former leader, Constantine Karamanlis.75 
Such a turn of  events was hardly welcomed in Washington. Kissinger’s reluc-
tance from the outset of  the conflict to ‘rake the Greeks’ was dictated by a 
concern that a Greek government sympathetic to Moscow would attain power, 
and Karamanlis was deemed to hold such sympathies.76 The British, on the 
other hand, were troubled by such events for different reasons. British efforts 
at finding a peaceful solution had been for naught, and Turkish action had 
endangered British sovereign bases in Cyprus. It also raised the spectre of  a 
wider war between Turkey and Greece that would undermine NATO.
Following the Turkish invasion, Callaghan again offered the auspices of  
the British government to broker a peace settlement.77 After a further round 
of  diplomatic negotiations, which produced UN Security Council Resolution 
353, Callaghan called for peace negotiations on neutral territory. After much 
wrangling over location and participation, it was finally settled that Geneva 
would act as the venue, and negotiations would commence on 24 July 1974. 
This conference was designed to broker the terms of  a ceasefire and another 
conference, scheduled to begin on 8 August 1974, would attempt to produce a 
lasting political settlement.78 
At the conference, Callaghan stuck to his original intention of  restoring 
Makarios to power. He also outlined that Cyprus should be administered on a 
bi-federal basis.79 Such a policy did not have the backing of  the US and, follow-
ing their briefing of  the Turkish on this point, they too announced that they 
would not support this. The Turkish also insisted that in order for them to begin 
negotiations on a lasting political settlement the north-eastern third of  Cyprus 
would have to be ceded to their authority.80 
With such diametrically opposed positions, the Geneva peace conference 
turned into a somewhat rancorous affair. Nevertheless, Callaghan managed 
to establish terms for a ceasefire agreement which included the halting of  all 
offensive activities and an agreement that phased withdrawal of  all military 
forces from Cyprus would begin. Following the successful adherence to this, 
a second conference would convene to work out how a buffer zone between 
the two sides would be created.81 In London, the prime minister was especially 
pleased with Callaghan’s efforts, and believed that it afforded the opportu-
nity for the British to create a lasting political settlement in Cyprus. As Wilson 
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noted to Callaghan, ‘We have the chance to create a more stable Cyprus, better 
relations between Greece and Turkey, and (for the first time ever) an alliance in 
NATO consisting of  fully democratic states’.82
Callaghan was rather less confident than his boss and remained suspicious 
of  Turkish ambitions. He suspected that the Turkish would use the period 
between the conferences to gain more territory in Cyprus that would be of  
strategic value.83 He therefore informed Washington that if  the Turkish under-
took further military measures then Britain would respond in kind.84 Wilson 
supported Callaghan by providing a demonstrable sign of  Britain’s seriousness 
– he reinforced Britain’s sovereign bases on Cyprus.85
Geneva: Part II
As the second Geneva talks convened, British officials in the FCO were deeply 
pessimistic about finding a lasting settlement. One noted that the exercise was 
a ‘dead duck’ and, in the assessments of  senior FCO officials, Callaghan’s stated 
objective that Cyprus should be administered on a bi-federal basis was simply 
unrealistic. The return of  Makarios was also felt to be implausible.86 Events would 
prove such pessimism accurate, because British interlocutors were confronted 
with deadlock at the talks. The Turkish demanded that Cyprus be administered 
on a bi-regional basis and that, to achieve this, a population transfer on the 
island – that separated Turkish and Greek Cypriots – would have to take place. 
Clerides, the acting president of  Cyprus, requested that he be allowed 24 hours 
to consider this Turkish proposal. This, however, was rejected by the Turkish 
delegation. The conference therefore collapsed without any settlement being 
reached. Less than two hours after the conference had finished the Turkish 
made further military moves, seizing approximately 35 per cent of  the island. 
This included the port city of  Famagusta. However, Famagusta contained few 
Turkish Cypriots, thus undermining the Turkish argument that all of  their 
military moves were designed solely to protect Turkish Cypriots.87 
Callaghan was infuriated with such action, believing that the Turkish had 
been negotiating in bad faith and felt he had been vindicated in arguing that 
Turkey was seeking military-strategic aggrandisement.88 President Ford was 
now faced with the first foreign policy crisis of  his administration, because 
Callaghan had suggested that Britain would respond militarily to further 
Turkish actions. For the US, this situation was an incredible one. The possibility 
of  a UK–Turkish war, which would likely descend into a wider Greek–Turkish 
conflict, appeared to now be a real possibility. Ford, barely 24 hours into his 
presidency, was confronted with the possibility of  three NATO members being 
at war with one another! However, as with earlier British threats of  military 
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intervention, the US did not believe them to be credible. ‘One of  the stupidest 
thing[s] I have heard,’ Kissinger told Ford. The president evidently concurred 
and ordered Kissinger to ‘calm down our British friends a bit’.89
In London, Wilson convened a meeting to discuss the possible ways in which 
Britain should react to Turkish moves. As Callaghan noted, Britain’s ‘real’ 
interests in Cyprus – the sovereign bases – had been left alone by the Turkish 
military. He explained further that British military intervention was unlikely to 
succeed without full US support. This, as Callaghan informed the prime minis-
ter, was unlikely to be forthcoming. Kissinger’s efforts to calm the British had 
worked. As Wilson understood, without US backing the British were unlikely 
to be able to easily remove the Turkish military. More importantly, the Turkish 
had not infringed upon Britain’s sovereign bases, and Wilson concluded that 
military action would not be undertaken.90
British indignation towards Turkey was met with little sympathy in 
Washington, and Callaghan’s inability to find a peaceful solution to the crisis 
was met with scorn.91 ‘In this business you are paid by your results, and 
[Callaghan] didn’t deliver a damn thing,’ Kissinger complained.92 Kissinger, 
while far from happy about Turkish actions, did not believe that a mili-
tary response was required. Ultimately, Turkey’s strategic importance to the 
US meant any military response was unpalatable. A reading of  Kissinger’s 
memoirs makes it quite apparent that he believed Turkey was of  considerable 
strategic importance to the US.93 At the time, Kissinger was rather less artic-
ulate in making this same point. ‘Whether Turkey occupied a third of  Cyprus 
or not did not affect US interests,’ Kissinger informed the president.94 In sum, 
Kissinger was not prepared to sacrifice Turkey as an important regional ally to 
ensure a bi-federal peace settlement in Cyprus. Rather, in Kissinger’s assess-
ment, a bi-regional solution, where Turkey controlled one portion of  Cyprus 
and Greece the other, was acceptable.95
Washington’s analysis of  the Cyprus crisis was therefore driven largely by 
overarching Cold War considerations. Events in Vietnam, the rise of  Euro-
communism, and the emergence of  communist influence across Africa all 
contributed to Kissinger believing that another Soviet advancement could 
occur in Cyprus. Divorced from such geopolitical considerations, Kissinger was 
concerned about the impact of  Watergate on America’s international stand-
ing. He believed that Watergate was undermining US foreign policy, and he 
suspected that the USSR would exploit the president’s domestic troubles for 
their own aggrandisement.96 Kissinger also suspected that the advance of  
North Vietnamese forces once again could be explained by the domestic situa-
tion in Washington.97 It is within this context, then, that events must be viewed. 
This, however, is not to suggest that Kissinger was supporting Turkish military 
action. Contrary to the claims of  some authors, Kissinger was against Turkish 
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military action from the outset of  the crisis, and he had worked laboriously, 
if  ultimately ineffectively, to prevent the escalation of  hostilities.98 Once the 
Turkish had gained a foothold on the island, Kissinger was opposed to further 
military action. As Kissinger made clear to the president on 10 August 1974, 
the US could not support any unilateral military action in the first 48 hours 
of  Ford’s new presidency. As such, Kissinger warned Ankara against taking 
further military action.99
For US–UK relations the episode had demonstrated a number of  impor-
tant points. It reiterated the fact that the special relationship between the two 
countries was largely limited to specific areas, such as intelligence or nuclear 
cooperation, and was becoming a lot narrower in its scope. When US interests 
were perceived to conflict with those of  the United Kingdom, then the United 
States was prepared to fully pursue its aims with little concern for London’s 
ambitions. Again then, the disparity in power within the US−UK relation-
ship was evident. Wilson and Callaghan both sought a close relationship with 
Washington so as to influence its policies. On this occasion, the absence of  
influence was apparent.
Détente and economic decline
This chapter now turns its attention to Britain’s economic plight, and the 
ramifications it had for Britain’s defence posture. By doing so, one can trace 
a systematic shift in US–UK relations, in that the UK came to be viewed as a 
less useful ally by the US. It also illustrates that Wilson’s efforts at restoring 
closer US–UK interaction were largely ineffective, because of  such defence 
cuts. From here, areas of  international diplomacy which sought to push 
forward the process of  détente, such as the CSCE and MBFR, are also reviewed 
in this section. This again allows for a broader assessment of  the relationship 
to be provided and counterbalances the impression that US–UK relations were 
constantly beset by acrimony. 
Wilson assumed power at the time when Britain had come to be regarded as 
the ‘sick man of  Europe’.100 Heath’s mismanagement of  the economy, coupled 
with the inflationary pressures generated by the oil embargo, had led to an 
unsupportable budget deficit. To combat this, public expenditure cutbacks had 
been enacted in Anthony Barbour’s budgets of  1973–74 in order to reduce 
Britain’s borrowing requirements.101 Britain’s defence budget, however, 
remained largely unaffected by such cutbacks until December 1973, when it 
was announced that defence would incur a cut of  £178 million.102 Such was 
the seriousness of  these economic problems that the likes of  Lord Rothschild 
– who headed up Heath’s economic think tank – were predicting that the 
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UK would be one of  the poorest countries in Europe by 1985, unless serious 
defence cuts were enacted.103 
Given this, Wilson inherited a situation where defence expenditure was to 
be reduced, but internal party politics within the Labour government also 
encouraged the new prime minister to look for defence spending reductions. 
At the Labour Party conference of  October 1973, there had been vociferous 
demands for defence expenditure to be reduced, and £1,000 million had been 
suggested as the figure that a new Labour government should be looking to 
reduce Britain’s defence expenditure by.104 Wilson, while privately scornful of  
such thinking, did accede somewhat to these demands in the Labour Party 
manifesto of  February 1974.105 As it outlined, a new Labour government 
would seek to find savings of  ‘several hundred million pounds per annum’ in 
the defence budget.106 Consequently, on assuming office, the chancellor of  the 
exchequer Denis Healey cut an additional £50 million from defence expendi-
ture in his first budget. This, however, was only an interim solution, and Wilson 
ordered a full defence review to be undertaken. This, as Wilson warned, could 
result in reductions ‘amounting to hundreds of  millions of  pounds’.107 
Washington observed Wilson’s defence policy closely, and was none too 
pleased by what it believed were the ‘soft’ policy choices being made in London.108 
From the military-strategic perspective, American officialdom did not wish to 
see Britain lessen its pre-existing commitments, and senior US policy-makers 
– including Nixon, Kissinger, Haig and Schlesinger – lamented Britain’s global 
military decline. Yet during their time in office, they had been unable to prevent 
this decline, and had little success in convincing London to reverse its East of  
Suez policy or contribute more heavily to NATO. Nevertheless, this had been 
viewed as the limit of  Britain’s military downsizing. Now it appeared, from 
Washington’s perspective, as if  further large-scale military cutbacks were to be 
enacted by the new Labour government, which would have the likely effect of  
increasing the military burden upon the US.
Further to this, in Kissinger’s assessment, such policies acted as another 
example of  the European states trying to ‘cop out’ of  the Cold War.109 By this 
it was implied that with the onset of  détente and improved superpower rela-
tions, NATO members would wrongly conclude that the Soviet threat no longer 
existed, and could reduce their defence commitments accordingly. Along with 
this, US officials were also concerned that British defence expenditure cuts 
would have more practical effects on US–UK cooperation. Most obviously, 
the worries of  the US surrounded the issue of  whether Wilson would endorse 
the decisions made by the Heath government to upgrade Polaris and retain 
intelligence posts in Cyprus.110
Washington, therefore, sought to convince their British allies that they 
should not embark on another round of  deep defence cuts. Thus, during a 
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meeting between Kissinger and John Hunt, the US secretary of  state outlined 
his concerns. Hunt assured Kissinger that rumours referring to substantial 
defence cuts were unsubstantiated, and that Wilson was committed to the 
upgrading of  Polaris and to retaining Britain’s existing NATO commitments.111 
American elites remained sceptical of  such assurances and this can be partly 
explained by the low opinion that prominent US policy-makers, including Ford 
and Kissinger, had of  Wilson and his government. Kissinger regarded Wilson 
as a ‘greasy sort of  man’ and ‘Healey is a shit who can’t be trusted’ was his 
even more scathing verdict of  the British chancellor of  the exchequer.112 
Significant concerns surrounded the suitability of  Roy Mason as defence 
secretary, especially in regard to whether or not he would be able to func-
tion independently from his former boss, Denis Healey. The US ambassador in 
London, Walter Annenberg, warned Washington that Healey would be able 
to cajole Mason into making substantial reductions in the British defence 
budget.113 It was also felt that Healey’s first budget was indicative of  things 
to follow in the future. Earl Sohm, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in 
London, predicted that once Wilson had assured his position as prime minis-
ter, more significant cuts would follow.114 The turn of  events would prove this 
assessment correct. The general election of  October 1974 solidified Wilson’s 
authority somewhat, and both he and Healey could now begin to tackle Britain’s 
budget deficit. It took no great leap of  faith, then, to think that Britain’s defence 
budget would once again be coming under severe scrutiny, and that cutbacks 
would follow in the near future.115 
Throughout the winter of  1974, the US maintained a keen interest in British 
debates about possible defence cutbacks. Washington repeated its earlier posi-
tion that it did not wish to see any substantial defence reductions undertaken 
by the British government. More specifically, the Ford administration articu-
lated clearly that it believed the British government should maintain several 
key areas of  its defence commitment, which included the Polaris upgrade, the 
retention of  Britain’s presence in Cyprus, and the continuation of  the US–UK 
Diego Garcia commitments.116 Such suggestions appeared not to have reso-
nated in London, because reports soon arrived in Washington that suggested 
that Wilson was ‘agonising’ over whether to continue with the Polaris upgrade. 
Additionally, Kissinger was informed that the British sovereign bases in Cyprus 
were set to be disbanded.117 
Evidently, US diplomacy had failed to achieve the desired outcome from the 
British government, so Kissinger set about taking a more rigorous approach 
with his British allies. He first despatched a cable to Callaghan where he warned 
a British withdrawal from Cyprus would ‘undermine our overall position in 
the Mediterranean’.118 Kissinger, along with Schlesinger and the CIA director, 
William Colby, took an even sterner tone with John Hunt during a meeting in 
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Washington. Apparently, Kissinger’s explanation that the US did not want the 
British to close their bases in Cyprus was laced with a series of  expletives. Given 
that America’s relationship with Turkey was strained because of  the Cyprus 
crisis, and the US Congress was threatening to halt all military assistance to 
Turkey (this was achieved in January 1975), the British presence in Cyprus 
took on a greater degree of  importance. Indeed, Britain’s intelligence facilities 
in Cyprus assumed extra significance when US posts in Turkey were shut down 
in retaliation to the Congress’s termination of  military aid.119
Following Washington’s warnings, debate continued in Wilson’s govern-
ment regarding the scope of  defence cuts, and after much wrangling Mason 
announced the preliminary results of  the defence review to the House of  
Commons on 4 December 1974.120 In retrospect, Mason claimed that the 
defence review ‘preserved our core defensive interests in Europe and fully 
maintained the integrity of  NATO’ and at the time he was equally confident.121 
Wilson, in a number of  his public speeches, was just as self-congratulatory, yet 
in private he was rather more reticent about the likely American reaction.122 
Thus, Wilson reported to his Cabinet that in the opinion of  the Ford adminis-
tration, defence cuts had reached ‘the limit of  what is tolerable’. In confidential 
correspondence with his chancellor of  the exchequer, Wilson was even more 
forthright in expressing the same sentiment.123 
Wilson was correct to be apprehensive about the reaction of  the US given 
that even before the latest defence review had been completed, key US policy-
makers were privately bemoaning the likely results. ‘You have to operate on 
the assumption that Great Britain is through’, was Kissinger’s candid judge-
ment.124 The results of  the defence review only soured Kissinger’s opinion 
further.125 Other influential US policy-makers were equally irritated with the 
British defence review. The US could ‘no longer expect Britain to pull any 
weight,’ Schlesinger allegedly stated.126 Alexander Haig, now the supreme 
commander of  allied forces in Europe, believed that the defence review was not 
‘reassuring’. As Haig articulated to Ford, the British had become ‘spongy’.127 
Clearly this was not meant as a term of  endearment. Indeed, under Haig’s 
direction, NATO responded rather sourly, with a public spokesman complain-
ing that British defence cuts were ‘hard to swallow and there is no doubt that 
they will do some damage’.128 
Not all US officials were as critical as the aforementioned. The US ambas-
sador to the UK, Elliot Richardson, gave a rather more positive appraisal of  
the defence review: ‘Britain and NATO have come away from the defence 
review rather better than initially might have been expected. Nothing vital has 
been lost, and the ingredients for a continued, meaningful British contribu-
tion to Western defense are still present’.129 Such opinion was in the minority, 
however, and Ford’s two most influential officials for foreign and security affairs, 
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Kissinger and Schlesinger, agreed that the defence review had done significant 
damage to Britain’s standing with America. Additionally, US officials perceived 
the British defence review to have harmed US interests on several fronts. For 
example, the decision to reduce the scope of  British bases in Cyprus and Malta 
was seen to have undermined America’s ability to gather intelligence in the 
region. British actions were also seen to have undermined US efforts at promot-
ing burden-sharing, and US attempts at negotiating an MBFR agreement with 
the USSR were deemed to have also been dealt a blow.130 
Such evidence could lead one to conclude that US–UK relations were critically 
undermined by Wilson’s defence review. Nevertheless, on closer inspection it 
is remarkable just how little impact the defence review of  March 1975 actu-
ally had upon existing US–UK cooperation. As US policy-makers concluded, 
the types of  cooperation undertaken with the UK – especially in the nuclear 
and intelligence realms – still benefitted the US. As the US Embassy in London 
noted, to cancel such mutually beneficial cooperation would only have a ‘“cut 
off  your nose to spite your face” quality’ about them.131 Given the interna-
tional environment, it becomes clearer as to why the Ford administration 
was unwilling to terminate mutually beneficial arrangements with a friendly 
country. The likes of  Kissinger, Schlesinger and perhaps even Ford believed 
that the US was experiencing a period of  power decline, and the events unfold-
ing in Vietnam acted as a timely reminder of  the limits of  American power. US 
concerns abounded over the future stability of  countries such as Greece, Italy 
and Portugal, and the spectre of  ‘Euro-communism’ was – from the perspec-
tive of  the Ford government – a very real danger to American interests in 
Europe. Moreover, in terms of  proportion of  GDP, Britain still remained the 
largest contributor to NATO. Wilson continued with the Polaris upgrade and 
gave in to US demands to retain intelligence posts in Cyprus. To put it simply, 
allies for the US in 1975 were in short supply. Terminating military coopera-
tion with a country which, even given the latest round of  defence cuts, still 
promoted US interests made little sense from the perspective of  the Ford White 
House.132 
Britain’s economic difficulties in this period were the backdrop behind all of  
these other events. Economic recession, stagflation and an ever-growing deficit 
were the driving forces behind Wilson’s need to reduce public expenditure. 
Moreover, the policies undertaken by the Wilson government to solve Britain’s 
economic problems were to have an impact on US–UK relations. Most obvious 
were the defence cuts enacted to help reduce Britain’s public expenditure. 
Besides, there was the broader concern in Washington about the economic poli-
cies pursued by Wilson’s government. For instance, the president complained 
to the US ambassador designate for the UK, Elliot Richardson, about the Wilson 
government and ordered Richardson to ‘get close’ to the unions in the UK, so 
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they would not follow ‘disastrous’ policies. In other words, Ford was asking his 
ambassador to involve himself  in the domestic affairs of  the UK.133
Throughout 1975, the president continued to take an interest in the 
British economy, and was vocal in chastising the policies pursued in London. 
Ford admonished Wilson’s economic policies during one interview with the 
magazine Fortune:
If  that growth in transfer payments continues, we can’t have the same 
economic system by the year 2000 that we have now. I don’t think that we 
are over the cliff, but it is something we have to stop now. As more people get 
on those transfer payments they become a political force and the programs 
are sort of  self-perpetuating. In my opinion, the best example of  how the 
matter can get out of  hand is the situation in Great Britain today. They just 
don’t seem to be able to stop the momentum.134 
This was followed by a speech in San Francisco on 4 April 1975, where again 
Ford labelled the UK as a prime example of  a government that mismanaged its 
economy. These comments raised eyebrows in London, and Peter Ramsbotham 
lodged a complaint with the Ford administration and was granted an apology, 
along with a promise that the president would not publicly talk about Britain’s 
economic problems in such a fashion again.135 In spite of  such promises, in 
October 1975 Ford once again spoke candidly about Britain’s economic prob-
lems, with the New York Times reporting that Ford had said that a ‘horrible 
example of  a government that spends itself  sick was Britain’s with its Labour 
Government and its Welfare State’.136 If  the public statements were causing 
disquiet in British circles then one can only imagine what would have been 
made of  the private comments being made in Washington. Kissinger, in one 
remark to President Ford, was particularly scathing, stating: ‘Britain is a 
tragedy – it has sunk to begging, borrowing, stealing until North Sea oil comes 
in … That Britain has become such a scrounger is a disgrace.’137 Even if  one 
allows that Kissinger may have been talking in a moment of  exasperation, the 
fact remains that Ford’s other advisers were just as critical; for example, US 
Treasury Secretary William Simon, Chairman of  the Federal Reserve Arthur 
Burns, and Ford’s special adviser on economics, Alan Greenspan, all lambasted 
the British government’s economic policies.138 
This low opinion of  Britain became obvious during President Ford’s tour of  
Europe in May 1975. Kissinger advised that Wilson was a ‘marginal’ figure 
and as such Ford was best spending ‘a lot of  time’ with the West German chan-
cellor, Helmut Schmidt.139 In practical terms, how much time the president 
spent with foreign leaders had little effect upon US–UK bilateral cooperation. 
Nonetheless, if  the defence cutbacks are viewed in conjunction with Britain’s 
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economic troubles, it becomes clear that the Ford administration viewed 
Wilson’s government as an increasingly less reliable ally for promoting US 
interests.
Due to Britain’s continuing economic problems, rumours soon began circu-
lating that further defence cuts were forthcoming and Ford was kept informed 
of  these developments.140 This advice was well founded because Healey was 
arguing that further public expenditure cutbacks were required to control 
Britain’s expanding borrowing requirements and this would likely involve 
bigger cutbacks in defence expenditure.141 America’s reaction to these proposed 
defence cuts was even more belligerent than that exhibited earlier in the year. 
At the Helsinki conference (July 1975), Ford articulated American displeasure 
about further British defence cutbacks.142 Schlesinger was less diplomatic and 
employed rather bellicose tactics in an effort to convince the Wilson govern-
ment to maintain its defence spending, when he threatened to permanently 
terminate US–UK nuclear and intelligence cooperation if  substantial defence 
cuts were made. Mason reported Schlesinger as follows to the prime minister: 
If  the British Government were to make further cuts in defence expenditure, 
the US government would have to re-consider its bilateral arrangements 
with us [Britain] on the exchange of  communications and intelligence 
information and on assistance in respect of  nuclear weapons, including 
specifically our POLARIS force and the improvement of  its missiles.143
Following Schlesinger’s warning, it was Kissinger’s turn to convey the 
Ford administration’s displeasure and he did so in conversation with James 
Callaghan. Whilst demonstrating a significantly more subtle approach than 
Schlesinger had with Mason, he articulated much the same point: US–UK 
security collaboration would be re-assessed if  a further round of  UK defence 
cuts was enacted.144
If  this type of  diplomacy was supposed to cause Wilson to rethink his 
defence policies then it appears to have failed. In fact the prime minister 
blithely dismissed these warnings and informed Mason that he should have 
told Schlesinger ‘to get stuffed’.145 Wilson also doubted whether the president 
or Kissinger ‘would have supported this kind of  pressure on us’.146 Callaghan 
questioned this assessment, believing Ford would support Schlesinger if  he 
suspended US–UK intelligence collaboration and, from his conversations with 
Kissinger, it was clear that the Ford administration was generally unhappy 
about further British defence cuts.147 Healey, meanwhile, advised Wilson that 
Schlesinger’s remarks should be considered, but the fundamental objective 
had to remain getting the economy ‘right’. In Healey’s assessment, this would 
require ‘major reductions in public expenditure’ and defence could not be 
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exempt, given that ‘desirable features of  other public expenditure programmes 
were having to be foregone’.148 
Of  all the advice given to Wilson, it was Callaghan’s that most accurately 
portrayed US opinion. To be sure, Wilson’s thinking was not illogical given that 
Schlesinger’s public differences with the president and Kissinger gave a clear 
impression of  a divided administration.149 However, while Wilson may have 
doubted that Ford and Kissinger would have supported Schlesinger, the fact 
was that they had actually sanctioned his actions.150 This, though, was all a 
moot point from the perspective of  the Wilson government and, in the final 
assessment, Schlesinger’s threats and Kissinger’s more subtle suggestions were 
ignored. On 24 June 1975, Mason announced that further defence cuts were 
to be expected in the near future.151 Interestingly, US pressure had been unable 
to prevent a further round of  defence cuts, and threats to cancel intelligence or 
nuclear cooperation had, on this occasion, been futile.
The US secretary of  defense made a scheduled visit to London in September 
1975, and it was here that Schlesinger again made his opposition to defence 
cuts known. He told Mason that the March 1975 defence review should be a 
‘one time’ process and he made similar arguments to Wilson and Healey.152 
The chancellor responded by making it known that public expenditure related 
to the ‘social services’ was going to be cut, thus meaning it was rather self-
evident that the defence budget would also be reduced.153 Wilson was not as 
blunt with Schlesinger, informing him that, ‘There was no need to expect any 
major changes in our defence expenditure’.154 In spite of  such assurances, 
Wilson had been careful not to make any specific promises about upholding 
Britain’s defence expenditure and, given the economic and political realities 
which confronted the prime minister, this was a wise decision. Britain’s deep-
ening recession and increasing borrowing levels meant that public expenditure 
was going to be reduced further, and it was, therefore, a case of  how substan-
tial, rather than if, defence cuts would be implemented.155
How public expenditure would be cut was being rigorously debated in 
London. Healey sought to introduce an aggressive programme of  tax increases 
and public expenditure cutbacks, which was dubbed the ‘civil formula’. The 
civil formula was not accepted in its entirety; however, on 13 November 
1975, the Cabinet gave its approval for public expenditure cutbacks of  £3,750 
million. One hundred million pounds of  this total was designated to come from 
the defence budget up to Financial Year (FY) 1979–80. The Treasury, however, 
demanded a further reduction from the defence budget throughout the winter 
of  1975. Such demands were made because Healey had only managed to find 
some £2,600 million in savings, leaving a shortfall of  £1,150 million from 
the agreed £3,750 million target. It was therefore evident that there would be 
increased pressure to reduce the size of  the defence budget. As it turned out, it 
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did not take long for these calls to materialise as Healey called for the defence 
budget to be slashed by an additional £550 million.156 
Healey’s demands encountered immediate opposition from Roy Mason, 
who argued that such cutbacks would terminally damage Britain’s relation-
ship with the US. John Hunt lent his support to Mason’s appeals, advancing 
a similar argument which resonated with the prime minister. Wilson there-
fore rejected Healey’s demands, and asked the various Cabinet ministers to 
re-submit their budget proposals with increased savings.157 
Kissinger decided that he had to strengthen the resolve of  Wilson against 
those arguing for substantial defence cutbacks, and thus despatched a scathing 
cable to London. ‘I am sure that you are aware that America’s long-term rela-
tions with the UK will inevitably have to take into account Britain’s standing 
as a partner in our common security exercise,’ Kissinger ominously warned.158 
While not specifically stating so, it is reasonable to suggest that Kissinger was 
referring to US–UK nuclear and intelligence cooperation. Kissinger, follow-
ing Schlesinger’s earlier path, invoked the possible re-assessment of  the 
US–UK nuclear and intelligence relationship as a means of  convincing Wilson 
that a substantial reduction in Britain’s defence expenditure should not be 
undertaken.
Kissinger’s actions, however, were largely irrelevant in deciding the final 
outcome of  the defence reductions debate. Throughout the whole of  the delib-
erations, it is evident just how little credibility Wilson gave to US threats.159 
As Wilson had learned in the 1960s, bellicose US diplomacy could not actu-
ally force his government into maintaining defence commitments which he 
was determined to scrap.160 More importantly, Wilson was not prepared to 
accept Healey’s suggestion that defence expenditure should be so radically 
reduced. As a trained economist himself, Wilson had always been sceptical 
of  the Treasury’s advice, and he remained unconvinced by the balance that 
Healey’s civil formula approach was trying to strike between tax increases and 
public expenditure cutbacks. In Wilson’s estimation, Healey was focusing too 
much on public expenditure cutbacks and not enough on ways to bolster the 
economy, in order to raise tax receipts, or enact new means of  taxation. Added 
to this, Wilson still believed that Britain could not reduce its defence expen-
diture by the sums Healey was demanding because he desired to safeguard 
certain projects, such as the Polaris update, in order to, as he saw it, retain 
influence with Washington. One particularly ill-tempered retort to his Cabinet 
colleagues demanding defence expenditure be more significantly reduced that 
military spending ‘was more important than school meals, or social security for 
Irishmen with 18 children’ captures this thinking rather well.161 Thus, in the 
series of  Cabinet debates that followed, Wilson skilfully managed to ensure that 
defence’s contribution to the overall public expenditure cutbacks fell from an 
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initially ‘scored’ agreement of  £225 million, to £193 million.162 This was 5.5 
per cent of  the total public expenditure cutbacks of  £3,750 million. Perhaps 
more importantly from Wilson’s perspective was the fact that the figure the 
defence budget had been reduced by was less than half  the figure Healey had 
been seeking. 
The majority of  the defence cutbacks involved manpower reductions, 
extending the duration of  defence projects and delaying infrastructure 
programmes.163 The major defence projects, such as the Polaris upgrade and 
the Harrier jet programme, continued and the intelligence posts in Cyprus 
were also retained. In Washington, the announced British defence cuts were 
being analysed closely and, in the final analysis, they were deemed not to have 
been as bad as was initially feared. Whilst private complaints in Washington 
ensued, rather less bellicosity was exhibited in bilateral contact with British 
officials. Perhaps given that the Ford administration had itself  decided to cut its 
own defence expenditure in October 1975, lecturing the British on their own 
efforts was seen as less than wise.164 
Finding a CSCE agreement
As shown earlier, Heath’s government had been sceptical as to how the CSCE 
and MBFR would benefit the UK. At their most melodramatic, the British 
regarded both sets of  negotiations as having the potential to critically under-
mine European security. For US–UK relations, the negotiations had been 
a point of  disagreement and Wilson’s return to office did little to alter this. 
Shortly after returning to power, Wilson had read an article in the Economist 
about the CSCE which sparked his interest in the subject and he therefore 
ordered a full review of  British policy towards the CSCE.165 After receiving 
various opinions on the CSCE, Wilson decided that any summit designed to 
conclude the CSCE should not be agreed to without first obtaining major 
concessions from the USSR.166
This line of  thinking was at variance with that of  Washington. As shown 
earlier, the Nixon administration had initially wished to delay progress on the 
CSCE as a means of  enacting leverage upon other areas of  US–Soviet diplo-
macy. By the middle of  1972, agreements on subjects such as SALT and a 
Berlin Treaty had been reached and movement on CSCE was now sought. 
Now, US policy sought a swift resolution to the ongoing CSCE to ensure 
that nothing of  real substance was reached in this multilateral negotiation. 
Accordingly, the visit of  Nixon to Moscow in June 1974 was envisaged as a 
cut-off  point. In sum, once the summit was over, the US wanted the CSCE to 
be promptly settled.167 
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What divided British and American policy were fundamentally different 
ideas about both what the CSCE could achieve and what could reasonably 
be expected to be extracted from the USSR in exchange for agreeing to the 
CSCE. For instance, the issue of  Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which 
included things such as the right of  free movement throughout Europe, was 
one example of  British and American policy being deeply divided.168 Wilson’s 
government sought tangible concessions from the USSR in these areas as the 
British believed these would be granted because the USSR was determined that 
the CSCE would act as a substitute treaty for ratifying Europe’s post-World War 
II borders. This thinking was based on information garnered from Soviet and 
American sources that indicated that Brezhnev was personally determined to 
hold a CSCE summit. British policy-makers thus concluded that there existed 
a potential to extrapolate Soviet concessions for agreeing to such a summit.169
US thinking differed from this. It must be recalled that from the outset of  
the process the CSCE was never seen solely as something that would benefit 
US interests on its own. Rather, the CSCE was useful in so much as it allowed 
the US to apply leverage upon other areas of  US–Soviet interaction. As a result 
of  this, CBMs were viewed as peripheral factors, and what really mattered for 
the US was getting Soviet movement on issues deemed more important to US 
interests. In particular, Washington wanted progress on SALT II and MBFR. 
However, as US policy-makers were aware, events in the Middle East had 
damaged détente and made it less likely that the Soviets would offer the US 
an agreement which they could realistically be expected to agree to. Events 
were proving such conclusions correct given that SALT II was becoming mired 
in technical debates and MBFR discussions had progressed little. As Helmut 
Sonnenfeldt succinctly summarised for Kissinger, negotiations had moved at a 
‘snail’s pace’.170
In order to garner a more responsive attitude from Moscow, Kissinger 
informed Nixon that he was ‘holding up’ progress on the CSCE until after the 
Moscow summit. This, as Kissinger explained, would give the US leverage over 
the USSR because they wanted to conclude the CSCE at a summit meeting. 
Refusing to move towards this would encourage the Soviets to be more forth-
coming in both the SALT and MBFR discussions.171 Indeed, this belief  was not 
without foundation given Soviet interlocutors had intimated that progress 
in SALT and MBFR was directly linked to the condition that the US agreed to 
hold a CSCE summit.172 Therefore, a CSCE summit was something that could 
be offered to the Soviets as a means of  ensuring progress in areas deemed more 
important to the US.173 Kissinger explained this policy approach candidly to 
Schlesinger: ‘What can we do to keep the Soviet Union happy? We have MBFR, 
but that may be premature. CSCE is cheap. The Germans or French will proba-
bly give it away anyway and we should beat them.’174 By August 1974, this had 
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become official US policy, and consequently the CSCE and MBFR were explicitly 
linked and a conclusion to the CSCE at a summit would be agreed to only as a 
means of  producing movement on MBFR.175
Earlier in the year, Kissinger had indicated to the Soviets that a CSCE would 
be concluded in the near future.176 In the communiqué following the Moscow 
summit of  June 1974, this private assurance was given a public endorsement.177 
For US–UK relations, this was to create further disagreement. Kissinger had 
provided Wilson with prior notice that the US would, at the conclusion of  the 
Moscow summit, announce its intention to hold a CSCE summit.178 The British 
informed Kissinger that they were not averse to settling the CSCE quickly, but 
they doubted whether Kissinger’s timeframe was realistic.179 Certainly, the 
negotiations at the CSCE were complicated and intricate. Less kindly, William 
Hyland noted that the CSCE had a ‘Talmudic nature’ which featured ‘esoteric 
debates’.180 It was certainly the case that the CSCE involved over 30 countries 
which were seeking to find agreement on a wide range of  issues.181 Completing 
the CSCE according to Kissinger’s timetable was, if  one wishes to be charitable, 
a rather ambitious objective. 
Causing further frustration to Kissinger’s ambition of  settling the CSCE 
quickly was the actions of  the British CSCE delegation which, according to 
one US observer, enjoyed debating complicated technical matters.182 As the 
year progressed, the British delegation continued to debate the finer points of  
what the final CSCE agreement would include with their Soviet counterparts 
which left the clear impression that the talks were rapidly reaching a stale-
mate.183 Such a situation angered Washington. In the opinion of  Scowcroft, 
there was ‘little to commend’ in Britain’s CSCE approach; Kissinger, therefore, 
attempted to break this impasse.184 How this would be achieved presented an 
obvious problem. Trying to enforce US views on the Western negotiators was 
likely to create a rift amongst the Western alliance, and risk a repetition of  US–
European troubles witnessed throughout 1973. More dangerously, a fractured 
negotiating stance would provide the USSR with an opportunity to exploit this 
weakness. Nevertheless, from the standpoint of  the US, the negotiations could 
not just be allowed to continue at their current rate for the above-mentioned 
reasons. This predicament was neatly summarised by Arthur Hartman, the 
assistant secretary of  state for European affairs:
The issue then is how to nudge the Allies along toward a more precise and 
realistic definition of  objectives in Basket III and toward an agreed fallback 
position on CBMs without pressing them so hard we would risk a new US–
European confrontation, but in a way that this autumn we would be in a 
position to show the Soviets that we have made a strong effort to bring CSCE 
to a conclusion.185
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Kissinger consequently injected himself  into this and encouraged the US dele-
gation to hasten the rate of  the negotiations. In his assessment, this would be 
achieved by the West largely accepting the terms of  the agreements already 
reached, and by the British dropping their demands concerning CBMs. As a 
result, the US delegation insisted that ‘we understand and support the Allied 
wish for progress in the Basket III area, although realistically we must not set 
our sights too high’.186 Such an attitude, however, was met with consterna-
tion by the British delegation. In London, it was met with equal incredulity. 
Callaghan wanted something ‘concrete’ on Basket III before agreeing to the 
Soviet demand to settle the CSCE at a summit.187 
British inflexibility was again met with little sympathy in Washington. 
Accordingly, Kissinger instructed his delegation to support the ‘Finnish 
compromise’, which meant that the Soviets would give some concessions over 
the issue of  ‘freer exchanges’. Crucially, however, this would be monitored by 
an internal regulatory apparatus, rather than by an outside body. Thus, Soviet 
sovereignty would not be violated by having to accept outside observers in 
their state, and would enhance the likelihood that the USSR would accept this 
condition.188 
A divided West
As negotiations continued, Callaghan and Kissinger – during a meeting in 
July 1974 – took the opportunity to explain their respective approaches to the 
CSCE. Kissinger pressed Callaghan to accept that the CSCE should be concluded 
at a summit, and further suggested that the USSR could not be expected to 
accept Britain’s preferred level of  CBMs. Callaghan remained unconvinced 
by Kissinger’s line of  reasoning. Instead he argued that the West should be 
pushing for greater concessions from the USSR, and would achieve them as 
long as the West remained resolute in its demands. At the end of  the discussion 
it was evident that little agreement between the two sides existed. This said, it 
was agreed that it was essential for the Western bloc to unify its own negotiat-
ing position and only once these internal differences had been settled could a 
final CSCE be concluded.189 Reaching this point, however, was going to be an 
obviously difficult task. 
Given that Kissinger had failed to convince the British to alter their position, 
the contents of  Basket III remained the principal sticking point in the nego-
tiations. In December 1974, this impasse appeared to have been potentially 
broken. During Brezhnev’s visit to Paris, the French, acting on behalf  of  the 
entire Western bloc, found agreement on the contents of  Basket III. Following 
this, the Austrian delegation at the CSCE negotiation in Geneva was used to 
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table the Soviet–French agreement. As a part of  the agreement, the French 
had agreed to the Soviet demand that the CSCE should be concluded at an 
international summit.190 
As seen above, a major summit to conclude the CSCE was something that 
both the US and British governments had not wanted to agree to without 
the Soviets offering something significant in return. French agreement to do 
this angered Ford and Kissinger with both reasoning that French actions had 
undermined the Western negotiating position, but, more importantly, it meant 
that the US could not extract concessions from the USSR in other areas of  
their diplomacy.191 British officials were divided in their assessments of  French 
behaviour. Crispin Tickell (the FCO’s head of  western organisations depart-
ment and therefore responsible for the CSCE negotiations) informed Ronald 
Spiers, the US chargé d’affaires in London, that the French had not broken 
with the agreed Western position.192 Tickell, however, was in the minority.
Michael Alexander, the chief  negotiator for the British at the CSCE negotia-
tions, agreed with the American opinion that French actions had undermined 
the entire Western negotiating position. Moreover, the chances for obtain-
ing further CBMs now that the ‘carrot’ of  a CSCE summit had been agreed 
to seemed remote. In London, Callaghan held a similar viewpoint.193 French 
actions had a profound impact upon British policy towards the CSCE. Now that 
the summit had been agreed to, it was deemed unwise to deviate from this posi-
tion because it would likely ostracise Britain and present an image of  them 
being particularly belligerent. Moreover, British policy-makers figured that 
British opposition to a summit was not going to prevent it from occurring now 
it had been publicly agreed to. Thus, British policy-makers deemed that it was 
imperative to finalise the terms of  Basket III and to quickly move to a summit 
so that the final CSCE agreement could be signed.
French actions should have brought US and UK policy closer together, as 
both countries understood that reaching an agreed Western position was 
required. British policy-makers believed that their complaints involving CBMs 
would have to be watered down (the very thing the US had been requesting 
throughout the past year), in order for an agreement to be reached in time for 
the summit.194 As such, when Callaghan met with Kissinger in January 1975, 
he informed him that ‘we won’t get out of  line with you’ over the CSCE.195 
However, the reversal in British policy was unwelcome. Kissinger now argued 
that the summit should not be held unless the Soviets agreed to include further 
CBMs in Basket III. Ironically, the very thing the British had originally been 
arguing for now had Kissinger’s support!196 
How then is this curious shift in US policy explained? Ultimately it comes 
down to Kissinger’s overarching concern to obtain possible leverage over other 
areas of  Soviet policy via the CSCE, and agreeing to a summit to settle the CSCE 
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was seen as a trump card for influencing Soviet policy. Although the summit 
had been scheduled, little movement in Soviet foreign policy had been forth-
coming. Kissinger, noting that the West had agreed to the summit, believed 
that the US may as well attempt to extract concessions on the contents of  the 
CSCE. As Kissinger explained in conversation with President Ford, Brezhnev 
personally attached great significance to agreeing to a CSCE at a summit. 
Therefore, if  the West could delay the summit by refusing to agree terms on 
CBMs, this would harm Brezhnev’s position within the ruling elite of  the USSR 
and could result in him accepting these demands in order for the summit to take 
place.197 However, as Kissinger realised, the US could hardly make demands 
about CBMs, given they had to this point barely mentioned them in US–Soviet 
negotiations. Thus, other countries which had made an issue of  CBMs should 
act as America’s proxies; hence, the US secretary of  state sought to convince 
the British that they should act as the American stalking horse.198 Similarly, 
Kissinger ordered the US delegation at the CSCE to encourage their allied coun-
terparts to stand firm against Soviet demands.199
This last-minute diplomacy by Kissinger was successful in extracting several 
concessions from the USSR. For instance, the USSR agreed that Europe’s 
borders could only be altered via peaceful means, in accordance with interna-
tional law. As Kissinger convincingly argued:
American influence had helped to confine the recognition of  borders to an 
obligation not to change them by force, which was a mere duplication of  the 
UN Charter. Since no European country had the capacity to bring about a 
forcible change or a policy to that effect, the formal renunciation was hardly 
a Soviet gain. Even this limited recognition of  legitimacy was vitiated by a 
statement of  principles which preceded it ... It declared that the signatory 
states consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with 
international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.200
Nevertheless, Kissinger failed to achieve the level of  leverage in other areas of  
US–Soviet relations that he wanted. For instance, there was little movement 
over SALT II and MBFR. Consequently, as a tool of  leverage over Soviet foreign 
policy, the CSCE failed to produce the type of  result which Kissinger had envis-
aged was likely. 
Helsinki was chosen as the location for the signing of  the CSCE documents, 
and negotiations on the content of  the CSCE continued until the actual date of  
the summit (30 July – 1 August 1975). Yet, following last-minute wrangling 
on the substance of  the CSCE, the ‘Helsinki Accords’ were eventually signed 
on 1 August 1975.201 For Kissinger, he doubted whether the CSCE would 
mollify Soviet behaviour and worried that it would only encourage ‘communist 
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inroads’ throughout Europe.202 Worse still for the president, the signing of  the 
accords became a political liability, with the New York Times parodying Winston 
Churchill when it opined that ‘Never have so many fought for so little’.203 Other 
media outlets were equally scornful.204 Former government officials, such as 
George Ball, and the Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn attacked Ford’s 
decision to attend the summit. Large and vocal elements within the Republican 
Party were equally critical, and this fuelled the challenge to Ford’s presidency 
from the right of  the party. As Ford would soon discover during his election 
campaign, the signing of  the accords would prove to be a domestic burden that 
provided ammunition for his political opponents.205 
Likewise, Harold Wilson faced vitriolic attacks from his political opponents, 
and Margaret Thatcher, the then leader of  the opposition Conservative Party, 
vehemently attacked the CSCE and the entire process of  détente.206 Certainly, 
some elements of  the popular British press agreed with her stance. The Daily 
Express, for instance, believed that if  Wilson believed the ‘guff ’ he had spoken 
at Helsinki then he should be prevented from ‘going out alone’ in the future.207 
But, as Thatcher accepted, her opinions placed her largely as the ‘odd woman 
out’.208 In the main, the British public appeared to be embracing improved 
East–West relations and the signing of  the CSCE was somewhat of  a political 
boost for Wilson’s leadership.209 
MBFR 
In both Washington and London, the MBFR had been seen as a rather more 
significant aspect of  East–West relations. It is worth reflecting on how British 
and American policy had evolved. First, Wilson’s return to power marked a 
subtle change in British policy towards MBFR. Most obvious was the fact 
that British enthusiasm for MBFR grew throughout this period which can be 
attributed largely to Britain’s continuing economic problems. Simply, MBFR 
presented an opportunity for Britain to reduce its defence commitments in a 
multilateral format that would not undermine Western security. Nevertheless, 
British officials remained sceptical of  US motives towards MBFR. In partic-
ular, the British were concerned that an MBFR agreement would be agreed 
regardless of  NATO’s concerns, and therefore severely damage British security 
interests.210 
Perhaps the British were correct to be suspicious given that we now know 
that Nixon had suggested that the MBFR should be settled on a bilateral 
basis between the US and USSR. Kissinger persuaded Nixon against such 
a course of  action, citing that it would create innumerable problems for the 
US within NATO.211 But, following the US–Soviet summit (June 1974), it was 
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Kissinger that was now suggesting that MBFR should be settled bilaterally 
because he was growing impatient with its lack of  progress.212 Kissinger’s entire 
détente strategy was also coming under increasing pressure, both domestically 
and from within the administration. MBFR, therefore, was becoming an issue 
of  growing significance for US–Soviet relations, and as such Kissinger now 
suggested it should be conducted bilaterally with the USSR. ‘If  we get serious 
about MBFR, we should do it like SALT – give them proposals through your 
channel before surfacing them,’ Kissinger advised Ford.213 
Kissinger’s suggested approach, however, was being challenged within 
Washington. Helmut Sonnenfeldt had consistently advised that US intentions 
vis-à-vis MBFR should be made abundantly clear to US allies and continued to 
argue this.214 Sonnenfeldt could hardly act as a bureaucratic rival to Kissinger, 
but James Schlesinger certainly could and he was also not convinced that 
moving so quickly over MBFR suited US interests. He also remained sceptical 
about whether settling MBFR bilaterally with the Soviets was the prefera-
ble route to take. As Schlesinger reminded the president during one National 
Security Council meeting:
Our objectives on MBFR have been two. First, to improve security in Western 
Europe. This has led us to concentrate on getting out the tank army. And 
we have agreed not to be stampeded into movement that does not serve our 
ultimate objective of  improved security. Second, we want to get the Allies to 
do more. If  we place limits on Western forces, we cannot get them to increase 
their manpower and budgetary support. It is important not to undermine 
these basic objectives by accepting some short term possible deal held out by 
the Soviets.215
Following this conflicting advice, the president ordered that US MBFR propos-
als should be given to the British and West Germans before other NATO 
members.216 This was done largely because it was hoped that by engaging with 
the British at this early stage they would be able to mollify their likely resistance 
towards MBFR in forthcoming NATO meetings.217 Regardless of  this preferen-
tial treatment, US policy-makers were confident that they would obtain British 
support for their policies because Britain’s economic woes would increase their 
desire to reduce military spending.218
The Ford administration continued to push for agreement within NATO 
about the contents of  an MBFR settlement, and thus proposed that 1,000 
nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing surface-
to-surface missile launchers should be removed from Europe. This would be 
the fundamental basis from which NATO would negotiate an MBFR settle-
ment with the Warsaw Pact.219 The US was correct in its earlier thinking 
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that the British would present the sternest challenge to its MBFR proposals. 
Within NATO, British officials pressed their American counterparts on both the 
substance of  their proposals and the logic that supported them. According to 
one report, Callaghan had ‘cornered’ Kissinger at a NATO conference and had 
proceeded to list a whole series of  complaints over the US’s MBFR proposals.220 
British officials had spent the opening months of  1975 opposing the US’s 
MBFR proposals. However, by May this stance had completely altered, and 
London notified Washington that it would negotiate for an MBFR along the 
lines the US had proposed in January 1975.221 Elliot Richardson gave further 
impetus to this, confirming that the British would genuinely seek an MBFR 
agreement.222 This change in policy is best explained by Britain’s economic 
difficulties. As predicted by US policy-makers in 1974, the MBFR afforded the 
British the opportunity to reduce their defence commitments within a multilat-
eral framework, and would thus reduce the risk of  damaging Britain’s security 
interests within Europe. 
In spite of  Britain’s new-found enthusiasm, the MBFR process remained 
painfully slow in achieving anything of  substance and it also continued to 
be a source for US–UK disagreement.223 British officials complained that the 
US no longer seemed interested in substantively negotiating the contents of  
MBFR, and this was hardly an unfair assessment given that the Ford adminis-
tration came to view MBFR as an increasingly meaningless exercise which was 
unlikely to benefit US interests.224 Ford, for instance, complained that the only 
accomplishment his MBFR approach had achieved was to give an impression 
that he was seeking to ‘de-nuclearise’ Europe which had only managed to raise 
the ire of  the NATO alliance. Kissinger had reached a similar conclusion.225 
It was apparent that, by the latter part of  1975, the Ford administration had 
effectively lost interest in reaching a substantive MBFR agreement in the near 
future.
This loss of  interest can be explained because of  an intermixing of  strategic 
and domestic political factors: US–Soviet diplomacy was stalling in a number 
of  areas, internationally the entire détente project appeared to be collapsing, 
SALT II had become mired in technical debate with little likelihood of  further 
progress, the Paris Peace Agreement collapsed in April 1975 when North 
Vietnam captured Saigon, and the USSR appeared to be advancing in Africa. 
The CSCE summit in July–August 1975 had also not resulted in any discern-
ible shifts in Soviet foreign policy.226 Domestically, the continuation of  détente 
was coming under severe attack. Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, the likely Democratic 
nominee for president, vocally admonished Ford’s foreign and defence policies. 
With Jackson’s encouragement, domestic critics of  détente became more vocal 
in the ensuing years. Jimmy Carter’s campaign for the presidency also accused 
the Ford administration of  pursuing a weak foreign policy towards the USSR. 
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For the president, then, the continuation of  détente was becoming a prominent 
political issue that was hurting his chances of  winning the 1976 presidential 
election. Such was the fear of  appearing to be pursuing a ‘weak’ foreign policy, 
Ford had forbidden the word ‘détente’ being used to describe his foreign policy 
during his campaign for the presidency.227 
Within the administration itself  the challenge to détente was just as great, 
with Schlesinger leading the charge for a new foreign policy approach. Indeed, 
he would openly challenge official US policy aims in SALT II, and argued 
that the US should seek much tougher terms than those sought by Kissinger. 
Schlesinger would find himself  fired as secretary of  defense in November 1975, 
but his successor, Donald Rumsfeld, argued along similar lines.228 Moreover, 
events in Asia, Africa and Southern Europe appeared to undermine the argu-
ment that détente was producing a more amenable foreign policy from the 
USSR. It appeared as if  both superpowers were coming to the conclusion 
that détente would not provide them with what they wanted. In the case of  
the US, it could not prevent the Soviet arms build-up, nor obtain Soviet assis-
tance in extracting itself  from Indochina. For the Soviet Union, détente would 
not provide the anti-Chinese alliance it sought, or the economic assistance it 
required.229 
Coupled with all of  this was Henry Kissinger’s dwindling influence on the 
course of  US foreign policy. Kissinger’s position within the administration as 
the chief  architect and implementer of  US foreign policy was being under-
mined by both changing international and domestic circumstances. While 
he had been largely unaffected by the scandal of  Watergate, he was now 
becoming embroiled with similar controversies as the Church Committee (the 
Congressional inquiry into the CIA) began to reveal Kissinger’s association with 
the more controversial activities of  the agency. As the most visible member of  
the Ford administration associated with the détente project, such revelations 
were damaging to Kissinger’s reputation and standing within the administra-
tion. Coupled with this, the challenge from the right of  the Republican Party 
began to make Kissinger a political liability for the president. Ronald Reagan 
attacked the administration’s détente policies and based this as his challenge 
against Ford as the Republican nominee for the presidency.230
Ford was not immune to these pressures, and he began to rely less upon 
Kissinger’s policy advice.231 Thus, when Kissinger lost his position as national 
security adviser in November 1975 (something Ford had never been comfort-
able with, and had been advised to change at the outset of  his presidency),232 
it signalled that the president was now determined to chart a more indepen-
dent and perhaps alternative course in foreign affairs.233 The likes of  Donald 
Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney offered this alternative, advising the president to 
take a much sterner approach in their diplomacy with the USSR.234 As John 
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Lewis Gaddis – the eminent historian of  the Cold War – has noted, ‘whatever 
“thaw” had occurred in the Cold War now seemed to be ending’.235 Given this, 
projects closely associated with détente, such as SALT II or MBFR, became less 
significant for the Ford administration.236 It is of  little surprise then that MBFR 
failed to substantively advance during the final year of  the Ford administration.
Conclusion
During Wilson’s final premiership, he had sought to repair the relationship 
with Washington and from here ensure that relations remained as close as 
possible in order to influence Britain’s superpower ally. In some ways, Wilson 
was highly successful in that he managed to improve personal relations with 
the key policy-makers in Washington and, at least in the public arena, the 
impression of  a close and harmonious relationship was presented.237 Along 
with this, the areas traditionally seen as the most ‘special’ in the US−UK 
relationship continued under his government. Finally, as witnessed during 
both the CSCE and MBFR negotiations, US−UK negotiations, if  not always in 
agreement, showcased that a significant amount of  interaction, discussion 
and cooperation continued between the two sides. 
Yet, underneath the surface, US−UK disagreement was never far away and 
it even threatened to impact upon the intelligence and nuclear relationship. 
As such, a constant feature of  the relationship was the coercive diplomacy 
employed by Washington against its British ally. Threats to curtail, limit, or 
even permanently cancel, nuclear and intelligence cooperation with London 
were made periodically by Washington in order to persuade London not to 
enact sweeping defence budget cuts which would harm perceived US interests. 
Wilson, having been well versed in experiencing the more belligerent policies 
of  Washington during the presidency of  Lyndon Johnson, was able to largely 
ignore the threats emanating from across the Atlantic. Indeed, Wilson, unlike 
his predecessor Edward Heath, had judged, quite correctly as it would turn out, 
that Washington would not act upon its threats because, in the final analysis, 
this cooperation benefitted the United States. As Wilson well understood, even 
an ally that was of  declining utility remained, nonetheless, useful.
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All out of money
1976–77
There is a difference between being a charitable benefactor and 
host to a parasite.
William Simon’s explanation of US policy towards  
Britain during the IMF crisis1
Introduction 
Allegedly suffering from the first stages of  Alzheimer’s disease, Harold Wilson 
announced he would resign as prime minister in March 1976. As one close 
associate of  the prime minister recalled, Wilson had simply ‘had enough’.2 A 
battle for the party leadership (and thus to become prime minster) ensued which 
the ‘champion of  the moderates’ James Callaghan eventually won.3 Callaghan 
took office on 5 April 1976, and Anthony Crosland took over from the new 
prime minister as foreign and commonwealth secretary. In his previous posi-
tion, Callaghan had been influential in the formulation of  British foreign policy 
and he was determined to retain a dominant role in foreign policy-making. 
Callaghan’s promotion to number 10 Downing Street thus ensured a degree of  
continuity in the conduct of  British foreign policy.4 
On the other side of  the Atlantic, events were tumultuous for the Ford admin-
istration, both domestically and in the realm of  international relations. The 
SALT II negotiations with the USSR effectively ground to a halt, and US diplo-
macy with the PRC was failing to produce any discernible results for the US. 
This was most obvious in respect to America’s long war in South East Asia and, 
in May 1975, US forces were ejected from Vietnam. In Africa, a Soviet-inspired 
revolution appeared to be taking hold throughout Angola. The situation in 
Europe did not appear much better, given that the rise of  Euro-communism 
05_Strained_partnership_175-209.indd   175 06/11/2013   13:53
176 A strained partnership?
was perceived as a growing challenge to American interests. In the economic 
realm there was little cheer for the president, given that international reces-
sions were deepening and the solutions reached amongst the major Western 
economies appeared to be making little positive difference. Domestically, the 
president had to survive Ronald Reagan’s challenge to become the actual 
Republican nominee for president. Barely surviving this, Ford found himself  
involved in an arduous and closely fought presidential campaign with the 
Democrat nominee, Jimmy Carter. After months of  lengthy campaigning, 
Ford would eventually lose the general election in November 1976. The year 
1976–77 was, on all fronts, a difficult one for the Ford White House.5 
US–UK relations were not to be an exception to this. Following a summer 
of  economic turmoil, which included speculative pressure on the UK 
currency (sterling), and the refusal of  international markets to lend further 
credit to Britain to finance its spending, James Callaghan was forced to seek 
a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF insisted that a 
loan would only be provided if  Britain cut its projected Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) for the financial years 1976–77, 1977–78 and 1978–
79. The IMF wanted to see a reduction in the UK’s PSBR from a projected £12 
billion to a figure in the region of  £9 billion by FY 1978–79. This policy was 
designed to deflate the British economy and restore borrowing to levels that 
would be deemed ‘credible’ by international markets.6 Callaghan, however, 
believed the IMF’s proposed PSBR reduction was too high because it would 
lead to increased unemployment and, moreover, fail to resolve the problem of  
sterling being utilised as an international reserve currency. Instead, Callaghan 
wanted a loan from the IMF that did not require such large cuts in the PSBR, 
and also a ‘safety net’ loan that could be drawn upon to defend against currency 
speculation.7
The UK–IMF loan application dominated US–UK relations at this juncture 
because Callaghan wanted the Ford administration to intercede on Britain’s 
behalf  to reduce the IMF’s PSBR demands. The US – given its economic influ-
ence, coupled with its preferential position within the world’s economic 
institutions – did have the ability to do this.8 The real test for Callaghan, 
though, was to convince the Ford administration to use its influence to assist 
the UK. Callaghan therefore sought to convince Washington that the IMF’s 
economic reasoning behind such a large PSBR reduction was flawed. The prime 
minister, however, had a contingency plan which involved Britain’s security 
commitments to the Western alliance acting as a sort of  ‘bargaining chip’. In 
essence, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, its contribution to NATO’s conventional 
forces and its intelligence facilities would all be threatened to be reduced, or 
even disbanded, if  the US did not provide the level of  economic assistance that 
London desired. It was believed that by threatening such action, the US would 
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provide economic assistance for fear that the British would undermine US 
security interests.
Events would prove that Callaghan’s thinking was misplaced. The Ford 
administration refused to directly interfere in the UK–IMF loan negotiations, 
and the final safety net loan it assisted with did not meet Callaghan’s expec-
tations. In the final assessment, the Ford administration was unwilling to 
acquiesce to Callaghan’s request for a number of  interlinked reasons. The most 
obvious was that they simply did not agree with his argument that Britain’s 
public expenditure only required a small reduction. Secondly, the drawn out 
negotiating process between the British government and the IMF showcased 
how a number of  longer-term trends in British economic and defence policy 
had undermined the US–UK relationship to a point that the US did not believe 
Britain any longer warranted preferential treatment in its dealings with the 
IMF so it could maintain its defence commitments. In essence, when the 
Labour government of  James Callaghan needed the US–UK’s special relation-
ship to deliver material benefits, it came up rather short. 
The context of the IMF crisis
Whilst this chapter is focused predominantly upon the political–diplomatic 
US–UK relationship, the economic context to the IMF crisis needs to be explained 
in order to contextualise the wider political issue. Throughout 1974–76, the 
Wilson government had implemented a series of  public expenditure cutbacks 
and tax rises in order to control inflation, reduce the budget deficit and restore 
international confidence in would-be creditors that Britain remained a sound 
investment destination. Such measures, however, failed to achieve Wilson’s 
ambitions, and by the spring of  1976 the issue of  Britain’s budget deficit had 
become a major concern for the Callaghan government.9 The forefront of  
British concerns surrounded both the size of  Britain’s PSBR and the level to 
which it had grown throughout the past two years. For example, in March 
1974, the PSBR stood at £2.7 billion but, by 1975, Denis Healey had outlined 
that a PSBR of  £9 billion was needed. By 1976, the figure had grown even 
further to approximately £12 billion. Lack of  economic growth, rising unem-
ployment, industrial unrest and more aggressive inflation all contributed to the 
new prime minister’s woes. Given Callaghan’s inheritance, it is understandable 
that some have seen Wilson as having exited ‘in the nick of  time’.10 
Given these economic difficulties, sterling – in a repeat of  what had occurred 
only ten years previously – came under speculative pressures from interna-
tional money markets. In its simplest terms, this meant that holders of  sterling 
began to offload the currency, and the price of  sterling began to plummet. 
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Thus, those holding sterling deposits were seeing the value of  their invest-
ment fall and this increased the likelihood that they too would look to offload 
their deposits. The Bank of  England responded to this by purchasing sterling; 
it was believed that this would provide a demonstrable sign of  confidence in 
the currency’s stability, and thus convince investors to hold on to their ster-
ling deposits. This, it was hoped, would stabilise the currency and prevent its 
further depreciation. By June 1976, it was apparent that this had failed and, 
on 3 June 1976, Callaghan was informed that the Bank of  England – having 
spent some £3 billion in trying to defend the rate of  sterling – had exhausted 
its capacity to continue purchasing sterling. Consequently, Callaghan was 
advised that Denis Healey should hold a meeting with both US and European 
officials to begin preliminary discussions about obtaining further funds to 
support sterling.11 Healey himself  urged Callaghan to agree to a swap facility 
with the US Federal Reserve and European central banks, which would allow 
Britain to draw on further credit to defend sterling. It should be noted at this 
point that US assistance in defending sterling from speculation was not unique 
to this period, given that in 1974 Wilson had attempted to get a ‘cooperative 
attitude’ from the US if  sterling came under speculative attack.12 Given also the 
US’s economic power, looking for US assistance was an entirely natural option 
for British policy-makers to take. 
Other options were suggested, which included a ‘sweating it out’ approach, 
or to seek an IMF tranche support loan. Both, however, were quickly dismissed 
by Healey who believed the ‘sweating it out’ option would only lead to sterling’s 
price collapsing even more quickly. The IMF route appealed less given that it 
would seek to link any loan with a number of  political conditions. For Healey, 
these would be politically unpalatable because they would likely involve the 
British government having to make large public expenditure cutbacks which 
would harm the social welfare programmes that the Labour government was 
both committed to and electorally reliant upon. Healey’s thinking was based on 
good foundations given that Dr Johannes Witteveen, the Managing Director of  
the IMF, had told Healey in November 1975 that any loans provided to the UK 
would be conditioned on the British government enacting large public expen-
diture cutbacks.13 Reinforcing this position was the fact that only a week after 
Healey had proffered his advice to Callaghan, Witteveen reiterated a similar 
warning to him.14
Callaghan accepted Healey’s advice and a meeting with William Simon, 
the secretary of  the Treasury, and Arthur Burns, the chairman of  the Federal 
Reserve, was arranged. Once the meeting commenced, Simon and Burns 
explained that they wanted to help Britain in ‘every way they could’.15 Yet, as 
they informed Healey, it was believed in ‘some quarters’ that Britain was not 
doing everything it could to rectify its increasing budget deficit. ‘Some quarters’ 
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clearly referred to people such as Robert Hormats, the senior staff  member for 
International Economic Affairs on the National Security Council.16 Hormats 
had made it known earlier in the year that the British government’s incompe-
tence was leading the country towards economic ruin, and Healey’s budget of  
February 1976 would not control inflation or stabilise the price of  sterling.17 
When Healey had announced in February 1976 that Britain would be cutting 
its PSBR by £1 billion, senior Ford administration officials had to be instructed 
to welcome the news. Though the announcement was viewed as a positive 
signal, the cut of  £1 billion in Britain’s PSBR was still deemed insufficient to 
rectify Britain’s economic problems.18 As Simon and Burns reminded Healey, 
if  this type of  thinking won through, there would be little chance of  market 
confidence in sterling returning until radically different economic policies were 
pursued by the British government.19 
Given all of  this, Sir Kenneth Berrill, the head of  the Central Policy Review 
Staff, was surely correct when he warned Callaghan that Britain would likely 
meet a frosty response from Simon and Burns at the upcoming international 
economic conference in Puerto Rico. As Berrill suggested, US officials were 
likely to respond with a ‘putting your house in order first’ attitude.20 In prac-
tice, this meant the extension of  further credit would not be forthcoming until 
deeper cuts in Britain’s public expenditure occurred. Events soon demonstrated 
the accuracy of  such advice. 
Stories throughout the newspaper media suggested that Arthur Burns 
would be particularly unwilling to offer Britain an extension of  credit unless it 
involved the British government enacting serious economic reforms.21 At the 
Puerto Rico conference, these stories were proven to be well founded, given 
that Burns informed Callaghan: 
We in the United States wish to support you in every way that we can but 
we could not consider the provision of  further credit. Without a change in 
underlying economic and financial policy, financial assistance would merely 
increase your external debt and delay the inevitable.22
Burns had demonstrated his hostility to providing further credit unless some 
type of  fundamental adjustment to British economic policy was forthcoming 
and therefore, when the British agreed to a loan from the Federal Reserve in 
June 1976, it was attached with a series of  conditions. The most important one 
was that the loan had to be repaid in full by December 1976, and if  Britain was 
unable to do this then a loan from the IMF would have to be sought in order to 
repay this American credit.23
At this stage though, British policy-makers were not overly concerned about 
these conditions attached to the Federal Reserve’s loan. In fact, Healey was 
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confident that Britain would be able to repay the American loan on time, as he 
reasoned that economic growth would reduce Britain’s deficit by bringing in 
extra taxation for the Treasury. Accordingly, the PSBR could be reduced and 
a surplus would be left to repay the loan.24 US officials were of  the opposite 
opinion. ‘At the present rate the British, who have yet to make the substantive 
policy changes necessary, will have to borrow from the IMF,’ Edwin Yeo – the 
under-secretary for monetary affairs at the US Treasury – informed the presi-
dent.25 Yeo’s assessment would prove to be rather more accurate than Healey’s 
and by September his prediction was coming true. Britain had been unable to 
reduce its deficit because Healey’s projected economic growth had simply not 
happened. Market confidence in sterling, and Britain’s economic policies more 
generally, also remained low. Despite earlier predictions that Britain would not 
require an IMF loan, Healey was now seriously contemplating undertaking 
this course.26 As Simon informed Kissinger and Scowcroft, ‘Healey appears to 
be readying himself  for negotiations with the IMF. He indicated quite clearly 
that he plans to begin negotiations with the Fund – probably in late October’.27 
Whether Healey would have attempted to gain an IMF loan to repay the 
standby credit is a moot point, because events surrounding sterling forced 
his hand. Throughout the summer of  1976, sterling’s rate steadily depreci-
ated, which, in large part, had been promoted by the UK Treasury as a means 
of  making British export goods more competitive internationally. However, 
by September 1976, sterling had begun to slide uncontrollably, and holders 
of  sterling began to offload it en masse.28 Further reducing confidence in the 
British economy were the events of  the Labour Party conference – held in 
Blackpool at the end of  the month – that gave the impression to the financial 
markets that Callaghan was losing his grip over the party. As the Daily Express 
noted in its lead article, James Callaghan would be ‘cracking the whip amid 
mounting squabbling behind the scenes’.29 Events at the conference hardly 
gave an impression that Callaghan was fully in control of  his party, given that 
when Healey took to the stage to explain that some level of  public expenditure 
cutbacks was required to stabilise the economy, he was roundly booed by the 
audience.30 
Events soon took an even worse turn for the British economy when on 28 
September the situation surrounding sterling ‘exploded’.31 In practical terms, 
this meant that the value of  sterling had begun to tumble uncontrollably as 
holders of  the currency sought to offload their deposits. This resulted in the 
infamous episode where Healey did not travel to an IMF conference in Manila. 
Instead, he returned from Heathrow airport to provide a public sign that he 
was in control of  the situation. The markets took the opposite impression and 
the price of  sterling plummeted further.32 To combat this, the Bank of  England 
attempted to stabilise sterling by purchasing a further $100 million of  the 
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currency. This bought the government some temporary respite with sterling 
stabilising somewhat, yet – in spite of  such efforts – Callaghan was informed 
that sterling was going to fall to at least $1.50 (to place this in perspective, 
on 27 September sterling stood at $1.70, and had lost over 12 per cent of  its 
value). More worryingly, this could not be guaranteed as the floor rate, i.e. ster-
ling would keep falling in value.33 Thus, it is with only a touch of  hyperbole 
that one national newspaper would exclaim the need to ‘Save our Sterling’.34 
Callaghan’s government, without the necessary funds to indefinitely defend 
the rate of  sterling, restore market confidence or repay the standby credit loans 
due in December 1976 to the US Federal Reserve, decided an application for an 
IMF loan was the only recourse available.35 
An important point to be added at this juncture is that the IMF does not 
always have enough money in convertible currency to lend to foreign govern-
ments. Accordingly, it must go to central banks to request these funds, and 
from here the IMF negotiates with a government and then presents the loan 
conditions to the Group of  Ten (G10). The G10 (comprised of  the world’s 
leading industrial nations, plus Switzerland) then decides whether to provide 
the necessary currency for the loan. The US, given its powerful economic posi-
tion, had an influential role within the G10, and the US Federal Reserve was 
probably the single most powerful member of  the central banks represented.36 
Callaghan expected the IMF to demand a major reduction in Britain’s PSBR 
which would only be accomplished by reducing Britain’s public expendi-
ture programmes. For Callaghan this was unpalatable politically, but he also 
believed that Britain’s economic problems were magnified by sterling acting 
as an international reserve currency. In his assessment, this meant that the 
British economy was exposed to international speculative pressures on ster-
ling, which could force significant price fluctuations and damage Britain’s 
economic performance.37
Internal Labour Party politics was the other key factor influencing the prime 
minister’s decision-making. For the Labour government, the form of  any IMF 
loan was a matter of  vociferous debate. Healey had suggested that Britain 
should seek a loan of  £2.3 billion from the IMF, and that this would finance 
the projected budget deficit of  £3 billion and would involve public expenditure 
cuts of  £700 million.38 Anthony Crosland was opposed to Healey’s plans, and 
argued that such a reduction in Britain’s public expenditure would only deepen 
Britain’s recession and make economic recovery more difficult.39 For the left-
wing members of  the government (which included Deputy Leader of  the Party 
Michael Foot, Business and Energy Secretary Tony Benn and Secretary of  State 
for the Environment Peter Shore), the concept of  public expenditure cuts while 
unemployment remained at over 5 per cent of  the workforce was anathema.40 
Moreover, the idea of  having to sacrifice aspects of  welfare spending in order 
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to repay loans to central banks was deeply unappealing for the Labour govern-
ment. The trade unions, which provided strong support to the Labour Party, 
were also making their opposition known to accepting deep PSBR cuts as a 
condition of  the IMF loan.41 The trade unions were hardly being encouraged to 
shift from this position given that the likes of  Michael Foot were giving rousing 
speeches proclaiming that public expenditure on social services should not 
be reduced.42 The prime minister therefore had a divided Cabinet, and more 
worrying was the fact that his two most senior Cabinet officials, Denis Healey 
and Antony Crosland, held diametrically opposed positions.43 
To work his way from this impasse, Callaghan believed that he could convince 
President Ford to utilise US influence with the IMF to ensure that the loan 
conditions set by the IMF would not demand such a substantial reduction in 
Britain’s PSBR. The prime minister therefore began the process of  acquiring US 
support. He arranged for a telephone call with Ford and began drafting a letter 
to the president outlining Britain’s position. Callaghan’s initial draft letter was 
in keeping with the ‘pugnacious’ mood he held towards the entire IMF applica-
tion.44 In the 1960s, when he had been chancellor of  the exchequer, Callaghan 
had suggested that a reduction in the British Army of  the Rhine (BAOR) should 
be threatened to ensure US financial assistance. The thinking behind this idea 
was that the US would not want to see one of  its key alliance partners with-
drawing from the defence of  Europe so would supply the necessary financial 
support.45 Callaghan, now as prime minster, once again suggested a similar 
course.46 However, Callaghan was persuaded against pursuing a path that 
so explicitly linked US financial assistance to Britain upholding its security 
commitments for fear this would appear as a type of  blackmail and needlessly 
irritate opinion in Washington. Thus, direct references to BAOR commitments 
were omitted from his letter to Ford.47 The letter did note, however, that without 
financial assistance Britain – ‘as an ally and a partner in the western alliance’ – 
could no longer be expected to continue with its current commitments.48 While 
not as bellicose as originally intended, Callaghan had signalled his intent to 
utilise Britain’s position within the Western security alliance as a means of  
obtaining financial assistance. 
The Ford administration evaluated Callaghan’s letter, and particular atten-
tion was given to his suggestion that the US should pressure the IMF into giving 
Britain less stringent loan terms. Ford’s economic advisers were deeply scep-
tical about pursuing such a course of  action. Throughout the 1970s, large 
reports received from the US ambassador in London had been sent to the State 
Department expressing concern about Britain’s economic plight.49 Recent 
events only confirmed the suspicions of  prominent US economic policy-makers, 
such as Simon, Yeo and Burns, that Britain had to enact serious economic 
reforms. Such measures would include a reduction in the PSBR, a cut in public 
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expenditure and a tightening of  monetary policy (which an IMF loan would all 
be conditioned upon). Accordingly, they advised Ford that the US should refuse 
the British request to intervene in the UK–IMF negotiations.50 Ford’s political 
advisers agreed with this. As Scowcroft noted, ‘It is clearly undesirable for us to 
become involved in negotiations with the IMF’. He reasoned that if  the IMF was 
pressed into being ‘more lenient on the UK,’ it would likely see the Callaghan 
government refuse to make the necessary cuts in the PSBR. This would only 
‘postpone the inevitable crisis’, because Britain’s substantial levels of  borrow-
ing would remain.51 
To support his case, Callaghan also arranged for a telephone conversation 
with Ford. Scowcroft prepared the president with a ‘talking points’ memoran-
dum for this conversation, which again illustrated the US’s disinclination to 
accept Callaghan’s proposal for intervening in the UK–IMF negotiations.52 As 
Scowcroft’s talking points outlined, ‘We will give our full support to whatever 
agreement is reached between the UK and the IMF’. He further made clear that 
the British government alone would have to reach an agreement with the IMF, 
and that the US should refrain from applying bilateral pressure on the IMF to 
advance Britain’s cause.53 
Though receiving this briefing, the president failed to precisely follow 
Scowcroft’s advice during his telephone conversation with Callaghan. 
Rather than clearly articulating that the US would wait for the UK and IMF 
to reach an accommodation by strictly bilateral methods, Ford told Callaghan 
that his government would ‘do whatever we can to be helpful’.54 From the 
British perspective, the offer to ‘do whatever we can to be helpful’ was taken to 
mean that the US would use its influence with the IMF into providing lenient 
loan terms. Indeed, this is exactly the fashion in which Healey interpreted 
Ford’s statement.55 In Washington, however, the president’s advisers made it 
clear they did not want to pursue such a course of  action. One can infer that 
this was the belief  of  Ford also given that, if  he did not agree with Scowcroft’s 
advice, he would have asked for a different memorandum for his discussion 
with Callaghan.
Safety net
Having been chancellor of  the exchequer during the 1960s, Callaghan was 
well acquainted with the fluctuations in the rate of  sterling. He therefore saw 
the current difficulties as an opportunity to not only overcome the short-term 
fluctuations in sterling, but also as a means for ensuring its longer-term stabil-
ity. For the immediate problem of  sterling’s significant depreciation, Callaghan 
envisaged Britain obtaining a safety net loan, which would be acquired from 
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the G10 (though it would predominantly be financed by the US Federal Reserve 
and the West German Deutsche Bundesbank). The safety net would be designed 
as a means of  easing any speculative pressures on sterling in the event that if  
sterling was being offloaded en masse, thus driving its value downwards, the 
British government could draw on this safety net to buy sterling and defend its 
value. The safety net would therefore provide a visible sign to investors that the 
currency could be defended from speculators, and offer investors the much-
needed assurance that sterling was a stable currency in which to invest. In 
the longer term, Callaghan actually wanted to see the liquidation of  sterling 
balances.56 
On 1 November 1976, the IMF negotiating team, headed by Johannes 
Witteveen and Alan Whittome, landed in the UK to begin negotiations. 
Callaghan was determined to achieve parallel objectives. Negotiations with the 
IMF would establish the terms of  a future loan to cover Britain’s budget deficit 
and repay its international loans, and a safety net loan designed to protect 
sterling against future currency speculation would also be sought. Callaghan 
saw these two negotiations as intertwined, noting that ‘it was important to get 
international agreement on the safety net/bond scheme in parallel with the 
IMF negotiations’. He also wanted the safety net loan to be announced simul-
taneously with the terms of  the IMF loan.57
Callaghan’s wishes were well understood in Washington, and his position 
was deemed an opportunity for the Ford administration to ensure that the UK 
agreed to the IMF’s loan conditions.58 As Scowcroft informed the president, 
Callaghan ‘implied in this message the possibility that Britain might accede 
to the tough terms likely to be required by the IMF if  agreement on sterling 
balances could be announced at the same time’.59 With Kissinger also support-
ing Scowcroft’s analysis, the Ford administration appeared quite confident that 
the British government would agree terms with the IMF.60 
Callaghan, however, still wanted support from the Ford administra-
tion in obtaining preferential loan conditions from the IMF and information 
obtained from Helmut Schmidt, the chancellor of  West Germany, suggested 
that this was a possibility.61 Schmidt convinced Callaghan (and a number of  
his advisers) that the US would sanction the safety net loan prior to the final-
isation of  the IMF loan, and he was further advised by his private secretaries 
that appealing to the US on grounds of  international security would yield 
results. For instance, during the Cabinet meetings which discussed the IMF 
negotiations, one of  Callaghan’s private secretaries noted to him that he was 
‘certain’ that the tactic of  reaching out to Ford and Kissinger would get Britain 
a ‘safety net’ prior to the conclusion of  the IMF negotiations. Michael Palliser 
wrote in a similar fashion to Callaghan’s principal private secretary, Kenneth 
Stowe.62 
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Following such confident advice, Callaghan attempted to use his relation-
ship with Henry Kissinger as a means of  ensuring the US would pressure the 
IMF into providing preferential loan conditions. The prime minister wanted 
Kissinger to ensure that the IMF negotiating team would not receive encour-
agement from US economic officials to demand stringent British spending cuts 
as a condition of  any loan. It soon became apparent that such tactics were not 
producing the results that those in London had predicted. The British ambassa-
dor to Washington, Peter Ramsbotham, reported on his efforts with Kissinger, 
informing London that Kissinger wished to take a ‘compassionate approach’ 
towards Britain, but within the administration there existed a strong clamour 
for the IMF to demand stringent terms because the ‘needed’ economic changes 
would fail to be implemented otherwise.63 
Certainly it was clear that Callaghan’s appeals were unlikely to convince the 
president’s economic team. Simon, Yeo and Burns wanted to keep the two loan 
negotiations separate, because they feared Britain would use the safety net as a 
substitute for the IMF loan. As a result, they demanded the IMF negotiations be 
concluded prior to any safety net being agreed.64 The president largely agreed 
with such advice, and Ford had little inclination to apply the necessary leverage 
upon the IMF so they would provide preferential lending terms to the British 
government. As Ford wrote in a handwritten comment on 11 November 1976, 
‘British Cab must accept IMF’.65
In contrast to Callaghan’s misjudgement of  the Ford administration, Healey 
was much more in tune with American thinking. In Healey’s opinion, the 
US held a ‘totally uncooperative attitude’ and it appeared unlikely that the 
US government would support the safety net loan until the IMF negotiations 
were concluded. As for the IMF negotiations, Healey noted that the US was not 
placing any pressure on the negotiators to offer Britain less stringent terms.66 
Nevertheless, many of  the outward signs emanating from the Ford administra-
tion appeared to contradict this. Kissinger was claiming to be ‘sympathetic’ yet 
Simon, Yeo and Burns were clearly less so. Yet, at the outset of  the IMF nego-
tiations Ford had personally informed Callaghan that he ‘would do whatever 
he can’ to assist the British. Not surprising then that policy-makers in London 
were confused about the likely course of  US policy.
The apparent contradictions stemming from Washington led Callaghan to 
send Harold Lever, the chancellor of  the duchy of  Lancaster, as a personal envoy 
to the US. Lever, a self-made millionaire and former businessmen, was seen 
by Callaghan as something of  an economics expert.67 Callaghan again sought 
to utilise his relationship with Ford and Kissinger as a vehicle for mitigating 
the demands of  the IMF, and wanted Lever to emphasise the repercussions for 
‘the alliance’ if  Britain had to accept the IMF terms.68 Callaghan also backed up 
such attempts by directly contacting Ford by telephone, and again reiterated 
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the negative consequences for the Western alliance if  Britain was forced into 
enacting substantial public expenditure cutbacks.69 
Douglas Wass, the permanent under-secretary at the Treasury, has ques-
tioned the logic of  the Lever mission. According to him, Callaghan had been 
informed on several occasions that Britain would have to reach agreement 
on terms with the IMF prior to any safety net loan being granted. As shown 
above, this was undoubtedly the case, and Wass was certainly more attuned 
to the reality that the US was not going to pressure the IMF into providing less 
demanding loan conditions.70 Scowcroft had advised the president against 
following such a course and Kissinger also reinforced such advice prior to 
Lever’s visit.71 Kissinger’s advice was given even though he suspected it would 
lead to the collapse of  the Callaghan government!72 Callaghan’s judgement, 
that appealing to the political masters in Washington would be met with more 
sympathy, was clearly misguided. US policy-makers both in the political and 
the economic realm were in complete agreement that the US would not involve 
itself  in the UK–IMF negotiations.
The Lever mission 
Harold Lever flew to Washington and met with Henry Kissinger and, follow-
ing the instructions of  the prime minister, he attempted to link the nature of  
the IMF loan to Britain’s existing security commitments. Lever argued that the 
IMF’s demands would result in a critical reduction in Britain’s defence expen-
diture, which, in turn, would severely damage NATO, and undermine broader 
US security interests.73 Kissinger’s response indicated that he was less than 
convinced by such an argument, and he informed Lever that both he and the 
president supported the idea that Britain had to reduce its PSBR and would 
have to achieve this by reducing its public expenditure. Clearly this was unwel-
come news for the British government. Kissinger did, however, offer a caveat 
of  hope when he suggested that the level of  public expenditure cuts would be 
mitigated by ‘political considerations’. Added to this he also gave his support for 
the safety net loan. As Kissinger told Lever, he was going to push the ‘political 
aspects’ of  the situation, and try to convince Simon, Yeo and Burns to provide 
the safety net once the IMF loan had been agreed.74
As with most international events, Kissinger’s thinking was dictated predom-
inantly by political, rather than economic, considerations. Ultimately, on this 
occasion, Kissinger did not feel Britain was important enough to warrant US 
interference in the UK–IMF negotiations. He did, however, conclude that the 
safety net was needed in order to restore confidence in Britain’s currency. 
Furthermore, this approach demonstrated the consistency behind Kissinger’s 
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thinking. For instance, during the Italian IMF negotiations in the summer of  
1976, Kissinger had been keen to ensure that it was ‘not simply economic 
conditions’ that mattered in an overall settlement.75 From the British view-
point, it was perhaps rather worrisome that they were to receive little more 
assistance than Italy had from the US, in spite of  efforts by the Wilson and 
Callaghan governments to nurture close US–UK relations.
By utilising Kissinger, Callaghan had attained some minor achievements. 
As Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross have noted, Lever was able to secure 
US agreement to help provide the safety net.76 Critically, however, Arthur 
Burns remained unconvinced. Moreover, Yeo was making it known to the 
West Germans that he wanted to see the IMF demand substantial PSBR cuts 
from Britain.77 Given this then, the Lever mission must be deemed a failure, 
because Callaghan wanted the ‘political considerations’ placed at the fore-
front of  the IMF debate so as to temper ‘the orthodoxy of  the monetarists’.78 
Callaghan was still hoping that the Lever mission would convince the US to use 
its influence with the IMF negotiating team in London. As seen above, Lever’s 
mission did not accomplish this. Even Kissinger, believed by Callaghan to 
have most clearly understood the wider political implications of  the IMF loan, 
refused Callaghan’s wishes. Therefore, on 24 November 1976, Callaghan was 
informed that Kissinger would not intervene in the UK–IMF negotiations.79 
To compound Callaghan’s predicament was the clear indication he received 
from Washington that the US was unlikely to support the simultaneous conclu-
sion of  the IMF and safety net loans. While Kissinger had informed Lever that 
he would support this, those authorised in Washington to implement such a 
deal (Simon, Yeo and Burns) were unwilling to undertake the necessary proce-
dures to create this.80 The hope that Kissinger could overrule this opposition 
was dealt a blow by Ford’s election defeat to Jimmy Carter. Kissinger was soon 
to be out of  office and his ability to influence other actors, especially the likes of  
Arthur Burns who did not rely on the president for his position as chairman of  
the Federal Reserve, was reduced.81
Callaghan could also be in no doubt that American approval for the safety 
net was conditioned upon Britain concluding terms with the IMF. The IMF 
negotiators had made it clear that, if  Britain was to receive an IMF loan, it 
would have to enact public expenditure cutbacks. Callaghan thus convened 
his Cabinet, where he attempted to convince them of  the necessity to accept 
a loan with such stipulations. As he explained to his colleagues, whilst ‘good 
will’ existed in the US, a ‘general view’ existed that Britain had to make signifi-
cant cuts in its PSBR if  a loan was to be granted. However, the level of  the PSBR 
reduction was still something to be debated within the Cabinet.82 
At the end of  these Cabinet meetings, Callaghan authorised Healey to nego-
tiate a loan agreement with the IMF that would involve a cut in the PSBR from 
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£12 billion to £9.5 billion for FY 1978–79. This would involve public expendi-
ture cutbacks of  roughly £1.25 billion for FY 1977–78 and 1978–79. Healey, 
however, disagreed with Callaghan’s proposals. As he had been negotiating 
with the IMF, it was evident that a reduction in the PSBR to £9.5 billion fell 
short of  the IMF’s expectations. Witteveen for instance had informed Healey 
he wanted Britain to reduce its PSBR to £8.8 billion by FY 1978–79.83 Added 
to this, the IMF had made it known publicly that a reduction of  £3 billion was 
what it were aiming for. Healey believed he would be able to negotiate the figure 
slightly downwards, and suggested he would target a PSBR of  approximately 
£9 billion. Such advice was ignored and Callaghan assured his Cabinet that he 
would utilise his relationship with President Ford to ensure an agreement was 
reached at £9.5 billion.84 
Callaghan’s bravado in front of  his Cabinet colleagues did not accurately 
reflect his real level of  influence in Washington. As US policy-makers were 
aware, Callaghan would likely again seek to convince the president to interfere 
in the IMF negotiations and were thus preparing contingency plans for this. 
Accordingly, Brent Scowcroft and Alan Greenspan once again warned Ford 
against agreeing to support any British request to pressure the IMF into provid-
ing less stringent loan conditions.85 This course of  action was pertinent given 
that Callaghan would again telephone the president and ask for assistance. In 
spite of  Callaghan being ‘tough with Ford’, he again came away with nothing 
of  substance.86 As Ford had decided prior to Callaghan’s call, Britain’s PSBR 
had to be cut below £9.5 billion.87 Other last ditch efforts from British officials 
to get the president to change his mind were equally fruitless.88 
Callaghan had to return to the Cabinet and inform them that he could not 
deliver on his £9.5 billion target. The Cabinet now debated the best course of  
action. Healey reported that his discussions with the IMF indicated that reduc-
ing the PSBR to a figure of  £9 billion was deemed insufficient. He therefore 
proposed that he should seek agreement with the IMF to reduce the PSBR to 
£8.7 billion for FY 1977–78, and £8.6 billion for FY 1978–79. These cuts 
would be supplemented by the sale of  British petroleum (BP) shares that 
were worth in the region of  £500 million.89 Healey, however, encountered 
stern opposition from his colleagues and the Cabinet was split into three main 
factions. One group supported Healey’s proposal to reduce the PSBR and sell 
the BP shares. One opposing faction was headed by Crosland, who argued that 
such a reduction in the PSBR could not be accepted and proposed that Britain 
enact a ‘leverage’ strategy. By this, he meant that Britain could threaten to 
withdraw from NATO or enact trade tariffs, unless US pressure was placed on 
the IMF to lessen its demands.90 The final faction within the Cabinet was led by 
Michael Foot. This group, which included Benn, Shore and Minister of  State for 
Social Security Stan Orme, argued that Britain should refuse an IMF loan with 
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such conditions and should instead implement trade tariffs in order to raise 
additional funds for the Treasury and thus protect public expenditure. Benn, in 
a moment of  flamboyance, noted that if  Callaghan accepted the IMF terms it 
would be the ‘political tomb for the Government’.91
The extent to which the Cabinet was divided was openly speculated about 
throughout the media, and one newspaper even suggested that Healey was on 
the verge of  submitting his resignation.92 Regardless of  the Cabinet’s apparent 
division, the prime minister was confident that if  he decided upon a course of  
action he would have the numbers to push it forward. While reluctant to do so, 
Callaghan decided that he would have to support his chancellor’s proposals.93 
Efforts to convince the US had failed and pursuing the alternative strategies 
appealed little to Callaghan. Crosland’s proposal to threaten NATO with-
drawal was deemed too dangerous a course to pursue and, moreover, when 
similar suggestions had been made subtly, they had failed to make any discern-
ible impact upon US policy. More significantly for Callaghan, he believed that 
agreeing to the IMF loan would guarantee a quick settlement on the safety 
net loan, which in his opinion was more important than the actual IMF loan. 
Therefore, the idea of  erecting trade tariffs which would antagonise the inter-
national community and likely prevent a G10-sponsored safety net loan would 
simply contradict his wider objectives.94 Following heated Cabinet discussions 
Callaghan won support for Healey’s proposals and, following tense negotiation 
with the IMF, the terms of  the loan were settled. Callaghan agreed to reduce 
Britain’s PSBR to £8.7 billion for FY 1977–78 and £8.6 billion for 1978–79, 
and BP shares worth approximately £500 million were also sold to help reduce 
Britain’s PSBR.95 
Even if  one is exceedingly charitable towards Callaghan, it cannot be ignored 
that his tactic of  appealing to the US for assistance had failed. Compounding 
this was the fact that it was public knowledge that both President Ford and 
Chancellor Schmidt had rebuffed his efforts to obtain financial assistance.96 
Throughout the negotiations, Callaghan had been told on numerous occasions 
that no US interference in the UK–IMF negotiations would be forthcoming, yet 
this was seemingly ignored.97 Why the prime minister ignored this advice is 
curious. Perhaps Callaghan believed Britain’s political significance in relation 
to the US would have resulted in preferential economic treatment. Certainly, 
Britain – despite its defence reductions in 1974–76 – retained its nuclear 
and intelligence relationship with the US. However, Callaghan had witnessed 
American displeasure at Britain’s defence cuts, and he must have realised 
how much the US believed that the UK had declined in importance given that 
Kissinger had told him as much on several occasions. 
Perhaps, therefore, Callaghan’s situation within the Labour Party better 
explains his determination to stubbornly cling to the idea that he could 
05_Strained_partnership_175-209.indd   189 06/11/2013   13:53
190 A strained partnership?
influence US policy. Callaghan was a firm believer in the social contract 
with the trade unions, and he knew that breaking with the trade unions 
would severely damage Labour’s electoral and financial situation. The terms 
of  the IMF loan would enforce deflationary measures on the British economy, 
which meant that public expenditure cutbacks would be invoked and would 
inevitably lead to job losses. For the trade unions, this was a deeply unpopu-
lar policy, and Callaghan therefore had to reduce the IMF demands in order to 
mitigate trade union disgruntlement. Accepting the IMF terms without even 
attempting to make them less stringent would have seriously undermined 
Callaghan’s political position.98 
Of  course, this line of  argument should not be taken too far. Edmund Dell, 
the secretary of  state for trade, has made a convincing counter-argument 
which suggests that Callaghan could always convince his Cabinet to follow his 
lead, simply because the collapse of  the Labour government would have led 
to Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party – which would have implemented 
the PSBR reductions on a larger scale – obtaining office. Indeed, during the 
crisis itself  Thatcher was publicly talking of  the need for much larger scale 
reductions in the PSBR in order to ward off  the bailiffs.99 Given this, for the left 
wing of  the Labour Party to have brought down the Callaghan government 
would have been a futile effort to prevent the PSBR cuts. For Dell, therefore, 
arguments that Callaghan’s room to manoeuvre was prohibited by his domes-
tic position are unconvincing.100 Interestingly, this is exactly what one of  
Callaghan’s private secretaries advised him at the time.101 However, by present-
ing himself  in opposition to Healey’s more demanding PSBR cuts, Callaghan 
managed to escape the full vitriol of  the Labour Party. Instead, it was Healey 
who was largely blamed for having forced through the IMF terms.102 This, as 
the archival record now suggests, is an unfair categorisation. 
Obtaining the safety net
Although the issue of  obtaining the safety net remained unresolved, Callaghan 
envisaged that it would be announced simultaneously, or very soon after 
Britain publicly announced its application for an IMF loan. He also wanted the 
safety net to be in the region of  $3.5 billion.103 Callaghan agreed to the terms 
of  the IMF loan on the proviso that the safety net would be swiftly granted, 
and this was certainly the impression Ford had given to Callaghan.104 Ford 
remained unconvinced as to whether the US should agree to such a loan 
but, by 3 December 1976, Ford had been persuaded by Kissinger that Britain 
should be granted the safety net loan, as long as Britain agreed terms with 
the IMF. Ford therefore instructed William Simon to undertake the necessary 
05_Strained_partnership_175-209.indd   190 06/11/2013   13:53
All out of money 191
preparations for providing the safety net loan.105 This was reported to London, 
but the British ambassador in Washington warned against placing too much 
confidence in Ford.106 As he explained, the president could not guarantee 
the safety net because it was not his constitutional authority to do so; rather, 
this decision would come about at the behest of  the US Federal Reserve. It was 
Chairman Arthur Burns, and not President Ford, who was the man who would 
have final authority over providing the safety net. This was a point that would 
become of  supreme importance in the following weeks.107 
The prime minister expected stern opposition from the US Treasury and 
Federal Reserve against providing the safety net, and his mood consequently 
deteriorated. In a handwritten note Callaghan scrawled, ‘Do [the] US ... want 
us to do this with consequences?’108 What these consequences were soon 
became apparent as British officials in discussion with their NATO counter-
parts suggested that substantial defence cutbacks would likely be enacted 
if  significant financial support was not forthcoming. Subtle suggestions 
within this context, however, failed to significantly alter American policy.109 
Callaghan therefore decided to analyse whether invoking Britain’s Western 
security commitments more explicitly with the Ford administration would 
persuade the US to offer the necessary financial support. He ordered John 
Hunt and Michael Palliser to provide him with a survey of  British defence 
commitments, and from this he wanted to know whether threatening the 
cancellation of  such commitments would engender a more cooperative atti-
tude from the US.
Hunt and Palliser produced this for the prime minister and outlined several 
possibilities, which included the abandonment of  the British nuclear deter-
rent and the cancellation of  the Chevaline improvement to Polaris.110 Further 
ideas ranged from a total withdrawal from Cyprus or a reduction in Britain’s 
BAOR commitments to a complete abandonment of  Britain’s extra-European 
military capabilities. Hunt and Palliser concluded that a complete withdrawal 
from Cyprus or the disbandment of  Polaris were the only measures likely to 
influence US policy.111 
John Hunt was in a very good position to make such judgements given that 
he had witnessed first-hand the American aversion to seeing Britain withdraw 
from Cyprus, or perhaps scrapping its update to Polaris.112 Hunt, however, 
warned about the wisdom of  using such tactics and the biggest problem he 
noted was the fact that the British were still, at this juncture, negotiating the 
final terms of  the PSBR reduction with the IMF. An argument employed by the 
British government against reducing the PSBR much below £9 billion was that 
they were committed to retaining costly defence projects. If  Britain threatened 
to cancel these, then the IMF could potentially demand Britain make an even 
greater reduction in its PSBR.113 
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While the British government debated its own course of  actions, events in 
Basle, where representatives from the G10 were discussing the structure of  
the proposed safety net, were coming to a conclusion. Healey reported that 
the US delegation was taking a line far from the ‘sympathetic’ one that Ford 
had promised and noted that the US was reluctant to agree to any safety net 
loan.114 The US now reasoned that, since Britain had concluded its IMF loan, 
market confidence in sterling had been restored and it was now unnecessary to 
provide a loan to defend the rate of  the sterling.115
Although Callaghan had been provided with a number of  alternative areas 
in which to exert political leverage upon the US, he decided not to use them. 
Perhaps the late advice received from John Hunt convinced the prime minister 
against pursuing such a course.116 Instead, Callaghan wrote directly to Ford, 
arguing that the safety net was imperative to restore market confidence in 
sterling.117 Callaghan also sought to use his relationship with the West German 
chancellor, Helmut Schmidt; he wanted Schmidt to convince Ford that the 
safety net should be given to Britain. Schmidt obliged, and wrote to Ford on 12 
December arguing Callaghan’s point.118
Very little appears to have come from Schmidt’s efforts to convince Ford to 
provide a safety net to Britain, and reports from Washington suggested that 
the US would refuse to sign up to a G10 safety net loan. Derek Mitchell, the 
deputy permanent under-secretary at the Treasury, reported that both Burns 
and Yeo remained reluctant to support the safety net.119 Callaghan attempted 
to circumvent such opposition by appealing to Washington’s political elites, 
and Ramsbotham was tasked with persuading Kissinger and Scowcroft that 
they should convince Ford to overrule Burns and Yeo. The British ambas-
sador had some success as Scowcroft agreed to speak with Yeo and make 
him more ‘reasonable’ and he promised to get Kissinger to ‘weigh in’ his 
support for providing the safety net.120 Ramsbotham remained pessimistic 
as to whether this would achieve much and repeated his earlier warnings 
that it was Burns’ constitutional right, and not Ford’s, to agree to the safety 
net.121 
Ramsbotham’s assessment was astute given the turn of  events that would 
transpire in the following days. While Ford had ordered the US to sign up to 
the safety net, the US delegation in Basle simply ignored this and continued to 
present counter proposals to that of  the safety net. Thus, progress in finalising 
the safety net was being prevented by the US.122 The British once again looked 
to Kissinger and Scowcroft for assistance and Ramsbotham liaised with both. 
However, both appeared rather uninterested in the safety net negotiations and 
Kissinger went on to claim that he did know what the US delegation was up 
to, and merely reiterated that Ford had given his backing to the safety net.123 
Kissinger was not being disingenuous as Ford had ordered the safety net to be 
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granted, but the US Federal Reserve and Treasury continued to block approval 
for it at the Basle negotiations.
Following heated debate in Washington, Burns and Simon succumbed to 
the wishes of  the president and American agreement for the safety net was 
transmitted to the British.124 Though US approval for the safety net had finally 
been given, the actual details of  the safety net would still have to be worked out 
and this would obviously take some time.125 In the interim, Ford offered public 
support for the British IMF agreement which came about at Kissinger’s sugges-
tion. Indeed, Kissinger noted that Ford had never intended to ‘weasel’ out of  the 
safety net commitment, but that he had been constrained by his constitutional 
role vis-à-vis the Federal Reserve.126 The president, Kissinger and Scowcroft all 
realised that Callaghan would be ‘disappointed’ with this, and this was clearly 
the case as Callaghan again floated the idea of  sending a recriminatory letter 
to Ford.127 Douglas Wass claims that Healey had ‘to beg [Callaghan] not to send 
such a message to President Ford’.128 Healey’s efforts paid off, and Callaghan’s 
letter to Ford illustrated none of  the frustration that the prime minister felt.129 
The final safety net was secured in the second week of  January 1977.130 The 
US would initially allow Britain to draw up to $250 million from a safety net 
of  $3 billion. This agreement, however, came with a number of  caveats. The 
British could only draw on this fund on condition that the PSBR reductions 
agreed with the IMF were implemented.131 At the very least, Callaghan had 
obtained the safety net which he felt was imperative for Britain’s long-term 
economic well-being. Nevertheless, the safety net was loaded with a number of  
conditions that Callaghan had sought to avoid. It had also failed to be delivered 
at the time he believed was economically necessary, and politically convenient 
to stave off  domestic criticism. For Callaghan, then, this had been a politically 
calamitous affair. 
Moreover, the IMF crisis demonstrated the lack of  influence which the prime 
minister had with the Ford administration. Callaghan had spent consider-
able effort in trying to garner a warm relationship with both the president and 
Henry Kissinger, in order to influence US policy. As Callaghan claims within his 
memoirs, this was something which he believed he had achieved, and this is 
something that both Ford and Kissinger corroborate in their own retrospec-
tive accounts of  their relationship with Callaghan.132 Regardless, throughout 
the IMF crisis, Callaghan’s personal relationship did little, if  anything, to alter 
the course of  US policy along lines more amenable to his wishes. Even when 
Kissinger suspected that the Callaghan government could fall as a result of  the 
IMF terms, it did not alter US policy. In fact, the biggest concern for Kissinger was 
to avoid the impression that the Ford administration had caused the Callaghan 
government to collapse. As he noted to the president, it was imperative that the 
image of  ‘sinking the British’ was not attributed to the Ford administration.133 
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Personal relations, therefore, were secondary to broader considerations. When 
Kissinger would talk about not being a ‘sentimental’ person, it clearly applied to 
the conduct of  US–UK relations in spite of  public statements to the contrary.134 
US–UK relations within the economic context
There has been considerable debate over the reasons for US policy taking the 
course it did throughout the IMF crisis. Some writers have suggested that 
Ford’s electoral defeat to Jimmy Carter in November 1976 undermined his 
authority. As such, an unelected president who was sympathetic to Britain’s 
predicament was unable to exercise his authority vis-à-vis the Federal Reserve 
and Treasury.135 Callaghan, in his memoirs, provided a similar analysis.136 
Certainly, throughout the crisis, Kissinger used the impending election as a 
reason why the US could not be seen to be placing pressure upon the IMF.137 
Others, however, have dismissed this explanation.138 This latter interpretation 
is much more convincing because, as the documentation in the Ford Library 
shows, Carter’s election did not constrain Ford in his foreign policy-making. 
Even if  Kissinger saw the election of  1976 as a potential problem in aiding the 
British, he admitted that once it was over he would be a lot freer to tackle the 
issue.139 
Instead, other factors better explain US policy. The first point to remember 
was that the fashion in which the Ford administration dealt with Britain’s IMF 
application would have ramifications in other areas in the world, most notably 
in regard to the IMF applications being made by Mexico and Italy.140 The Ford 
administration was consistent in the advice it offered to Mexico, Italy and 
Britain: public spending had to be curbed in order to bring down the level of  
borrowing each power undertook in order to generate economic productivity; 
only by doing this would speculative pressures on their respective currencies 
come to an end. Along with this, the Ford administration was concerned that 
pressuring the IMF into providing beneficial loan terms for Britain would estab-
lish a worrying precedent for future IMF bailouts.141
Callaghan’s policy of  linking Britain’s defence commitments to the IMF loan 
also failed to have a discernible impact upon the course of  US policy, and was 
largely ineffective for several important reasons. First, Britain’s global impor-
tance to the US as a military ally had steadily declined throughout the past 
20 years. The most dramatic demonstration of  this was the East of  Suez with-
drawal, but, as shown in earlier chapters, the 1970s had witnessed further 
defence retractions that had severely dented Britain’s standing in Washington. 
Added to this was the important fact that key policy-makers in Washington 
believed that the UK would likely reduce its military commitments still further. 
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By the summer of  1976, such fears were proved correct as the British issued 
a defence white paper which outlined further reductions. Such action hardly 
enamoured the British to the Ford administration.142 
In response to this latest defence cutback, Roy Mason promised Donald 
Rumsfeld, the US defense secretary, that this would be the final cutback for 
the foreseeable future.143 Throughout 1974–76, other British policy-makers 
had made similar promises, but had then gone on to break them. Clearly then, 
Mason was stretching credibility when he made such assurances. This is an 
important point to remember when understanding the Ford administration’s 
policy. In 1965–67, sterling came under speculative pressures, but the Johnson 
administration provided the demanded economic support. This was done partly 
to ensure that Britain retained its presence East of  Suez.144 In 1976, Britain was 
no longer East of  Suez, and Wilson’s last two governments had further reduced 
Britain’s military commitments. By 1976, Britain’s importance for the US had 
waned significantly, and its status as the key military ally in Europe had argu-
ably been eclipsed by that of  West Germany. In April 1976, General George 
Brown, the chairman of  the joint chiefs of  staff, symbolised just how far the 
UK’s significance had fallen in American military opinion, when he expressed 
that the military of  the UK was ‘pathetic’ and consisted of  nothing more than 
‘generals and admirals and brass bands’.145 This perhaps overstates the degree 
to which the UK had fallen in official US thinking, but the fact remains that the 
UK no longer assumed the level of  importance that it once had.146 
British threats of  curtailing its military commitments were also less credible 
than in previous years. Making further military reductions was thus seen to 
have the potential to undermine vital British security interests. In particular, a 
reduction in the BAOR would have negatively impinged upon NATO, and would 
also have undermined the ongoing MBFR negotiations.147 As Hunt reminded 
Callaghan throughout the IMF negotiations, reducing the BAOR would set in 
motion the ‘dismantling of  NATO’.148 Perhaps Hunt was being slightly melo-
dramatic, but if  Callaghan had threatened such a course – and perhaps even 
enacted such measures – it would have had significant ramifications for British 
policy. In the final assessment, Callaghan was not prepared to risk this.
Another point of  significance is that within the US documentary record it is 
remarkable just how little time was spent discussing possible British military 
reductions as a consequence of  an unfavourable IMF loan. Perhaps, then, this 
can be interpreted as a sign of  just how un-credible such threats were viewed 
in Washington or, worse still for the British, just how unimportant they were 
deemed in American eyes. While it would be too harsh to suggest that ‘Britain 
no longer mattered … as a world power or as a political example’, it was evident 
during the IMF crisis that Britain no longer mattered enough to constitute pref-
erential economic consideration from the US.149 
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One crucial factor does remain however, that being that Callaghan never 
tried to extract US cooperation by issuing threats pertaining to Britain’s most 
important defence contributions. The most obvious examples were Britain’s 
Polaris force, its intelligence stations in Cyprus and the Indian Ocean, the 
American bases located in Britain and its BAOR commitment. These were 
seen by British policy-makers as areas which promoted US interests and the 
American reaction to the Wilson government when it suggested that it would 
cancel or reduce such things indicated this was so. An interesting counterfac-
tual therefore presents itself. Whilst it would be foolhardy to suggest that, had 
such a tactic been utilised, the Ford administration would have immediately 
pressured the IMF into proffering less demanding loan conditions, it is worth 
considering whether Crosland’s ‘leverage’ strategy would have been more 
successful. Given that key US policy-makers believed that American primacy in 
international affairs was being severely challenged and that Southern Europe 
was succumbing to communist influence, then perhaps Callaghan would have 
obtained the type of  assistance he desired had he followed Crosland’s more 
bellicose strategy. However, as noted earlier, there was very little discussion in 
Washington about the British actually implementing such drastic cutbacks. 
This could either indicate that such matters were deemed so unlikely as to 
warrant discussion, or perhaps these interests were not deemed that important 
by the Americans. 
Economic thinking
The economic philosophy of  key US officials in the Treasury, Federal Reserve 
and in Ford’s government was of  course highly important in determining US 
policy throughout the IMF crisis. The likes of  Arthur Burns, Edwin Yeo, Alan 
Greenspan and William Simon were ardent fiscal conservatives.150 Simon was 
described by Denis Healey as somewhere ‘to the right of  Genghis Khan’.151 
Michael Palliser described the American administration less dramatically for 
the prime minister when he noted that they were in a ‘fundamentally conser-
vative mood’.152 Such British assessments were largely accurate if  the private 
papers of  American officials are anything to go by. In one example from Simon’s 
private correspondence, he bemoaned American fiscal policy for resembling a 
‘socialist’ agenda. If  such a course was not reversed, then Simon predicted that 
‘socialism’ would take hold in the US.153 Socialism was clearly used by Simon as 
a pejorative term in this context.
Ford’s other economic advisers were just as disdainful about Britain’s 
economic position. Greenspan and his staff  for instance provided damning 
verdicts on Callaghan’s economic policies. Further to this, information received 
05_Strained_partnership_175-209.indd   196 06/11/2013   13:53
All out of money 197
by Greenspan from his staff  about the British government’s economic poli-
cies was usually laced in negative or sarcastic commentary. Robert Hormats 
was equally critical of  Britain’s economic performance. Some outside of  
government – such as Milton Friedman, the influential economist at Chicago 
University – publicly predicted Britain would become the European equivalent 
of  Chile. Given the predicament of  Chile in the mid-1970s, this was clearly not 
meant as a favourable comparison.154 In sum, the medicine that the IMF was 
prescribing was fully endorsed by the economic masters in Washington. 
On the safety net issue, the role of  the US Federal Reserve was even more 
important. Constitutionally, it was the purview of  Arthur Burns to commit the 
US to the safety net. Therefore, appealing to the president, whilst not incon-
sequential, was no guarantee for securing the safety net loan. The president, 
Kissinger and Scowcroft were fully aware of  their lack of  control over the 
Federal Reserve.155 As William Simon told Kissinger, ‘I will have to get with 
Arthur Burns because in the final analysis that is where the buck or pound 
goes’.156 If  Callaghan was to get US assistance then convincing the likes of  
Simon and Burns was just as important as securing the support of  Ford 
or Kissinger. Ultimately, Burns and Simon were unconvinced that Britain 
should receive preferential treatment from the IMF, and British diplomacy 
failed to convince them to alter their position. 
There has been a tendency by former British officials to paint the likes of  
Simon, Yeo and Burns as the bogeymen who scuppered British hopes of  nego-
tiating more lenient IMF terms, and subsequent writers have followed suit.157 
While not inaccurate, it does omit several important points, and the biggest 
of  these is that Ford himself  was fiscally conservative. Therefore, the idea of  
providing bailout money to a country or institution deemed to be ‘living beyond 
their means’ did not sit well with the president. Balanced budgets, reduction of  
deficits and free markets were the key to economic success in Ford’s assessment. 
The president articulated this vision when he stated: ‘I propose that we make a 
substantial and permanent reduction in our Federal taxes, and second that we 
make a substantial reduction in the growth of  federal spending.’158 During the 
New York City financial crisis of  1975, Ford would demonstrate his adherence 
to such principles. The city had, in a similar fashion to the British government, 
extended all of  its available credit lines and requested assistance from the 
Federal government in order to meet its spending commitments. Ford refused 
this appeal and the city had to make sweeping public expenditure cuts in order 
to balance its budget.159 Accordingly, British appeals to Ford for economic assis-
tance were always likely to be met with reluctance.
Perhaps even more important was the fact that Ford’s government never 
accepted the economic arguments put forward by Callaghan and Healey: 
that was, Britain’s economic problems originated from short-term speculative 
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pressures on sterling and ‘malignant interaction between the exchange rate, 
the money supply and interest rates’.160 This line of  argument was deemed 
unconvincing in Washington because US policy-makers believed that Britain’s 
problems stemmed from long-term structural imbalances within its economic 
system. The intellectual tide of  monetarism, and all that entailed, challenged 
the largely Keynesian remedies which the British government was propos-
ing.161 Britain was judged to have too high a rate of  taxation which stifled 
economic productivity. Its trade unions were considered to be too powerful, 
which resulted in too many working days being lost due to strikes. Britain’s 
social security system was regarded as having been inflated beyond the coun-
try’s capacity to finance it.162 As William Simon noted in correspondence with 
Lord Hartwell (the owner of  the Daily Telegraph newspaper which attacked 
his conduct throughout the IMF crisis), it was the economic mismanage-
ment by successive British governments which had led to Britain’s current 
predicament.163 
More damning was that Ford’s economic team did not trust the Callaghan 
government to implement the economic reforms it promised it would enact if  
it was provided with additional credit to help finance its sterling balances. As 
Yeo noted: 
From a technical standpoint we have examined the various ways this 
could be done [providing a ‘safety net’ loan for sterling]. But from a policy 
standpoint a substitution account means additional credit, probably of  an 
unconditional nature, for the UK. A proposal or feeler on a substitution 
account would support the view that the UK still does not appreciate the 
gravity of  its situation and/or lacks the will to deal with it in terms of  
substantive policies.164
Such opinions were not exclusive to Ford’s economic advisers. The IMF itself  
was so sceptical about Callaghan’s government implementing the promised 
expenditure cuts that it would only provide the loan in instalments, with each 
additional one conditioned on the necessary cutbacks being enacted.165 Those 
who were believed to be sympathetic to Britain’s predicament were also crit-
ical of  its economic policies. David Bruce, the former US ambassador to the 
UK, who was viewed as somewhat of  an Anglophile, told President Ford that 
Britain suffered from ‘fundamental problems’.166 The people that Callaghan 
used throughout the IMF crisis to mitigate the demands of  the IMF – for 
example, Kissinger and Scowcroft – were of  the same opinion.167
In sum, the key actors within the Ford administration believed that the 
economic measures demanded by the IMF were necessary to prevent future 
British economic problems. Furthermore, there was an entrenched belief  
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that, if  the British were not given the strictest of  terms by the IMF, then it was 
unlikely that Callaghan would ever implement the economic changes which 
Washington deemed necessary.168 Given such conditions, it was always likely 
that Callaghan’s calls for US financial support would fall on deaf  ears. 
Conclusion
Callaghan’s first ten months in office were dominated by Britain’s economic 
crisis. The re-establishment of  the Atlantic relationship at the centre of  Britain’s 
foreign policy, which began when Callaghan was foreign secretary and contin-
ued throughout his premiership, was unable to produce the type of  results he 
desired during the IMF crisis. Such criticism needs to be issued with a caveat, 
which is that given President Ford’s fiscally conservative nature it was always 
going to be difficult to obtain an IMF loan without making what Ford believed 
were necessary cuts in Britain’s PSBR.
Even though he had won the safety net, Callaghan had clearly been outma-
noeuvred by Washington’s economic masters. Britain had to accept the 
terms demanded by the IMF in spite of  a great unwillingness to cut the PSBR. 
Callaghan, however, had envisaged that once the IMF agreement had been 
settled the British would be granted the safety net. Callaghan regarded the 
safety net as the most important matter; he had, for instance, even refused to 
implement import tariffs as a means of  ensuring the good will of  the inter-
national economic community. Yet, despite obtaining the safety net, this was 
only achieved following arduous negotiations; it was nowhere near the size 
Callaghan wanted, and was delivered a month later than he had envisaged.169 
Whilst a little unfair, the sentiments expressed by one British national news-
paper that ‘Jim and Denis play IMF Tune Dance of  the Puppets’, does capture 
the British situation nicely.170 In the final assessment, Callaghan had to yield 
to the demands of  the IMF and implement austerity measures upon the British 
economy. 
It is certainly apparent from Callaghan’s papers that he believed Britain’s 
importance as an ally to the US to be sufficient enough to force the US to restrain 
the demands of  the IMF. Callaghan’s appeals to the likes of  Ford, Kissinger and 
Scowcroft demonstrated this line of  argument, yet this ultimately failed to 
deliver the kind of  results he wanted. His investment in close US–UK relations 
failed to materially manifest into political capital when it was most needed 
during the IMF crisis. It is difficult to disagree with Kathleen Burk’s opinion 
that: ‘Britain had ... been humiliated, not only because this was the first case of  
a modern industrial country turning to the IMF for this type of  loan, but also 
because she was treated the same way as any other indigent country.’171 
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Though British elites clearly had little influence over their American counter-
parts, the fact remained that the institutionalised aspects of  US–UK cooperation 
– notably in the security/defence realms – continued and, in other areas, US–UK 
interaction functioned smoothly. For instance, the US and UK worked efficiently 
in evacuating their citizens from Lebanon in June 1976, and ongoing diplomatic 
cooperation continued over the future of  Rhodesia.172 This even saw Kissinger 
trying to alleviate domestic troubles for Callaghan vis-à-vis criticisms emanating 
from Margaret Thatcher. Kissinger went as far as to provide a brief  for Thatcher 
so she would understand the situation more fully and would, accordingly, lessen 
her criticism of  the Labour government. As Kissinger put it, ‘I thought it would 
be a good idea if  Rogers briefed Mrs Thatcher – to get her off  Crosland’s back’.173 
Likewise, the visit of  Queen Elizabeth II to celebrate the bicentennial of  the 
founding of  the United States was an occasion which was marked with great 
fanfare and gave the public impression of  close US−UK relations.174
This presents an interesting paradigm for historians in assessing the US–
UK relationship during the Ford–Callaghan era. If  one looks at the IMF crisis, 
it becomes apparent that Callaghan never received the type of  support from 
Ford that he believed Britain warranted because of  its position in the Western 
alliance. Alternatively, if  one focuses upon the ongoing security–military rela-
tionship then one can see a rather different impression. Ultimately, however, 
one must view this period for US–UK relations as one where the disparities 
in their respective international positions were more apparent, and when a 
number of  longer-term trends in British foreign and defence policy began to 
have profound effects on US–UK interaction. British defence commitments 
since World War II had gradually been reduced and the East of  Suez with-
drawal had markedly altered Britain’s position as a global actor. Britain’s 
economic policies were also viewed unfavourably and, by 1976, there was a 
clear sense throughout US policy-making circles that Britain had to under-
take a series of  austerity measures, because it had an overinflated public sector, 
coupled with an unproductive private sector. Callaghan thus inherited a set 
of  circumstances that made any appeal for US assistance throughout the IMF 
crisis likely to be met with a less than enthusiastic response. As events unfolded 
throughout the year, he found this to be the case. 
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Conclusion
As Henry Kissinger noted in 2001, the contemporary strains in the transat-
lantic relationship mirrored those experienced throughout the Cold War.1 As 
shown in the previous chapters, such an interpretation holds considerable 
merit. Given the political, economic and social changes witnessed in this era, 
perhaps scholars should not be surprised that the US–UK relationship was 
fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, the traditional interpretation that the 
Nixon–Heath years were a period of  constant acrimony for US–UK relations 
requires clarification. Nixon’s policies in Vietnam were publicly supported by 
Heath and, even in the face of  stern criticism from other European leaders, 
Heath remained resolute in his support. Nixon’s détente policies were also 
publicly supported and US–UK interaction in a number of  other areas contin-
ued. Intelligence cooperation was a continual feature of  the relationship and 
Heath revitalised US–UK nuclear cooperation. The upgrading of  Polaris was 
a subject that saw continual discussion amongst US–UK policy-makers, and 
the final decision to upgrade Polaris (in November 1973) confirmed that the 
US–UK nuclear relationship would continue in spite of  the prime minister’s 
flirtation with the idea of  an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent.2
Such information should not lead to a total reversal of  our understand-
ing of  the Nixon–Heath years. Whatever was stated publicly to the contrary, 
Heath’s government remained suspicious of  Nixon’s détente policies. In 
particular, there was a constant concern that superpower cooperation could 
morph into superpower condominium, and the secretive fashion in which the 
US–PRC rapprochement was conducted only increased London’s suspicions. 
US–Soviet negotiations concerning SALT were viewed with particular trepida-
tion because Heath’s government believed it could result in the curtailment 
of  US–UK nuclear cooperation. Such concerns had a direct impact on British 
nuclear policy and Heath’s nuclear overtures to France, and the final decision 
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to opt for the Chevaline upgrade to Polaris, were driven, in part, by a concern 
that SALT would limit US–UK nuclear cooperation.3 
Other elements of  détente, especially the CSCE and MBFR negotiations, were 
another source of  disagreement for US and UK policy-makers. To be sure, the 
Nixon and Heath governments were in agreement about the undesirability of  
both projects. Nixon and Kissinger viewed the CSCE with derision, and this was 
something that British officials largely shared. Nonetheless, there existed a point 
of  clear difference between US and UK policy. Nixon saw the CSCE as a potential 
avenue for pressuring Soviet foreign policy in other areas deemed more impor-
tant to US interests. Thus, the CSCE was initially directly linked to reaching a 
Berlin settlement and, when this was concluded in 1971, the CSCE was linked to 
progress on SALT and MBFR. Heath’s government viewed the CSCE differently. As 
détente improved East–West relations, it was believed that the CSCE would inevi-
tably be concluded. It was, as Douglas-Home noted, ‘unavoidable’.4 Accordingly, 
Heath sought to settle the CSCE as quickly as possible as a way of  ensuring that 
the CSCE would not actually deal with anything deemed to be of  extreme impor-
tance. This was clearly at variance with US policy and, as such, between 1970 
and 1972 this was a continued source of  divergence in US and UK policy.
MBFR was an area of  deeper concern for both US and UK policy-makers. 
If  not handled correctly, the British government believed MBFR could criti-
cally undermine NATO, and Heath wanted the issues surrounding MBFR to 
be vigorously analysed within NATO. Only once this had been accomplished 
would NATO undertake serious discussions with the Warsaw Pact. Nixon 
initially gave little attention to the concept, but by 1971 – due to a mixture of  
domestic, international and economic motives – the president gave the idea 
more interest. US policy was designed to press forward with the idea whilst the 
British continued to debate the merits of  the negotiation.
In existing accounts, SALT, MBFR and the CSCE are often depicted as 
being major sources of  antagonism for US–UK relations.5 Certainly they were 
subjects where differences were apparent, but the point that should be remem-
bered is that they were matters to be negotiated. Difference of  opinion, in and of  
itself, does not indicate that US–UK relations were in a crisis. Rather, it merely 
demonstrates that states have differing interpretations on matters. Indeed, 
throughout 1969–72 US–UK officials engaged in detailed bilateral discussions 
on these topics. It was only in 1973–74 when wider US–UK political differences 
intensified that these differences assumed greater importance. Where US–UK 
differences on MBFR were once viewed as natural policy divergences that could 
be negotiated, they were now seen as further proof  of  a more uncooperative 
US−UK relationship. Kissinger and Schlesinger viewed British differences as 
indicative of  wider British attempts to undermine US foreign policy. Initially, 
however, they were viewed as natural points to be debated amongst allies. It is 
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within this context that US–UK differences on international diplomacy can be 
properly understood.
Britain’s future role
In the opinion of  the Nixon White House, several aspects of  Heath’s foreign 
policy were regrettable. Nixon had enthusiastically welcomed Heath’s elec-
tion in June 1970, believing that he would reverse Britain’s global decline – a 
point which he felt had only undermined US interests because ‘the United States 
would by necessity be forced to “go it alone” in the foreign policy leadership 
of  the free world’.6 Nixon’s hopes for Heath were misplaced as Heath funda-
mentally endorsed Wilson’s East of  Suez withdrawal in his much-anticipated 
defence review of  1970. From Washington’s perspective this was an annoyance 
given that the Nixon Doctrine aspired to reduce America’s global commit-
ments, and their attempts to promote burden-sharing and improve NATO’s 
conventional forces were also dealt a further blow. Nonetheless, at this stage, 
the president accepted the British decision philosophically because he accepted 
that Britain still contributed, as a proportion of  GDP, the most of  any European 
state to NATO. Polaris had been kept, intelligence facilities in Cyprus remained 
and the UK’s other global bases, notably in Diego Garcia, were also retained. 
As Kissinger concluded, Heath’s government was ‘doing as much as they can’.7 
Heath’s overriding foreign policy priority was to obtain British membership 
of  the EEC but he did not view it as a zero sum game. He had no intention of  
ending aspects of  US–UK bilateralism which remained relevant for promoting 
British interests. The objective was, as Douglas-Home articulated, to have the 
‘best of  both worlds’.8 By the end of  1972, Heath had managed to achieve his 
main foreign policy objective. Britain, at the third time of  trying, had attained 
membership of  the EEC. For the Nixon administration this was perceived as 
potentially troublesome. The US had traditionally supported British membership 
of  the EEC yet Nixon would come to question this. His economic advisers persis-
tently warned about the economic challenges that EEC expansion would pose 
for US interests and the international economic policies pursued by the presi-
dent would only further enflame US–EEC economic competition. In 1971, the 
implementation of  a 10 per cent surcharge on imports and the refusal to convert 
dollar-gold transactions demonstrated Nixon’s determination to safeguard US 
economic interests. Therefore, the expansion of  the EEC was largely seen by the 
president as an economic competitor, rather than as a potential partner.9 
For Nixon, however, the political, rather than economic, consequences 
of  British EEC membership were more important. Here, Kissinger provided 
Nixon with several areas where future problems could arise. An ‘independent 
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Europe could prove to be a competitive power center with the US,’ Kissinger 
warned. Nixon feared that the US was potentially losing a close British ally in 
which confidential and close matters could be discussed. In its place was an 
enlarged EEC, built on cooler ties and with no foreign policy machinery to work 
through.10 Ultimately, despite these concerns, Nixon endorsed British member-
ship of  the EEC and even offered clandestine assistance for aiding the UK–EEC 
negotiations. As Nixon concluded, the US could do very little to prevent British 
membership of  the EEC and, more importantly, he believed British member-
ship could potentially benefit US interests in the longer term as it could turn 
the EEC into an ‘entity’.11 More simply put, the EEC could become a more equi-
table partner within the Western alliance which would advance the cause of  
burden-sharing and promote the Nixon Doctrine’s wider aspiration of  lessen-
ing direct US involvement globally. 
The year 1973–74 illustrated how misdirected such thinking was. 
Predictions from the likes of  Kissinger that EEC expansion would mark the onset 
of  a more competitive relationship were proving to be accurate. Kissinger’s 
warnings that the EEC’s lack of  foreign policy apparatus would prohibit easy 
bilateral relations were clearly highlighted during his ‘Year of  Europe’. So too 
was Kissinger’s fear that US–UK bilateral contact would be less easy now that 
Britain was a member of  the EEC. Kissinger’s wider concern that the EEC would 
actually challenge US primacy within the Western alliance was also apparent, 
as the EEC refused to cede to American demands that a higher degree of  linkage 
between economic and political matters should be implemented. When the 
EEC sought a separate policy initiative towards the Arab–Israeli conflict which 
directly contradicted US policy at the end of  1973, it was with some justifica-
tion that US policy-makers lamented the expansion of  the EEC.
It was Kissinger’s ‘Year of  Europe’, however, that sparked considerable US–
UK disagreement. The ‘Year of  Europe’ initially illustrated procedural problems 
for US–UK interaction now that Britain was a member of  the EEC, especially in 
regard to how the US would negotiate the Declaration of  Principles. Kissinger 
desired to operate bilaterally with European governments and Heath’s govern-
ment, whilst indicating a willingness to follow this course, soon backtracked. 
The prime minister wanted the EEC to unify a common position, and, once this 
was achieved, negotiate with the US as a collective.
Procedural issues aside, fundamental differences divided US and UK policy 
throughout the ‘Year of  Europe’. Most alarming yet, for US–UK relations, was 
that Heath and his senior advisers suspected Kissinger’s ‘Year of  Europe’ had 
rather more sinister objectives than those claimed, believing it was the inten-
tion of  the US to divide and rule the nascent common foreign policy of  the 
EEC. While several scholars have accepted this was Kissinger’s objective, there 
is very little evidence to support such an interpretation. Kissinger certainly 
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wanted more from the ‘Year of  Europe’ than his stated intentions to improve 
NATO’s forces and provide a symbolic gesture of  Atlantic solidarity. Indeed, US 
policy was designed so that direct linkage was made between US–EEC economic 
and political interaction. More simply, the Nixon–Kissinger theory of  linkage, 
primarily driving US foreign policy vis-à-vis the USSR, was to be applied to 
US–EEC relations. 
It is this crucial point which really created discord amongst US and UK 
policy-makers. Heath did not want this conceptualised approach applied to 
US–EEC relations, because he feared that the US would exploit its security guar-
antees to Europe as a means of  extracting more amenable trade and economic 
agreements with the EEC. Moreover, Heath did not want the US to influence 
EEC policies which were at a formative stage. Subsequently, Heath’s govern-
ment sought to resist US policy and did this initially when he let it be known 
that any US–UK discussions pertaining to the Declaration of  Principles would 
be transmitted to Britain’s EEC partners. Following French pressure, and 
further evidence that Kissinger’s real motivations were less altruistic than 
he presented, Heath suspended all US–UK discussion about the declaration. 
As Heath informed the US, they would simply have to wait until the EEC had 
formulated a common position before negotiations could proceed further.
Heath’s actions were viewed with incredulity in Washington, because his 
policy was effectively scuppering any hope of  a quick foreign policy success 
– which Nixon personally wanted to distract attention from his Watergate 
troubles. More substantively, Heath’s decision was seen to mark the end of  
close US–UK diplomacy, and both Nixon and Kissinger talked about the end of  
the ‘special relationship’.12 However, Kissinger was determined that his decla-
ration be created along the lines he sought, and therefore exerted bilateral 
pressure upon Britain to achieve this. This took the form of  US–UK intelli-
gence and nuclear cooperation being suspended temporarily. Such tactics soon 
yielded results for Kissinger, and Heath reversed his policy that US–UK discus-
sions on the declaration could not occur. Indeed, such was the pressure put on 
the British government that Heath not only allowed US–UK discussion on the 
declaration, but he also provided the US with reports about UK–EEC discus-
sions about the declaration.
By the beginning of  October, the EEC had produced a draft declaration, and 
British officials were also discussing the declaration with their US counterparts. 
US–UK relations were, at some level then, recovering from their summer of  hostil-
ity. The outbreak of  the fourth Arab–Israeli war was soon to ruin any hopes of  
relations being quickly repaired. During the war, Heath was foremost concerned 
with protecting Britain’s oil supplies, but he also envisaged an Arab–Israeli 
settlement that would follow the general outlines of  UN Resolution 242. The 
conflict for Heath presented both difficulties and opportunities but, by adopting 
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a neutralist stance towards the war, Heath believed he could bolster his chances 
of  producing an Arab–Israeli settlement as well as protect Britain’s oil supplies.
Oil, whilst of  course not unimportant in the American opinion, was of  second-
ary concern to larger geopolitical factors. The greatest concern for Washington, 
then, was the likely reaction of  the USSR, and the peace settlement that the 
US sought was designed to largely omit them from the region. US policy was 
predicated upon the assumption that Israel would be militarily dominant at the 
end of  the war, because this would ensure that the Arab states would negotiate. 
In turn, because of  the severe losses induced by the surprise Egyptian–Syrian 
assault, Kissinger believed this would make Israel more susceptible to American 
pressure to negotiate a lasting political settlement with its Arab neighbours. 
Accordingly, presenting America as the only power able to broker a peace deal 
would prise Soviet influence away from its Arab allies.13 
Given these radically different agendas it was always likely that US and UK 
policy would come into conflict. This quickly manifested when the British 
refused to table in the UNSC Kissinger’s ceasefire proposals that were predi-
cated upon the idea that all belligerents returned to the status quo ante bellum. 
In effect, the land occupied by Israel in 1967, and now re-captured by Egyptian 
and Syrian forces, would have to be given back to Israel. Heath believed that 
supporting this would be perceived as a pro-Israeli act by the Arab states, and 
his attempts to pursue a neutral course would be undermined. Heath would 
again infuriate Washington when he refused to allow US reconnaissance 
aircraft to fly from British bases in Cyprus to survey the warzone. The US airlift 
to Israel similarly was not allowed to utilise British air bases.
This level of  disagreement was to be dwarfed by the ramifications that 
emanated from the aftermath of  the DEFCON III decision. While Kissinger had 
informed Cromer of  this decision, it was never communicated to the prime 
minister. Further, Heath believed the US was endangering all of  the Western 
alliance without even consulting those states which would be affected by such 
a decision. Moving to DEFCON III was also viewed by Heath as a gross overreac-
tion to the situation, and he believed it was largely driven by Nixon’s Watergate 
induced troubles. 
Heath’s distancing from US policy had serious consequences for British 
interests when the US once again temporarily suspended its intelligence coop-
eration with London. This was done as a form of  punishment, but Kissinger’s 
ideas for longer-term punishments were never implemented. A series of  possi-
ble ‘pressure points’ drawn up for Kissinger all concluded that the cancellation 
of  bilateral security cooperation would only undermine US interests. This 
Kissinger accepted and, when a British request for additional assistance in 
upgrading Polaris was made at the beginning of  January 1974, this was duly 
approved. 
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The Washington Energy Conference was a watershed for US foreign policy 
towards the enlarged EEC and Britain. It was seen as a lesson in the Nixon White 
House in how to conduct future diplomacy with its allies. In particular, the US 
had learned that by utilising a number of  tactics, including the temporary cancel-
lation of  nuclear and intelligence cooperation, they had managed to ensure 
that the British would, if  forced, operate bilaterally with the US in opposition to 
Heath’s desire to formulate common EEC political and foreign policies. As shown 
in Chapter 3, US bilateral pressure on British interests could have profound effects 
upon the direction of  British foreign policy. It is the coercive elements in US diplo-
macy towards its British ally that are currently omitted from existing accounts of  
the Nixon–Heath years. Yet, as shown above, this was a feature of  the relation-
ship, and, more importantly, was an element of  US policy that had considerable 
success at influencing the course of  London’s policy decisions. 
The year 1973–74 was a difficult one for US–UK relations as disagree-
ment, suspicion and recrimination dominated the relationship. Nonetheless, 
other areas of  US–UK interaction indicate that such an analysis must be 
tempered somewhat. Kissinger tasked Thomas Brimelow with drafting a US–
USSR treaty which eventually manifested as the ‘Agreement on the Prevention 
of  Nuclear War (signed in Washington DC on 22 June 1973). Even though 
senior British officials enjoyed an often fraught relationship with Kissinger, this 
did not prevent the continuation of  close cooperation. The choice in upgrad-
ing Polaris, of  course informed by a concern about the future reliability of  
US nuclear cooperation, did cement US–UK ties.14 Heath had also illustrated 
during the Washington Energy Conference his propensity for close US–UK 
cooperation when he believed that it would better suit UK interests. Indeed, the 
EEC’s disunity at the Washington Energy Conference dealt a blow to Heath’s 
wider aspiration of  producing common EEC policies.
Accordingly, a rather more mixed assessment of  the Nixon–Heath years than 
currently exists is required. US–UK relations undoubtedly witnessed severe 
problems and adapting to British membership of  the EEC created numerous 
difficulties. Détente and the subsequent diplomacy it created – be it the CSCE, 
MBFR or SALT – continued to be points of  US–UK disagreement. Yet in other 
realms US–UK cooperation remained remarkably close and consistent. Thus, 
the portrayal of  the US–UK relationship in the Nixon–Heath period must be 
one that emphasises discord, cooperation and diplomatic coercion.
Wilson’s return
Wilson’s return to office saw renewed efforts to re-establish closer US–UK 
relations. Both Wilson and Callaghan were much cooler towards the EEC 
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and, whilst the renegotiation of  the terms of  EEC entry were mainly a facade 
generated by Wilson to appease his domestic critics, it did signal Wilson’s inten-
tion to refocus upon US–UK relations. This, Wilson believed, would allow Britain 
to influence US policy more directly, whilst accepting that EEC membership would 
allow Britain to derive a number of  economic benefits. Indeed, what Wilson had 
sought in the 1960s was the basis of  his foreign policy throughout the 1970s.
Wilson’s defence cutbacks, coupled with Britain’s economic troubles, were 
to undermine his foreign policy ambitions. US–UK relations were blighted 
by Britain’s chronic economic problems and the unwillingness of  Wilson to 
maintain Britain’s defence efforts. However, as previous studies have illus-
trated, Wilson’s defence cuts had little effect on the more practical aspects of  
US–UK defence cooperation.15 Such arguments are correct but, given what 
new material from the archives highlights, this analysis requires further qual-
ification. Firstly, US–UK nuclear and intelligence cooperation was utilised by 
the Ford administration to influence the scope of  British defence cuts, and the 
nature of  US–UK cooperation exposed the British to this type of  US pressure. 
This was evident during Wilson’s decision to retain Britain’s intelligence facil-
ities in Cyprus when he had initially wanted to close them yet, following US 
opposition, the British prime minister reversed his decision. On other occa-
sions US efforts were rather less successful. Wilson enacted defence cuts even 
when Kissinger and Schlesinger threatened to permanently suspend nuclear 
and intelligence assistance. Wilson calculated, correctly, that the US would not 
terminate this cooperation because it enhanced US interests. In sum, the coer-
cive diplomacy practised by the US at this juncture was rather less successful 
than its practitioners hoped for. Nevertheless, the fact that this coercive diplo-
macy existed is telling about the fashion in which the ‘special relationship’ was 
viewed by both the Nixon and Ford administrations. 
Callaghan and Ford
Callaghan’s first ten months in office were dominated by Britain’s economic 
crisis. Due to Britain’s worsening recession, the speculative attacks on ster-
ling and the growing rate of  the PSBR, Callaghan had to seek an IMF loan. 
The greatest concern for the prime minister was to avoid having to accept a 
loan that insisted on a significant reduction in Britain’s PSBR. Callaghan also 
wanted a safety net loan from the G10 to defend sterling from currency specu-
lation. In order to obtain all of  this, Callaghan wanted the Ford administration 
to pressure the IMF into providing Britain with preferential loan conditions. 
This, he believed, would be forthcoming because of  Britain’s military and stra-
tegic importance to the US.
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This was a fatal misjudgement by Callaghan. His appeals to Ford, Kissinger 
and Scowcroft ultimately failed to deliver the type of  results he wanted. Ford’s 
political advisers did not believe Britain warranted preferential economic treat-
ment. Meanwhile, Ford’s economic advisers believed the IMF’s demand that 
Britain significantly reduce its PSBR was a necessity and, moreover, in Britain’s 
long-term interests. Consequently, the Ford administration refused to intercede 
in the UK–IMF negotiations.
The IMF crisis illustrated a lack of  US–UK cooperation in the form that 
Callaghan wanted. Nevertheless, as other commentators have noted, the more 
institutionalised aspects of  US–UK cooperation continued to function smoothly 
in this period.16 Even in spite of  this, it is apparent that the courting of  the 
US–UK special relationship – at first by Wilson, and then pursued by Callaghan 
– had failed to provide the political influence within Washington when London 
needed it most. The Daily Telegraph, in its review of  1976, captured Britain’s 
declined position rather well when it noted: ‘Thus 1976 ends in total disarray, 
and perhaps the only consolation to the bewildered onlooker is that the farce is 
now rapidly drawing to its close, and a dénouement at hand.’17 Of  course, the 
British foreign policy-making establishment did not articulate British decline in 
such a manner. But one FCO briefing memorandum for David Owen, appointed 
foreign and commonwealth secretary in February 1977, articulated a very 
similar point about the continuing significance of  the US–UK relationship:
During the last administration our relations with the US were generally 
good, due both to mutual interest and to the close relationship which Mr 
Callaghan and later Mr Crosland developed with Dr Kissinger … But even at 
the height of  the good relationship with Dr Kissinger, the relationship was 
no longer an exclusive one: the FRG now matters as much to the US as does 
the UK, and even US–French relations are on a firmer setting.18
Conclusion
This then serves as an interesting episode in which to draw some broader 
conclusions about the nature of  the US–UK relationship. Certainly the idea 
that the most ‘special’ aspects of  the relationship were immune to the ‘tran-
sitory’ effects of  politics is a highly questionable one, given that intelligence 
and nuclear cooperation were to be affected because of  political disputes in this 
period.19 However, longer-term consequences were avoided. Despite the level 
of  political dissatisfaction in Washington towards their British ally, the US–UK 
relationship was still deemed to promote US interests. It is quite clear from this 
period that the ‘functional’ aspects of  the US–UK relationship triumphed over 
any short-term political differences. 
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The other striking feature of  this period was the level of  coercion that US 
policy-makers practised in their diplomacy towards their British ally. The 
vast number of  studies on the diplomacy of  the Nixon–Kissinger–Ford years 
usually associates this practice with US foes. However, this study has shown 
that coercion was part and parcel of  US alliance diplomacy also. Studies on 
US–UK relations during the years under study here omit this element of  the 
relationship altogether.20 Of  course, it should be remembered that coercion 
in US diplomacy was not the dominant theme in US–UK relations. Indeed, 
quite the opposite was the case, as diplomatic cooperation on a number 
of  issues – along with security cooperation – was far more common than 
coercive diplomacy was. 
Further to this, when coercion was utilised by the US it had quite mixed 
results. It was most successful during the ‘Year of  Europe’ period when US 
pressure was able to reverse Heath’s policy course. Likewise, US pressure later 
on in the year was to have a profound influence upon Heath’s wider European 
ambitions, when he chose to side with the US at the Washington Energy 
Conference. Given such success, then, it was only ever likely that US policy-
makers would seek to utilise coercive diplomacy in future political disputes 
with the UK. Yet the government of  Harold Wilson proved itself  far more resil-
ient to US pressure. In fact, Wilson had a far more accurate understanding of  
the dimensions of  power in the US–UK relationship. Whilst aware that the US 
could retract its intelligence and nuclear cooperation, he correctly concluded 
that the US would never do this because it actually promoted US interests. 
Wilson, far more so than Heath, understood the functional aspects of  the US–
UK relationship.
Whilst the US–UK relationship declined in importance during this period, 
in both the international arena and as an aspect of  bilateral relations between 
the two states, it did not mark a terminal decline for the US–UK relationship 
either. With the Soviet invasion of  Afghanistan (1979), the onset of  more belli-
cose US–Soviet relations, the coup in Iran by Islamic fundamentalists (1979) 
and the steadily worsening US economy, US–UK interaction and cooperation 
increased.21 As John Dumbrell points out, the US–UK relationship was forged 
in war, and is at its most ‘special’ during such moments.22 As readers will note, 
the US–UK ‘special relationship’, for better or worse, continues to function 
within the contemporary world of  international relations. 
Détente, therefore, was a curious phenomenon in which the US–UK relation-
ship was to operate. Throughout, there was – as a former British ambassador 
to the US noted of  the entire US–UK relationship – a level of  ‘mutual assured 
schizophrenia’ which permeated the relationship in this period.23 Even so, 
US–UK cooperation remained remarkably consistent despite numerous policy 
clashes and differences throughout 1969–77. Perhaps Kissinger sums up the 
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relationship best: ‘Nobody ever said that the special relationship precluded 
disagreements’ but ‘we had a degree of  confidence in British leaders that we 
did not have in leaders of  any other country’.24
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